DISSENT

Civil Disobedience and "Resistance"

a symposium on morality & tactics of the antiwar movement—Hilary Putnam, Arnold Kaufman, Robert Pickus, Henry Pachter

DENNIS WRONG
Negotiations &/or
Withdrawal?

STEPHAN THERNSTROM
Is There Really
a New Poor?

JAMES TOBACK
Bonnie & Clyde:
Style as Morality

IRVING HOWE
On "Bourgeois
Civil Liberties"

JAMES McPHERSON
William Styron
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MICHAEL WALZER
Radical Politics
in the Welfare State

RICHARD HOFSTADTER
Charles Beard &
the Founding Fathers

LEWIS COSER
Régis Debray—
Nechayev in the Andes

MICHAEL HARRINGTON
Can Private Industry
Abolish the Slums?

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1968

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DISSENT

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JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1968

DISSENT is a journal devoted to the ideas and values of democratic socialism. It seeks to serve as a forum for writers devoted to these ideas and values, while also welcoming a wide variety of other opinions. Each writer speaks for himself; there is no effort made to exact editorial consensus or uniformity.

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Potpourri

Senator McCarthy's Challenge

THAT SENATOR EUGENE MCCARTHY will wrest the Democratic nomination from the President seems an extremely remote possibility. Yet that is by no means the crucial aspect of his challenge. Nor is it, so far, crucial that he has failed to offer a precise program for ending the war in Vietnam. What matters right now is that he has decided to stand up to the President on the *need* for ending the war, the need for a sharp turn in American policy—which means, first of all, an end to the bombing of North Vietnam.

There is not much reason to expect that McCarthy's primary challenges will force the Administration to stop the madness of escalation. Mounting dissent has clearly put the Administration in a defensive position and has significantly cracked the consensus of its support; but it has not yet provoked any sign that an indefensible policy is being abandoned. Still, the effort to oppose idiocy and wickedness remains worth making.

One has to see how the President, consummate politician that he is reputed to be, will react if hurt in his political pocketbook. Dissenting Democrats will, by McCarthy's decision, have an opportunity to declare themselves for an alternative that does not sabotage what is decent in the ongoing program of social welfare (as, let us say, a Reagan or Nixon option well might).

That a certain risk is involved here we might as well recognize. The result of the primary confrontations might be to sustain the power of the hawks and give Johnson a green light for further escalation. But short of political surrender in advance, there is really no way of avoiding that danger—and right now, all the evidence seems to indicate a growing weariness with the war, if not yet a clear political outcome of that weariness.

Meanwhile, it is very good that at least in some primaries there will be a choice on the single most important issue in American politics today.

E. G.

After All, She Could Always Find Another Husband

". . . MOU-MAO-HSIU, a worker's wife, was rushing water to the fire when suddenly someone shouted to her: 'Your husband Heng Szu-shu is injured!' She abruptly recalled what her husband had told her that morning before going to work: 'We're out for the *gas tiger* today! If anything should happen, remember to save the state's property first.' Without the state's interests, she continued in her mind, there can be no personal interests. She just could not dash off to see her husband and stayed on to carry water.

"A little later, somebody urgently cried out again: 'Mou Mao-hsiu! Hurry up and go to your husband! He's hurt badly!'

"Mou Mao-hsiu's heart throbbed, the water almost spilled out of the container she was holding. She thought to herself: Should I go? At this moment, she saw some of the injured men pick themselves up from the ground and rush in front of her to the fire. Such heroism sustained her, and she became calm. 'No, I cannot leave my post. *Wherever there is struggle there is sacrifice.*'

"She quickened her steps as she brought water and barite powder to extinguish the flames."

—*Peking Review*, September 30, 1966

Geneology of Morals

SOME WEEKS AGO Andrew Kopkind, one of the more frenetic journalists speaking on behalf of the New Left, wrote in the *New York Review of Books*: "Morality, like poli-

(*Continued on page 95*)

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Dennis H. Wrong

Negotiations, Withdrawal, or What?

ONE SENSES THAT THE DOVES have won, or at least have gone far toward winning, the battle to influence public opinion. A mood of dissatisfaction with the war and unwillingness to approve any further escalation has begun to take hold. The signs are scattered but all point in the same direction: the opinion polls, some election returns last month, and, most of all, the behavior of the politicians, both those in the running for the Presidency and those up for lesser offices next year, and, perhaps more significantly, even some formerly hawkish Senators who are not up for reelection. Even Nixon, of all people, is now being touted by many of his backers less as a militant hawk than as a cool, experienced professional in dealing with international affairs.

To be sure, the war goes on and the Administration defends its policies with great heat. And it remains entirely possible that the Administration will escalate again in the hope of "winning" the war before next year's elections. Whether or not this is the meaning, or will prove to be the consequence, of McNamara's impending departure from the Pentagon remains unclear at the time of writing. If this should happen, the opponents of the war will be confronted with an entirely new situation.

Already militants in the peace movement, frustrated by their failure to end the war, are advocating active "resistance" in place of legal protests and demonstrations as the only effective answer to the Administration's rigidity. But if there is no further escalation in the immediate future, then the new mood of the country surely indicates that the most effective way of opposing the war at the present time is the most traditional and "square" method of all: political activity, electioneering. If an unambiguous dove could outpoll a field that included Shirley Temple in a district like San Mateo, the possibility of electing peace candidates is a real one throughout the country. And now that Senator Eugene McCarthy is challenging the President in several primaries on the war alone, the issue is joined on the highest level.

ONE MAY PROPERLY FEEL that the war is such an abomination that moral protests against it are their own justification and that the protesters, as Mary McCarthy has argued, are under no obligation to offer a "solution" to the situation in Vietnam. But if we are to be politically effective in taking advantage of the rising opposition to the war, the terms of opposition will *have* to be considered because much of the public is by no means indifferent to them. Evidently, many people are alarmed at the prospect of further escalation and/or a confrontation with China, fed up with the Saigon government, favorably disposed toward ending the bombing and reducing troop commitments, and ready to approve direct negotiations with the NLF.

But for better or worse they are not prepared to support unilateral American withdrawal without negotiations—they still hope for something that can be called an "honorable" peace, a peace that will not make the lives lost in the war appear to have been lost in vain or that will not look like a total American backing down. Surely, many such people would have found it possible to vote for the antiwar referenda in San Francisco and Cambridge if the wording of the resolutions had not called for "immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam" with no reference at all to preceding negotiations. The San Francisco resolution went on to imply that the United States had no business at all in Vietnam. Given this wording, it is amazing that a third of the voters nevertheless supported the resolution; but even the people who had fought to get it on

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the ballot conceded afterwards that a different wording would probably have produced a far larger vote in its favor.

WE SHALL HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT, then, the sensitivities of the newly restive audience if we are to evoke an electoral response that may lead to an end to the fighting. That is why, in a situation where for the first time the mood of the country seems to be turning in a favorable direction, we believe that the central emphasis of the peace movement must continue to be a demand for cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam, coupled with an immediate and serious offer to negotiate with the NLF. The idea of such negotiations should be linked with the prospect of a phased withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Vietnam and some kind of provision for political self-determination, perhaps under international auspices, by the South Vietnamese.

It is now sometimes said that in case the U.S. ceases the bombing, and Hanoi and the NLF then refuse to enter negotiations, that will raise new dangers of escalation by the U.S. Perhaps so; but that is a problem to be faced only after we have succeeded in getting the U.S. to take the indispensable preliminary step of ceasing the bombing and offering negotiations. To get that far would be a victory for the peace movement, a victory by no means assured but tremendously to be desired.

IRREGULARITIES IN THE PERFORMANCE OF PAINTING CONTRACTS ON FEDERAL FACILITIES IN THE WASHINGTON AREA

"One coat instead of two was used on a repainting job last year at CIA's headquarters in Langley. That job was done at night under such secrecy that union stewards were not allowed inside to make sure the painters' contract was not violated."

Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Ninetieth Congress 1st Session
June 22, 1967

Michael Harrington

Can Private Industry Abolish Slums?

The following article is a slightly revised version of testimony presented this fall at a hearing of the National Commission on Urban Problems.

MANY WELL-INTENTIONED AMERICANS are deceiving themselves and the public when they speak of abolishing the slums. The slums can be abolished, but not in the way they suggest.

A number of programs have been proposed to end the scandal of inhuman housing for the poor. I specifically want to address myself to the theory that some kind of partnership between government and the private sector will solve the problem, because I believe that this theory is an illusion. It will not work.

Although my analysis is radical, it can be documented in the official statements of the United States government.

The Council of the White House Conference on Civil Rights said that the United States must build 2 million housing units a year, with at least 500,000 especially designed for the poor, if it is going to live up to its responsibilities.

President Johnson this year proposed building 165,000 low-cost housing units, or 335,000 less than the White House Conference minimum. If past experience is any guide, the actual number constructed will come to a bit over 30,000, or a deficit of 470,000 units.

Moreover, none of the proposals now being discussed come near to the required number. For example, Senator Robert Kennedy's approach is clearly motivated by great compassion, yet it would only provide 400,000 units over seven years through a $1.5 billion tax subsidy to private enterprise.

There can be no creative federalist panacea, enlisting business in a social crusade, that will deal with this problem. The corporate sector, as Mr. David Rockefeller testified with great candor before the Ribicoff Subcommittee, is concerned with making money. Banks, and

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other business institutions, will only invest funds if they are going to get a return.

Yet the slums are, in business terms, a bad risk. Until August of 1967, the FHA excluded blighted areas from its mortgage insurance programs on the grounds that such undertakings were "economically unsound." I assume that the bloodshed in Detroit motivated the revision of this policy in August 1967. A governmental agency can thus decide, in the name of public social priorities, to make an "uneconomic" investment of money. A private enterprise will not and cannot.

Nor can this problem be dealt with by providing public subsidies to private builders. All such proposals now before the country—from Senators Percy and Robert Kennedy among others—are designed to operate on a publicly supported profit principle. Yet even with this federal support through tax incentives or artificial interest rates, every one of these suggestions ends up providing housing for families with incomes well over $4,000 a year.

There is certainly a need to give governmental support to the housing needs of people with incomes between $4,000 and $8,000. It is one of the great postwar scandals that lavish, but discrete, subsidies have been provided for the homes of the middle class and the rich in the form of cheap, federally guaranteed credit, income tax deductions, and other genteel doles which effectively exclude everyone with incomes of less than $8,000 from the benefits.

But the fact remains that the Kennedy and Percy proposals, if the published reports of their rent levels are correct, would not provide any housing for the poor and the almost-poor. The rents would be too high for, among others, the majority of Negroes in the United States.

And even if some way were found to bring the private sector into the slums, it could not and should not play the leading role. It is precisely the commercial calculus of land value that has exacerbated our crisis and can hardly solve it. As Mayor Lindsay's task force on urban design reported to him, beauty, charm, and history cannot compete with office buildings, and even a venerable structure like the Plaza Hotel will be torn down if present trends continue. Within the framework of such an "economic" approach, one builds most cheaply and profitably, while social and aesthetic considerations are secondary.

THE ISSUE RAISED here is simple: Who is going to design the "second America" President Johnson tells us we must build between now and the year 2000? We must construct more housing units than now exist. How? I submit that businessmen, whatever other qualifications they have, are not competent to design a new civilization and, in any case, have no democratic right to do so. The fundamental decisions on what America shall look like and what life in it will be like should be made by the people. And this is particularly important in the case of the slum poor, who have been excluded from the making of every important decision in the nation.

In arguing thus, I do not want to suggest that there is no role for the private sector. It is just that the social and aesthetic choices—those "uneconomic" options—must be democratically planned and, because of the logic of money-making, publicly financed. Then, and only then, can the companies and corporations contract to carry out the public will; but they should not determine it.

The necessity of such innovation cannot be evaded by magic schemes for "rehabilitation." The worst of our urban slums are criminally overcrowded. To rehabilitate them successfully would mean removing half to three-quarters of the people now living there to new housing. Moreover, the rehabilitation formulas often take the reality of segregation as a given.

I believe that our present crisis allows this country a marvelous opportunity to promote racial integration.

In fact if not in theory, our postwar housing has financed segregated, white suburbs. Now that the government has officially recognized that we must more than double the present supply of housing in the next third of a century, there is the possibility of reversing this ugly policy. There should not be one federal cent for "new towns," either outside of the present metropolitan areas or within them, that are not designed to promote racial integration.

And this points up the need for new public institutions of democratic planning. Our postwar housing deficit is not measured in simple terms of our scandalous discrimination in fa-

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vor of the rich and against the poor; it is a matter of the failure of the democratic imagination as well. Without thought of social or aesthetic consequences, we have proliferated superhighways and suburbs and made slums more miserable, employment more distant for the poor, old age more lonely for those left behind in the central city, and so on.

There is obviously no simple solution to such a complex crisis. But we should start immediately by adopting Senator Ribicoff's proposal of last January and spend approximately a billion dollars on finding out what we want to do. This would be a wiser investment, as the Senator suggested, than the present Model Cities program. (The monies which Ribicoff spoke of were the $287 million budgeted for three years of the Demonstration City program.) We cannot go on forever "demonstrating" techniques and leaving the main problem areas untouched.

And in the process of such a massive planning expenditure, every level of American society should be involved in the debate. I do not say this simply out of democratic conviction or populist sentimentality. For I am convinced that where decisions on public subsidy are made at high levels of expertise, there the priorities of money, rather than those of society, prevail. There is only one way of establishing the social and aesthetic values which will guide the "uneconomic" expenditure of money. That is through democracy.

IN SUMMARY, we know that we have to build 500,000 units of housing for the poor every year. We are not doing so.

- In market terms, business cannot be expected to go into the job of slum eradication because it is a bad risk.
- Even if the market terms are modified by federal subsidy, as in various proposals now before the nation, all the poor and the majority of Negroes would be effectively excluded from the benefits.
- There must, therefore, be an "uneconomic" investment of public funds motivated by considerations of social and aesthetic values rather than by a calculus of private profit.
- In this process, the private sector must play a subordinate role as the contractor for the popular will. For the basic decisions involved are not susceptible to business priorities and even hostile to them. These are issues in the public sector of American life.
- Moreover, the urban crisis *allows* the country a chance to use federal funds to promote, rather than, as has been the case until now, to thwart racial integration.
- Finally, the enormous undertaking I outline here clearly requires new public institutions for democratic planning. There is no other way to design a new civilization.

Stanley Plastrik

Making the Teachers America's Scapegoat

THE "LONG, HOT SUMMER" of racial turmoil was succeeded by the short but intense autumn of teachers' struggles. In a series of cities and states tens of thousands of teachers fought for union recognition, an improvement in school conditions, and the beginning of a voice in determining school policies.

What has led to this new militancy among the teachers, apart from such obvious factors as grossly inadequate salaries? The teacher's feelings that his worth as a professional goes unrecognized, and that he is being turned into a scapegoat, are partly responsible for the notorious shortcomings in our educational system. This new militancy of the teachers, in turn, provokes hostile reactions on the part of other groups concerned with education (parents, community organizations, etc.), and we now find ourselves in the unhappy situation where competing "militancies," each with authentic concerns, struggle at cross-purposes.

Most teachers' strikes took place in metropolitan centers, which indicates a close link with ghetto and urban problems. This also explains why feelings of outrage and even of desperation were at work. If the cities are explosive, the subject of education is dynamite. Old institutions are hard to change, and public education is among our very oldest; that is, it is most hide-bound, most bureaucratized, most burdened with conflicting interest-groups —and most in need of drastic reforms.

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THE TEACHERS, as they finally come into their own, are bound to step on some people's toes. Ghetto parents, filled with anxiety about the future of their children, are particularly prone to blame teachers for the damage wrought by the whole society. In asserting themselves, teachers ought to be aware of this problem. Their message to parents must be that an improvement in teachers' condition and status will show up in improved teaching and education; in short, that there is really no "conflict of interests."

If we have given up the notion popular during the days of "progressive education" that the school has the power to make over a deficient society, we still cling to an even more deeply imbedded notion that education is *the* road to success, status, and career. Every parent considers himself a "teacher" (as in some sense he is). And every American parent also considers himself an "expert" on education who must entrust his children to teachers whom he often distrusts and has contempt for.

All this intensifies the turmoil of the educational scene. But it does not invalidate an older and perhaps more "conservative" pedagogic view: that success in educating the child depends upon the skill and devotion of the classroom teacher. What goes on in the classroom is what counts, and aggrieved parents had best bear this in mind.

ALBERT SHANKER, president of the New York teachers' union and the leader who courageously bore upon his shoulders the weight of the New York strike, recently remarked:

> . . . Conflict between teachers and parents is most tragic. . . . parents do not see that massive educational failure cannot be explained by a simple good-teacher–bad-teacher theory . . . the truth is that both teachers and students are being destroyed by a rotten system . . . that system can be changed only if parents and teachers enter into a partnership for educational revolution . . .
> Teaching in itself is difficult; but to teach while engaging in a constant need to defend one's self against parental and community attack is impossible.

Shanker is aware of the professional inadequacy of a good number of public-school teachers, but he feels that it can be overcome by proper internship, help from experienced colleagues, and an alert administration. A competent teacher who has worked successfully in a white middle-class school cannot simply be transferred to a ghetto school without thorough reorientation and training. But I share Shanker's view that the overwhelming proportion of teachers "want to teach" and are keen to do a proper job.

At the moment, however, it is much more fashionable to needle the teachers, often in a distasteful and self-righteous way. One thinks especially of Murray Kempton, who devoted his *New York Post* column during the recent strike to denouncing the teachers for "money greed" comparable to that of "plumbers." If one acknowledges that few ordinary mortals are capable of the notorious asceticism of Kempton, it becomes possible to ask: what is wrong with both plumbers and teachers earning a living wage?

Is it so difficult to understand that an underpaid teacher is bound to be a poor teacher —or that satisfying his material needs may contribute measurably to his becoming a successful teacher? Teachers are neither saints nor sinners, although there seems to be a good deal more idealism present in the teaching profession than is usual in America. Most teachers would subscribe to the words of John Dewey:

> It behooves the teachers . . . to make it clear beyond a peradventure that public education is not a business carried on for pecuniary profit . . . but that money spent on education is a social investment . . . Teachers are simply means, agents in this social work. They are performing the most important public duty now performed by any one group in society. Any claims which they can rightfully make are not made in behalf of themselves as private persons, but in behalf of society and the nation.

Thwarted parents and feckless columnists tend to blame teachers, but the truth is that the present educational disaster is part and parcel of the collapse of the American city. If originally the abandonment of the cities by

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large numbers of suburbia-headed middle-class whites helped precipitate the educational crisis, its new, intensified stage is due to the cynical abandonment of school integration programs by white-dominated Boards and the growing white attitude of letting the Negroes, Puerto Ricans, and other slum dwellers stew in their own communal juices—offering "local educational autonomy" to ill-equipped groups.

THE DE FACTO ABANDONMENT of integration in the North is the single greatest indictment of American racism. It means that hundreds of thousands of school-age children and millions of children yet unborn are being condemned to a mode of education that can only be crippling in its consequences.

Now there has emerged a new panacea in the form of drastic proposals for decentralization of the school system. On all sides, it is taken for granted that centralized Boards of Education will be phased out of existence. ("The New York Board of Education is dead" —Albert Shanker.) Given our national penchant for reducing enormous issues to simplified formula we ought to look carefully at the notion of decentralization.

Everyone, including the central Boards, favors decentralization; the question is, what kind of decentralization? Realistically, one might put the question, if so much power (and money) is up for grabs who shall grab what? Wittingly or unwittingly, a disastrous alliance of forces is developing in urban centers. "White power" community leaders, bitterly hostile to all integrationist tendencies, are entering an uneasy alliance with "black power" leaders who probably represent only an insignificant portion of their ghetto communities. The nature of the alliance is also clear—separation of the schools; you run your schools, we run ours. The inequity of financing is clear enough, but ghetto schools increasingly dominated by black nationalist forces hope to close the monetary gap by applying a variety of pressures.

Talking recently to members of the newly-elected governing board of I.S. 201 in Harlem, I raised the question of what would be the long-range psychological effect, in terms of Dr. Kenneth Clark's study of "separate but equal" education, if Harlem children were now to pass through 12 years of *de facto* separatist education under so-called community controls. To anticipate their answer that this is what *already* exists, is not very helpful. One is not at all sure, to begin with, that these people are anything more than militant activists grinding the ax of black nationalism. I see no firm evidence that they are true spokesmen for their communities with a solid base of support or that they are professionally qualified in the area of pedagogy. Yet this trend toward ghetto separatism is unmistakable and perhaps not to be denied, thanks in great part at least to the cynical willingness of organized whites (Board of Education, city administration, so-called white tax-payers associations, etc.) to let the ghetto dwellers take over. What good can possibly come out of such an experience?

Because school integration may not be a living question today, shall we agree to its being permanently shelved? Because integration on a massive, city-wide scale is out of the question now, shall we drop all effort to have a more modest, small-scale integration wherever possible? For if we accept the Bundy report, with its proposed 30 to 60 school districts, or any similar version of miniscule autonomy, we accept an end to integration for the foreseeable future.

The more closely one examines the Bundy report, the more doubtful it appears as a fruitful starting point either toward constructive decentralization or toward giving various elements in the educational system a meaningful voice. The Teachers' Union has subjected the report to a searching criticism and has offered for discussion its own plan for decentralization, geared to the realities of New York financing and designed to provide the basis for a new—and indispensable—healing of relations between teachers and ghetto communities. At the least, this plan ought to be seriously considered.

If there is to be an authentic dialogue—and who can say whether this is possible in the current atmosphere?—we ought to recognize that, given the nature of the learning process, compromise will have to take place. And the teachers and their union can play a leading part in the reconciliation of the contending forces. But, for their part, parents, administrations, and communal groups must accept the central role of the teacher *within* the classroom.

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Jeremy Larner

Some Questions about "Decentralization"

JUST ONE YEAR AGO, after a week of visiting I.S. 201 in East Harlem and talking to community leaders there, this reporter warned that conflicts centering around ghetto schools would mushroom unless teachers and parents could get together. As it turned out, I was understating. The New York teachers' strike this fall provided a golden opportunity for out-and-out union busters (such as the Board of Ed, the *New York Times*, and, I'm sorry to say, Mayor Lindsay) to exploit the anger and frustration of Negro parents—and thereby to strengthen the hand of the most destructive "militants." To be fashionably radical in Fun City this fall season, one had to find the UFT unstylish—*cf.* the columns of Murray Kempton. The *Post* and the *Times* agreed that the teachers were teaching "lawlessness" and "crippling" their pupils by a two-week strike—though they did not suggest another way to obtain the contract provisions the teachers were so clearly entitled to.

Now everyone—including the UFT leadership — is aware that there are teachers in the public schools who should be gotten rid of. But does anyone take seriously—or even report—the UFT's suggestions for wider recruitment? Is it worth considering that the benefits and classroom conditions the teachers were fighting for would bring teachers to New York?

Granted that the Union was often clumsy in getting its case to the public. It lacks the skill, cash and connections for the high style of public relations practiced by, say, the Ford Foundation or the Center for Urban Education. But since when do people calling themselves "radicals" automatically assume the same position on a strike as our city's most reactionary elements?

At the moment, Mayor Lindsay has dispatched to Albany without modification "the Bundy plan" for school decentralization. In my report last January, I commented on the dangers of a too-loose decentralization, one of which is that the Board of Ed might be only too willing to let ghetto schools stew in their own juices (while white enclaves in Queens and Brooklyn set up sanctuaries for God and Country). Obviously some sort of decentralization is in order. Yet I wonder how many interested parties know that the UFT has proposed a plan which is in some respects *more radical*—calling for larger districts but complete abolition of the present Board of Ed, and for turning local boards entirely over to parents, who would then hire their own district superintendents? I wonder if Mayor Lindsay has read that plan?

A final piece of irony. John Marsh, the UFT chapter chairman at I.S. 201 who is not known for his diplomacy, was conspicuous on the picket line. When the strike was over, Marsh was physically barred from entering 201 by a man who was reported (incorrectly) to be a member of the 201 Planning Board. As the district superintendent stood by and did nothing to get Marsh into the school, Marsh was forced to leave and is now teaching elsewhere. At the time the press quoted without comment a good many insults defaming Marsh as a person and a teacher. But let me say this. Of all the teachers I observed in 201, John Marsh was absolutely the best. Even in one of the more difficult classes, he had his pupils conversing with him in elementary French after only a few weeks of instruction. Those who have taught in the public school system will appreciate this achievement. But Fred Hechinger and Leonard Buder of the *Times*—and other experts who would rather die than enter a classroom—will go on repeating what they are told, especially if it discredits the teachers' union.

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Irving Howe

A Word About "Bourgeois Civil Liberties"

> Objection after objection has been made that by obstructing [Dow Chemical] recruiters, we have been denying others—the recruiter and those who wish to see him—the right of free speech and assembly. In a sense, this is true. . . . The institutions our resistance has desanctified and delegitimatized, as a result of our action against their oppression of others, have lost all authority and hence all respect. As such they have only raw, coercive power. Since they are without legitimacy in our eyes, they are without rights. . . . Our critique argues that the social order we are rebelling against is totalitarian, manipulative, repressive, and anti-democratic.

THESE LINES, UNDER THE HEADING "Resistance and Bourgeois Civil Liberties," come from Interorganizational Secretary of SDS Carl Davidson and appear in *New Left Notes*, November 13, 1967. Because they reflect the thinking of some people in the American Left, I should like to raise a few questions, and if Mr. Davidson cares to reply, space will be available to him.

• Precisely what are *bourgeois* civil liberties? One thinks of civil liberties as including provisions of the Bill of Rights for freedom of speech, press, assemblage, etc. That these are sometimes violated by the bourgeois state or falsely linked with bourgeois ideology, is true. Yet to say that does not answer the question: in what way are civil liberties *themselves* "bourgeois"?

• Would Mr. Davidson offer some examples of *non*bourgeois civil liberties? The main kinds of nonbourgeois society in the world today are primitive and Communist. In the former there are few civil liberties, in the latter none.

• A historical examination would show that civil liberties have often been won through the struggle of labor unions, socialist movements, and liberal intellectuals, and sometimes in opposition to the bourgeoisie. Radicals have traditionally held this conquest to be precious as one that should be preserved and extended in a socialist society. It has further been our view that we should fight the hardest and the most consistently for civil liberties, first because we value them in principle and second because any trend to whittle them away would probably hurt us the most. If it is intolerable that a majority should deny the civil liberties of a minority, it is madness for a tiny minority to try to deny the civil liberties of a majority. But if no more is involved than *bourgeois* civil liberties which we can discard upon need, then, Mr. Davidson, they may not be so important?

• "The institutions," he writes, have "lost all authority and hence all respect." Being "without legitimacy in our eyes, they are without rights." Very well; but "lost all authority" *for whom?* For a majority of the American people? Or even of American students? Who has appointed SDS the judge of whether the institutions of this country retain their authority and rights? Suppose it could be shown that 98 per cent of the people continue to respect those institutions—would Mr. Davidson still persist in "abolishing" their authority and rights? And if so, might he not be guilty of elitism, that is, of substituting his own judgments and decisions for those of the people?

• SDS declares itself in favor of "participatory democracy." At certain universities—Columbia, UCLA—there have been referenda among the students on allowing Dow Chemical recruiters to appear on campus, and by a decisive majority the students voted in favor of so allowing them. Will SDS, in the name of participatory (or any other kind of) democracy, abide by the voice of the majority or will it continue advocating the forcible obstruction of recruiters? Mind: the issue is not whether SDS holds demonstrations against Dow Chemical, since no one can in principle be opposed to that. The issue is whether SDS will try forcibly to prevent recruiters from saying their wretched little piece, even though the majority of students favors allowing them to. And if so, how will SDS reconcile that stand with "participatory democracy"? Or are only right-thinking folk allowed to participate in "participatory democracy"?

• If Mr. Davidson declares "the institutions" to be stripped of authority and rights, by what moral and/or political standards does he then propose to denounce them when they violate the civil liberties they claim to uphold? We are

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all outraged by General Hershey's proposal to draft antiwar students as a punitive measure. Our outrage rests on the assumption that he is violating due process and common standards of decency—procedures and standards "the institutions" claim to value. But if we no longer recognize their authority or rights, how then can we claim the protection of their rules?

• If Mr. Davidson declares "the institutions" to have no further authority and rights, could he suggest on which *principled* basis—that is, more than an outcry that people of correct opinion are being hurt—he would argue against "the institutions" if and when these proceed to suppress *him?* And if he believes that SDS as a private organization has the moral authority to abolish the "rights" of "the institutions," on what grounds will he argue if other private organizations—say, the American Legion or the Birch Society—proceed on their own to abolish the "rights" of SDS? I know on what grounds Norman Thomas and Roger Baldwin would oppose the suppression of SDS by government or its persecution by enemy organizations; but on what grounds would Mr. Davidson?

• These questions were once faced by the Communists when they said that civil liberties were convenient under capitalism but could be disposed of once they took power. The results, as we all know, were disastrous. No one—even if, like myself, he felt obliged to defend the civil liberties of Communists as a matter of principle—could take seriously their claim to care about freedom. Does Mr. Davidson see any danger that people of good will might draw similar conclusions about him?

• Mr. Davidson declares the U.S. is "totalitarian." Could he then explain how it happens that SDS manages to pour out of its Chicago office—and through the postal system of this very "totalitarian" country—large quantities of material denouncing the society? How it happens that SDS can hold demonstrations urging people to defect from the army and declaring the President to be a murderer? Might not the ability to do these things be taken as evidence that the U.S., whatever its many and grave faults, is not quite "totalitarian"?

• A theory is now being advanced in New Left circles that we live in the U.S. under "liberal fascism." It is something to conjure with. In what way does *"liberal* fascism" differ from *"fascist fascism"*? In that the rights of organization and protest, action and speech so brutally destroyed by the latter, remain essentially operative under the former? In that Mr. Davidson and others of his persuasion, who under "fascist fascism" might well have been transformed into lampshades had they so much as uttered a peep of discontent, are, I am happy to say, continuing to shout their denunciation of the appalling Vietnam War under "liberal fascism"?

I would earnestly plead with Mr. Davidson and his friends that they look into the dismal story of an earlier but similar theory, advanced some 35 years ago under the label of "social fascism" in the Communist movement.

• Finally, a friendly offer. I am prepared to read any book proposed by Mr. Davidson, if he will promise to read Lenin's *"Left Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder.* Perhaps we can then each report on our reading and thereby contribute to a dialogue on the Left.

Emanuel Geltman

Social Attitudes Of Trade Unionists

A SURVEY COMMISSIONED by the AFL–CIO Committee on Political Education, and conducted by the Joseph Kraft polling organization in January 1967, offers rich information about the state of union membership.

Ostensibly commissioned to prove that the rank and file is overwhelmingly behind President Johnson (or such is the impression one gets from reading the article on the report by Alexander E. Barkan in the August *American Federationist*), the survey figures seem to show anything but. The findings do confirm that union members, whether young or old, cherish the social legislation and outlook they associate with the Democratic party. But the figures also reveal serious reservations about the President's policy, and the issue to which they react is clearly the war. So that while the members polled clearly approve Johnson over Nixon (55 per cent to 22) and over Reagan (60 per cent

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to 16) and Rockefeller (55 per cent to 20), the proportion is only 46 per cent to 30 over Romney, with members under 30 years of age preferring Romney (47 per cent to 42) to Johnson. Members in the 30- to 49-year age bracket were for Johnson 43 per cent to 29, and those in the 50-and-over bracket were for Johnson 51 per cent to 25.

The special significance of these figures can be read in another part of the report which shows that the union movement is getting younger. About a fourth of the membership is now under 25, and close to one half is under 40. What does this mean for trade unionism? For example, 25 per cent of the membership has belonged to a union less than five years. Are they as committed as the older members? The report is inconclusive; for example, members under 30 report both highest and lowest attendance at union meetings. (A surprisingly high rate of 20 per cent of all members claim they attend all union meetings.)

This figure becomes most intriguing in its relation to other opinions. The union membership is becoming increasingly suburbanized —almost three-quarters in the age group below 40 now live in the suburbs. On most legislative issues the members tend to endorse AFL–CIO positions wholeheartedly. (And did the pollsters really think that any but a few cranks would oppose water pollution control?) Yet, the single exception is the AFL–CIO's position on open housing. It is depressing, to say the least, that on this issue 46 per cent disagree with the AFL–CIO stand, while 43 per cent support it. There is some comfort in that as many agree as disagree among the members of the below-30 group—48 per cent. It means perhaps that the younger members have been reached best by education, the civil rights movement, etc. Let us hope they will be useful in educating their older brothers and sisters. But clearly, here is an issue that calls for the greatest educational activity, along with all those other measures involved in civil and equal rights—above all, the matter of Negro membership.

Women who now make up about 20 per cent of the membership, generally favor union positions most; an interesting fact, hard to interpret. About 13 per cent are now Negro, and some 4 per cent belong to other minority groups—Mexican, Oriental, etc. Without comparative figures at hand, one can only surmise that this represents progress, with a hell of a long way to go.

What the union has done for the worker can be read in the figures already cited on suburban shift. Some 46 per cent of union families are now in the $7,500 to $15,000 income bracket. But about 32 per cent are still in the $5,000 to $7,500 bracket, and in both cases the reference is still to *families,* including other incomes. It says much for the unions that they have elevated the standard of living of the worker and helped him secure all manner of legislated benefits in social security. It suggests, too, how far union members have yet to go in becoming the secure and stable fat cats that horrify mush heads and reactionaries. It also suggests how much plain organizing and educating remains to be done.

New Editors for Dissent

As part of our continuous effort to widen the base of DISSENT—politically, intellectually, even geographically—we are happy to announce that, simultaneous with our new format, the editorial board will have the following additional members:

BAYARD RUSTIN, the distinguished civil rights leader and executive director of the A. Philip Randolph Foundation;

ARNOLD KAUFMAN, a leader of the "dissident Democrats" and professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan;

ALEXANDER ERLICH, a distinguished economist specializing in Russian affairs who teaches at Columbia;

DENNIS WRONG, a sociologist who specializes in demography and teaches at NYU;

DAVID SPITZ, a well-known writer on political theory who teaches at Ohio State;

JACK RADER, a veteran socialist now active in New York community affairs.

STEPHAN THERNSTROM shifts from editor to contributing editor.

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Michael Walzer

Civil Disobedience & "Resistance"

The following statement by Michael Walzer was sent to a number of persons for comment. Both the statement and comments appear below.—ED.

THE SHEER GHASTLINESS of the American war in Vietnam forces all of us on the Left to think again of civil disobedience. It has led some of us to plan or engage in kinds of civil disobedience far more serious than those in which we were enthusiastically involved during the early years of the civil rights struggle. Now it is not a question of challenging Southern sheriffs but local draft boards, not of sitting in at lunch counters but at the Pentagon, not of breaking obnoxious laws but opposing a national policy—and doing that in time of war.

The willingness to "resist" and all the passions that accompany that willingness have grown enormously during the past year. So long as the war continues, moral anxiety and humiliation are inherent in our very citizenship—and in all our daily comforts—and there is no more attractive way of relieving these feelings than to disobey the government that carries on the war, and to do so publicly, deliberately, forthrightly.

But if we must think about civil disobedience, then surely we must think clearly about it, and if we choose civil disobedience we must justify our choice in moral and political, as well as emotional, terms, in terms of its consequences for others (and for the antiwar movement as a whole) as well as for ourselves. I want to suggest the terms in which such a justification might be attempted and also some of the difficulties involved in the attempt. My purpose is only to begin a discussion, and I won't pretend to be certain about everything I say.

1. In nondemocratic societies the issues are fairly simple: *uncivil* disobedience is justified whenever it is used by or in the name of oppressed or excluded social groups and whenever it really helps or can rationally be expected to help end the oppression or democratize the society. Violence can be defended by the same argument. *A fortiori*, civil disobedience is justified in all such cases, and probably should be tried first, but there is no obligation to act publicly and nonviolently against authorities who make this sort of action intolerably dangerous for all participants. There is no obligation to become a martyr.

2. The obligation to act civilly rather than uncivilly increases in direct proportion to the progress of democracy. The preservation of life and the safety of the innocent are increasingly significant objections to the use of violence as nonviolent means of social action gradually become available. Partially excluded groups in partially democratized societies are justified in effective or potentially effective acts of civil disobedience—for example, in the American civil rights struggle—but they may not be justified in acts of violence unless there is clearly no civil recourse, all other means have failed, and so on.

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3. The U.S. is a partially democratic society—*partially* for two reasons: first, because gross inequalities of power exist among various social groups; second, because there is no effective popular participation or representation in foreign-policy decision-making. At the same time, however, the argument that the U.S., for these or other reasons, is not democratic at all is plainly wrong. Like the argument that the war in Vietnam is genocidal, it is the expression of moral distress or distraction, but not of critical intelligence. It is important only to people who lack the moral stamina to oppose anything that's not positively monstrous. The truth is bad enough, but honesty requires us to say, *not that bad.*

4. In democratic or partially democratic societies, civil disobedience comes into its own. Only now is its limited character congruent with its social environment; only now is civility itself a genuine obligation—at least for those who participate or expect to participate in the democratic process. What civility requires is that disobedience, when it is thought necessary, be of a carefully limited character, that it aim at specific changes (not necessarily minor ones) in law, policy, or social structure, but not at a total transformation of state or society.

This self-limitation is exemplified in several ways, above all by nonviolence during the disobedient action and by nonresistance to police enforcing the law. It is also exemplified by the public character of the action and the public explanations offered in its defense (though this cannot always be the case, for example, in the violation of laws like the Fugitive Slave Law, where danger to others is sufficiently great to require and justify secrecy).

Given this crucial limit, civil disobedience in a democracy can be justified in three ways:

First, as a purely personal protest, a form of moral self-expression: the disobedient citizen says to his fellows, "I experience this law or policy as morally degrading; I cannot accept it whatever the consequences (though I do accept the consequences)." Here there is no commitment to a movement or a cause and no direct concern with the social outcome of the action. Like other forms of self-expression, this is apt to seem selfish, though moral selfishness—or pride—is sometimes the only resort of a principled but lonely man.

Second, as part of a democratic political campaign, a collective effort to persuade other citizens of the rightness or wrongness of some law or policy or to register extreme intensity of feeling. For democratic politics doesn't work by majority vote alone; it is sensitive also to the relative weights of interest, commitment, zeal, etc. on each side. A minority that feels strongly about some issue often gets its way (and often ought to) over an apathetic majority. Civil disobedience can be a way of demonstrating emotional force or depth of interest. It means: "You can have your way, but you had better think twice and decide how badly you want your way, for you are going to have to put us in jail to get it . . ." Here the disobedience has a clear political purpose and is or ought to be limited by collective decisions as to how that purpose is best pursued.

Third, as a form of limited coercion on the model of a strike: the disobedient citizens say, "You can pursue this policy if you like, but without any cooperation from us; insofar as our help is required for its success, the policy shall fail." Here success clearly depends on numbers and organization; an unsuccessful, especially a ludicrously unsuccessful "strike" might do more harm than good.

5. But do citizens of a democratic or partially democratic society have a right to obstruct decisions taken or supported by a majority of their fellows? They certainly have a right to oppose such decisions, even after they have been taken,

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and to demand their reconsideration. And both civil disobedience and civil non-cooperation as described above can probably be called legitimate forms of opposition. Nor is it clear, as is sometimes said, that these are justified only in extreme cases: the recent New York teachers' strike was an act of opposition of this sort, directed against a repressive but not morally atrocious labor law.

Active *obstruction* of officials carrying out government policy (if it is sustained and not a short-term demonstration) is something else again. It is difficult to see how sustained obstruction can remain within the bounds of civility; it is implicitly revolutionary, challenging the moral authority of the political system itself and not merely the rightness of particular laws or policies. (The recent "Call to resist illegitimate authority" is a misnamed defense of civil disobedience. It is, and ought to say it is, a call to resist the immoral acts of legitimate authorities. Civil disobedience is sometimes necessary in a democracy precisely because elected governments, as well as nonelected governments, can do obnoxious or atrocious things.)

6. In discussing the second and third justifications of civil disobedience, it is important to stress the moral relevance of tactical considerations. Anyone committed to struggle toward some goal is also committed to struggle as effectively as possible and if at all possible actually to reach that goal. No one can be morally justified in acting (however heroically) in ways that defeat his own stated purposes. Hence it is always important to talk about the likely political effects of any proposed disobedient act, even if this means nothing else than more or less disciplined speculation about an uncertain future.

A Given the character of the war in Vietnam, it seems to me that arguments about civil disobedience today ought to be primarily tactical.

The crucial questions are: will such actions help to end an immoral war? are they persuasive acts? do they legitimize all lesser forms of opposition and so increase the size and impact of the antiwar movement? or do they alienate people from the movement as a whole and make prowar activity easier?

What we have to do before we can justify civil disobedience is to explore the relations between disobedient citizens and all those others who oppose the war more moderately (or more fearfully) or who are just worried about it. It is not obvious that a single movement can or should encompass the two groups, but if the two are in conflict, if they cannot grow together, then surely the smaller group would have to give way. We would have to forego the moral heroism of civil disobedience in order to build the largest possible movement against the war.

8. Even assuming the tactical argument comes out that way (I am not at all sure it does), that may not be conclusive for any particular individual. For the larger movement may grow so slowly and the brutality of the war escalate so rapidly, that finally many of us could stand it no longer. We would resist the government, then, whatever the consequences, for our own sake if for no one else's, not in the hope of building a movement, but in despair of doing so. But surely that time has not yet come.

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Hilary Putnam

In Defense of Resistance

IF ANYTHING TROUBLES ME in Michael Walzer's thoughtful discussion of civil disobedience, it is the suggestion that those who use civil disobedience may "have to give way," because they may be hurting the antiwar movement. I don't believe that civil disobedience, that militant *resistance,* to this criminal war does hurt the struggle against the war. But it could be very hurtful if electoral politics and resistance come to be seen as alternatives, and even as antitheses, rather than as tactics to be used in an appropriate combination.

To the extent that those who engage in electoral politics come to see the resisters as enemies rather than as colleagues in a struggle, the lot of the resisters may be made harder. That in itself would be bad enough, at a time when solidarity is all-important. Worse yet, opposition to resistance may become support, however reluctant, of the *status quo,* as emotion of frustration and bitterness which ought properly to be directed against the *status quo* get directed instead against the "irresponsible" radicals, who, by failing to appreciate the possibilities of "the democratic process," cost us the victory we might otherwise have had.

I SHALL TRY TO ORGANIZE my remarks on resistance around three themes: (**1**) that resistance does not hurt the chances of electoral politics, as far as ending the war is concerned; (**2**) that those chances—the chances of ending the war through the elections—are, in any case, not good enough to justify an exclusive reliance on the electoral process; (**3**) that some forms of resistance are morally obligatory, at least as long as their efficacy is not known to be positively harmful. (And some—e.g., direct refusal to obey criminal orders—may be morally obligatory even if their "political" consequences *are* positively harmful.)

1. IT IS CLEAR that resistance, whether it takes the form of burning one's draft card or of sitting-in at the Pentagon, does provoke a certain amount of "backlash." How serious is this?

The distinction to be kept in mind is that between "backlash" which takes the form of hostility to demonstrators and their acts, and "backlash" which takes the form of support for the war. Doubtless, those who support the war are made more vigorous (and should be) by all forms of protest against it. But is there one shred of evidence that anyone who has doubts about the war has been driven back to support of it by protest demonstrations? On the contrary: while demonstrations are undoubtedly unpopular, so is Johnson—and increasingly so. The erosion in Johnson's popularity has been absolutely steady. So has the erosion in support for the war.

2. ONE MUST DISTINGUISH the questions: might electoral politics end the war in Vietnam—and might electoral politics end the foreign policy of which that war is but one expression? Electoral politics will almost certainly lead to the election of some other President than Johnson in 1968; and any President other than Johnson—even Reagan —may decide that the Vietnam War is too costly and that some kind of disguised withdrawal (disguised, say, as a "coalition government," with NLF participation) is preferable.

But will a different President—a Romney, a Rockefeller, a Bobby Kennedy, or whoever it might be,—withdraw Amerian troops from Thailand, and renounce our pretensions of "containing" China and controlling South-

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east Asia? Will he stop the American planes which are already dropping napalm on guerrillas in Guatemala and Peru? Will he stop providing the para-military training, the intelligence, and the multitude of gadgets that are propping up dictatorships from Bolivia to God knows where? Will he stop defining our "national interest" in terms of the interests of the great corporations and in terms of the interests of the military establishment? Not a chance!

WHAT ARE THE CHANCES of even stopping the Vietnam War through the electoral process? The one place at which the peace sentiment may have a dramatic effect is in the Democratic primaries; if Johnson should lose three or four primaries, the effect—at least in publicity—would be striking. But even so, Johnson would most likely be the Democratic candidate. This is not meant as discouragement. I think that even a small chance is better than none, and that we *should* try to defeat Johnson in the primaries. But we must recognize that chances are small, and that even *this* effort provokes "backlash" and polarization which may be unfavorable to us.

If we fail to "dump Johnson," we shall be confronted by an election in which the Republicans run someone who is at best ambiguous on the war and the Democrats run Johnson. If we succeed beyond our wildest dreams, we shall get a major party to run a "peace candidate." So what, *Johnson* was a "peace candidate" in 1964.

In any case, the hard facts are that whoever gets elected will be under tremendous pressure *not* to end the war. The military will argue that our "position" in Vietnam must not be bargained away; others will argue that various other "American interests" must not be jeopardized. Very likely the next President will make an effort to negotiate. But to negotiate *what* and with whom? An unsuccessful attempt to end the war on what the next Administration will regard as "acceptable" terms may well be followed by invasion of North Vietnam, or worse.

GIVEN THESE GLOOMY FACTS, it seems clear to me that the Left must have some alternative to electoral politics. Consider the position of a young person today who is told that electoral politics is the only "realistic" way to accomplish anything. He is intelligent enough to perceive that if it is true, then "third party" politics is also out—nothing is more futile than a "peace" candidate who garners a tiny percentage of the vote—and that only Presidential elections have much effect on foreign policy. (If even *they* do!)

So he translates the realistic advice somewhat as follows: "Vote for the lesser evil in 1968—if there is a lesser evil. If you fail—or if you 'succeed' and are once again betrayed—then you may get a chance to vote for Bobby Kennedy in 1972. If *that* fails, there will be 1976, etc." Is it any wonder that this is unacceptable advice? Is a small chance of effecting a change in foreign policy once every four years *enough?* Would you think better or worse of our young people if they found it enough?

I do not mean to suggest that the whole or only alternative to electoral politics is civil disobedience. On the contrary, I think that there are a range of alternatives, and that they all connect in one way or another with community organizing—not just with organizing *poor* communities, but with organizing all communities, including vocational ones. But the alternatives to electoral politics have this in common: they are or should be radicalizing activities. And at this time much radicalizing activity inevitably takes the form of resistance and civil disobedience; partly because that is the tradition of the Movement, and partly because nothing less seems really to be an appropriate response to a *criminal* war.

THE STRATEGY, in short, of which "civil disobedience" or "resistance" is only a small part is this: to recognize that we may not be able to end the Vietnam War, terrible as it is to admit that, and to commit ourselves to building a Movement which will eventually change the minds and the values of

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so many Americans that it will be possible to go after the entire system of institutions and assumptions that are victimizing America and the world, and not just to opt for a "lesser evil" candidate once every four years. Right now the sledding is tough; but the American Empire is already finding that things do not go its way, and I believe that as the coffins come home and the taxes go up, more and more people who may not seem radicalizable right now will be prepared to listen to such a Movement.

The tactic of resistance makes sense in this context, not only because resistance is a tremendously radicalizing experience for those who participate in it, but because it simultaneously fits in with the long-run objective of building a Movement and with the short-run objective of increasing the costs of the war so that the policy-makers will have one more reason for ending it. Electoral politics looks only to the 1968 elections and to ending the Vietnam War; movement-building looks primarily to the long-term future, and to social transformation; the tactic of resistance both looks to ending the Vietnam War (or ,more modestly, to contributing one among many influences to ending it), and to building the Movement.

3. TODAY SOME PEOPLE are in positions in which their consciences will not permit them *not* to resist. How can a young man who sees this war as criminal in itself and involving untold war crimes accept induction into the armed forces of the United States? Young men are refusing induction, are burning their draft cards, are severing their connection with the Selective Service System, not as a tactic at all, but as a moral duty.

And even lesser forms of resistance involve moral obligations. If my students are facing five years in prison and a heavy fine, have I not a moral obligation to support them? And, to move to a much lesser matter, if my friends organize a demonstration—say, against an induction center—have I not some obligation to join, unless I think their tactic is positively unreasonable or harmful, both to make their demonstration more visible (and thereby more effective), and to give them the protection which added numbers provide to those who engage in civil disobedience? To be sure, some forms of resistance are mistaken, just as some forms of electoral politics are mistaken, and some forms of community organizing are mistaken; but surely the right to criticize belongs mainly to those who have *acted*, and who have shown a spirit of solidarity with others who act.

In Greek Dungeons

From a report by Grigor Praxis in the *New Statesman,* November 24, 1967:

Facts are also available about the experience of three resistance prisoners unconnected with the Theodorakis trial. They are middle-class women of the 'artistic' type. All three come from well-to-do families officially considered as respectable—one could claim her father and her father-in-law as loyal supporters of the junta. However, they are accused of active resistance to the present government. Since being arrested, all have been kept in solitary confinement for periods ranging from 14 to 45 days. They have been ruthlessly beaten, interrogations have lasted for periods leading to collapse, and one girl has suffered acute haemorrhages. The most delicate of the three has been subjected to repeated electric shock treatment. She now suffers from hallucinations and from continual trembling of a type reminiscent of Parkinson's disease.

. . . Interrogation is carried out by the security police. Thick basement walls insulate prisoners from the outside world. The airless cells below street level, absolutely dark round the clock, measure one metre by 1.90 by 1.20. Suffocatingly hot during the summer months, they are infested with fleas, bugs and lice—deliberately, it is claimed. Prisoners are allowed out to the courtyard only for short periods twice a day. When first arrested, they are not let out at all for 72 hours; and they are allowed no food, water or cigarettes for that span of time. As soon as they fall asleep they are abruptly woken by the guards and hurried to an officer's room for interrogation. This can last for 10 hours or more, the questioners working in relays. A blinding flashlight shines in the prisoner's eyes throughout. . . .

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Robert Pickus

Civil Disobedience But Not Violence

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE should pose no problem for the antiwar movement. The problem is insurrectionary violence (and the attempt to create a climate for insurrectionary violence) masquerading as civil disobedience. Those who hold the mask but do not in fact accept the morality or politics of insurrectionary violence make the most serious mistake and bear the heaviest responsibility for activity that is damaging the antiwar movement. I mean men, for example, as valuable as Dwight Macdonald and Paul Goodman, who are rightly committed to civil disobedience but make common cause with those committed to insurreactionary violence on the latter's terms, thus robbing civil disobedience of its moral force and desired practical effect.

When clearly distinguished from and opposed to insurrectionary violence, civil disobedience poses no threat to the antiwar movement or to a democratic polity. Far from a threat, it is a requisite of democratic government. It is one necessary form of action if we are to keep such a government true to the values and procedures it proclaims.

Insurrectionary violence, even as fantasy, can deeply damage this country. It can deliver it into the hands of a repressive military nationalist Right (or into a violent contest for power between mutually antidemocratic forces). Insurrectionary violence limits and weakens the antiwar movement by robbing it of its moral foundations and the confidence of its fellow citizens.

It takes an extraordinarily troubled political climate, one of surpassing unreason, for insurrectionary violence and civil disobedience—two radically different forms of social action—to become so enmeshed; or to be more accurate: for the politics and morality of insurrectionary violence so successfully to capture its opposite.

For civil disobedience *is* at the opposite pole from insurrectionary violence. Those engaging in civil disobedience in this country are not attempting to avoid, deny, or overturn the law. They are refusing *as citizens* to comply with, or acting *as citizens* to change, a law or a policy they believe to be intolerably evil and fundamentally contradictory to the value commitment that is the spiritual base of their citizenship. Herb Kelman put it well:

> Civil disobedience does not represent a disassociation from society, but is, rather, an act of profound commitment to it . . . the term "disobedience" has meaning only if one assumes that, in general, the system is entitled to obedience. Unlike revolution which denies the legitimacy of the very system itself, civil disobedience [acts] . . . within the framework of the existing system . . . Civil disobedience is a form of persuasion whose success depends on awakening latent moral forces in society."*

That is why civil disobedience rejects violence. That is why civil disobedience requires the public announcement of the illegal act. That is why civil disobedience cannot involve attempts to evade the law's consequences but requires acceptance of the law's penalty. That is why Socrates, who did not place himself above the law or outside its jurisdiction, even when refusing to comply, is so much more profound and appro-

* *New York Times Magazine*, Nov. 26, 1967. Harris Wofford's "A Lawyer's Case for Civil Disobedience" is another brief, excellent statement of this view. The most thoughtful bibliography I know on the subject is available from the World Without War Council, 1730 Grove Street, Berkeley, California, 94709.

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priate an exemplar of civil disobedience than Thoreau.

"Our nation is founded on the principle that observance of the law is the eternal safeguard of liberty and defiance of the law is the surest road to tyranny . . . Americans are free, in short, to disagree with the law, but not to disobey it." The speaker was President Kennedy commenting in 1962 on the admission of James Meredith to the University of Mississippi.

Those committed to democratic values and procedures will not lightly ignore this argument. But accepting the importance of a climate of respect for law does not require rejecting genuine civil disobedience.

President Kennedy's case is weighty, familiar, and wrong. Our country needs civil disobedience. It is justified most easily in those traditions that rightly, I believe, posit an authority superior to the state and lay on the individual conscience imperatives by which the policies of the state are to be judged. But it is also justified in democratic political theory adequate to the realities of twentieth-century mass societies. In this perspective, civil disobedience is needed not just now and in response to current failures of our national community, but as an expected and essential part of that process by which a democratic polity fulfills its central values.

I SHARE AND SOMEWHAT EXTEND Michael Walzer's conception of civil disobedience in a democracy, but I do not share his uncertainty as to its tactical usefulness in the antiwar movement. It is, I believe, a mistake to oppose radical civil disobedience and more moderate forms of political action. Both are clearly needed and, properly related, strengthen and reinforce each other. In my experience the withdrawal of consent in acts of civil disobedience helps build the antiwar movement. When allied to concrete foreign policy proposals which speak to international realities, such acts energize, free, and strengthen the over-all antiwar movement. I've worked on too many civil disobedience projects and programs in American communities to underestimate their capacity for so changing the quality of the discussion that for the first time a new majority consensus, and not enlarged minority protest, becomes a possibility.

But I am discussing *genuine* civil disobedience. What if such action is absorbed in and dominated by its opposite: action set in an alienated context and conducted as an act of dissociation from, not committment to, a society; action which seeks to evade, not accept, the law's penalty; action which does not reject violence, but is instead consciously and publicly based on preparation for violence, or designed to further a climate that will engender violence? What if this action which teaches not respect for law but the most extreme hostility to it and to those responsible for its enforcement, is clearly an attempt to impose a minority's will rather than to persuade a majority?

What I describe here as a possibility is, in my experience, the reality. Any issue of the student, Left, and underground press confirms that. "We organized in advance . . . our plan took the form of a military action, against the cops," writes Jeff Segal, Steering Committee of Stop the Draft Week, in the U.C. *Daily Cal.* "Who knows," one reads in the *Berkeley Barb*, "some night a draft board may just disappear." The codirector of the October 21 Pentagon mobilization, Jerry Rubin, declares in the *Berkeley Barb* that he is committed to "total alienation from the system." How does he see the Pentagon affair? "Thousands of angry young people who had come to tear the place up . . . we're angry . . . we're angry like Ché." And such statements were the commonplace of planning meetings, visible in bulletins, and confirmed in the hate-filled Washington reality which Dwight Macdonald reports as "mixing it up with M.P.'s."

TO BE CLEAR: In discussing much "antiwar activity," we are not talking about this country's finest tradition of personal responsibility for moral action; we are talking

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about the morality and politics of "accepting any and all means necessary, including sabotage and armed resistance, to make it difficult if not impossible for the U.S. to continue to slaughter people in other countries as well as in the ghettos at home" (from the *National Guardian*). Or worse: we're talking about confusing the two.

The would-be insurrectionists have their morality and their politics. It is the morality and politics of war—the other side in the war. But what of those committed to ending the killing who do not wish to join one side of the war and who therefore reject that morality but make common political cause with such leaders? They, with eloquent defenses of the genuine civil disobedience to which they are committed, are effective shills for uncivil activity that strengthens every evil they would resist: hatred, violence, the resolution of conflict by competing armed camps, each seeking to kill its way to power. And what of the young people they draw into the movement? "There are 10,000 of us ready to burn this country down," shrieks one seventeen-year-old, explaining what she'd learned in the antiwar movement.

In such a situation discussions of civil disobedience and the antiwar movement are not "primarily tactical" arguments. They take us to the principled heart of antiwar politics. They are not arguments about alternate forms of action but about differing ends. They are arguments about what *deserves* to be described as an antiwar movement. A peace movement dominated by a Left that defines itself and virtue by the intensity of alienation from, or hostility to America, rather than by the character of values held and goals pursued, is not well-situated to conduct that discussion. A peace movement in which the basis of coalition activities is cooperative relations and which allows no public criticism of such a Left will never conduct that discussion.

Such a peace movement can help defeat America. It cannot help establish the understanding or the institutions essential to a stable peace.

It is incapable of civil disobedience.

It is where we now are.

Arnold S. Kaufman

Opposition Politics Is More Important

I HAVE TWO OBJECTIONS to Michael Walzer's stimulating essay.

Though Walzer's main thrust is that tactical considerations are typically relevant to a moral estimate of civil disobedience, he allows an important exception: civil disobedience as personal protest need not be evaluated in terms of political consequences. The point is of more than passing interest because it was only civil disobedience of this type that Thoreau was concerned to justify. Concord's sage claimed that if an act

> is of such a nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to another, then, I say break the law . . . As for adopting the ways which the state has provided for remedying the evil, I know not of such ways. They take too much time, and a man's life will be gone. I have other affairs to attend to. I came into this world, not chiefly to make this a good place to live in, but to live in it, be it good or bad.

But Thoreau's position is morally, hence politically, irresponsible. For *any* act of dis-

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obedience is likely to be public—to have *political* consequences. And in deciding on a course of action, responsible moral agents must always make a reasonable effort to evaluate such consequences. However insistent conscience may be, if it is itself properly conscientious, it will demand that the individual try to calculate the good and bad of consequences. The calculation need not be the decisive factor in shaping decision. That is not the point. It is enough that such an assessment is always morally relevant.

WALZER CLAIMS that "there is no effective popular participation or representation in foreign policy decision-making." If true, this assumption goes some way toward undermining his main conclusions. For the only rational defense of the view that we who are opposed to the war should pass from protest to resistance rests on belief in the impossibility of changing American foreign policy through established democratic process.

The argument typically made is that powerful corporate interests decisively shape American foreign policy. The Vietnam War and, more generally, the counterrevolutionary thrust of American policies in the Third World, are ultimately due to private industry's need to guarantee overseas markets for its surplus production. These corporate powers exercise an absolutely decisive, undemocratic control over American foreign policy. They are so powerful that to destroy their control of policy requires revolutionary reconstruction of American society. Hence, morally sensitive Americans should accept the need for revolutionary change. At the very least, a suitable mixture of civil and uncivil disobedience must comprise the peace movement's central strategic direction. So the argument goes.

THOUGH I AGREE with Walzer's conclusions about the need to reject "implicitly revolutionary" programs and to de-emphasize civil disobedience, the preceding argument uses what appears to be an assumption he shares in order to draw opposite conclusions. The following case seems to provide a stronger and more convincing basis for reaching his results.

Because the United States is "partially democratic," there exists here a presumption against *un*civil disobedience. Our social and political system has other virtues as well. It is, for example, a remarkable tribute to the resilience of our institutions that during the period of a major shooting war opposition has developed to the point where it now reaches deeply into existing political structures. The Eugene McCarthy candidacy is the surface manifestation of democratically organized antiwar efforts that began immediately after the escalation, first taking the form of the teach-ins.

The relationship between the teach-ins at their best and the present resurgence of conventional political activity is lineal and impressive. Since the teach-ins, many have made courageous efforts—elected officials, civil rights leaders, clergymen's groups, and so on. There is no *guarantee* that these political efforts will stop the war. But how many chronic doubters who persist in their dim view of politics within the Democratic party would have predicted that we could have come to the point where we have an established, serious, prestigious opponent to an incumbent President, and where a new mood of insurgency prevails that embraces a wide range of issues? In the state of Michigan, for instance, both a McCarthy for President committee and a Concerned Democrats organization have been founded, the latter being now well on the way to forging a coalition with militant elements within Negro communities.

MOREOVER, WHATEVER HISTORY'S RECORD may show, America's economic stake in the world's underdeveloped area is presently small and declining. All indications are that the strongest support for the President's war comes, not from corporate interests, but from the South, the lower ranks of the trade union movement, and that segment of the population that has a more or less direct

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interest in keeping the defense budget as high as possible. These are formidable forces, but not politically unbeatable—and, in the case of trade unionists, certainly not unchangeable. The claim that the main directions of American foreign policy cannot be fundamentally altered by efforts within the framework of existing political institutions is simply not supported by relevant facts.

Political remedies, far from having been exhausted, are just now *beginning* to be perceived as realistic possibilities. In these circumstances uncivil disobedience is totally unjustified. Civil disobedience tends to be counterproductive—not so much because bad public reaction is generated, though this may occasionally be the case, but because it wastes energies and resources that are better spent making American democracy work. Those who object to the present course of American foreign policy are, at least for the present, best advised to concentrate all their energies on a political and educational attack within the frame of established organizations.

UNDENIABLY, SPECIFIC FORMS OF CIVIL disobedience—for example, by selective pacifists—are morally justified. Nor need I deny that political activity outside the existing frame is sometimes justified. But only careful tactical calculation that takes all particular circumstances into account can justify the latter.

Those who refuse to try to improve our political system on the grounds that it cannot be made to work help fulfill their own gloomy predictions. They help create the social and political basis for their own revolutionary despair. By doing less than they can and should *within the existing framework* they promote catastrophe. Romantic passion for the tactics of disobedience cuts the nerve of meaningful political effort to end the war in Vietnam and reorder American priorities so that this nation can resume its progress toward a welfare society rooted in institutions that promote human dignity.

What will come to pass very much depends on what we who favor all these things *try to do politically*. The connection between belief and will is a vital determinant of historical outcomes. Only *mindless radicals* equate radicalism with the most extreme tactics and refuse to try to make existing political institutions function in behalf of radical goals.

Henry Pachter

The Movement Is the Message

IN A RECENT *New Yorker*, Richard Rovere made these points:

1) there is no basic difference between the Korean and the Vietnamese wars;

2) nor is the different reaction to both due to the more developed techniques of reporting;

3) but there is a difference in feeling between the present younger generation and that of 20 years ago.

No network would have offered pictures from the Korean war front like the ones we have seen recently, and the reporters themselves tended to stress the idealistic features of that war as against its realistic grimness. We are no longer afraid to disturb the unity of the country in time of war. The generation that has grown up since the 40's rejects both ideological wars and *Realpolitik*, and it overreacts against

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the conformism of the 50's; agreement with any authority has become suspect, and strong gestures of autonomy are a psychological need. If there were no war in Vietnam, this generation would find other issues on which to disagree. While the war offers an ideal target for protest, it is not the *cause* of that protest but its occasion. With apologies to McLuhan: *the movement is the message*; it is not any particular message of pacifism or humanism that now makes people think about society, but it is the massive desire to drop out of society that makes people react against the war.

Though I tend to sympathize with a movement af alienated people, I regret the refusal to clarify its aims. Civil disobedience as part of a revolutionary strategy or as a means to stop the war, yes; but civil and uncivil disobedience merely as a means of expressing one's discontent with civilization—No! Undoubtedly, the demonstrations are much more than a protest against a particular war. But then, why confuse the issues?

Is the Thieu government less representative than was the government of the late Syngman Rhee? Are our troops in Vietnam more cruel and less moral than the English were in Malay? Have the same arguments and indeed the same words that are being used against the present war in Vietnam not been used to justify the capitulation of Munich, to discourage resistance against Hitler's war?

All wars are ugly and cruel; all wars are unjust; no war ever settles anything. To oppose one war means to oppose all. There always are justifications for going to war; the other side will never be short of arguments—you have to resist an obnoxious ideology, a brutal system, the expansion of an irresponsible power, the extermination of a race, religion, or other group that is especially worthy of our protection. Finally, if all other arguments are exhausted, you have to resist the violation of peace. I don't think that all these justifications are necessarily hypocritical; history may still justify them. Had Themistocles not resisted the Persians and had Churchill not resisted Hitler, I would not be alive, and even the most doctrinaire pacifist must concede that I have a right to live.

THERE ARE ALWAYS TWO SIDES to a question, and if we concede the right of the pacifist to resist all wars, we also must concede the right of all states to rely on physical power in the defense of what they consider their individual and/or collective interests. I must reject the view of *Mac Bird* that we are in Vietnam because LBJ is a vicious man or because American civilization is so depraved it can survive only by applying violence throughout the world.

Whatever the cause of our intervention in Vietnam, all fair-minded historians agree that it was by stumbling rather than by design that we entered this trap. It is easy to say that we should not have stumbled, but even if this stricture is accepted, it is a stricture against the *judgment* of three Presidents, not a judgment on their *morality*. However, without any doubt, the movement directs its effort against LBJ's morality.

You can argue against a judgment, but in arguing you admit that the judgment may be either correct or incorrect; you are in a universe of discourse with your opponent and you cannot deny him your cooperation in case the jury decides in *his* favor—if a majority supports LBJ, you must not try to frustrate his action, that is, you must give him the chance of testing his view.

If your opposition is based on moral grounds, or if his action threatens irrevocable doom, then your conscience may direct you to oppose the action by all available means—disobedience, civil and uncivil. You are not conversing within one universe of discourse, and hence you are not obliged to cooperate. In other words, you are engaged in *revolution*. Your actions are designed either to make it impossible for the government to execute its purposes, or to draw attention to your point of view *irre-*

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spective of the consequences which may ensue for the action. Or your actions may simply be designed to provoke the government into illegal, brutal acts of suppression, thus revealing its basic badness. Let's be frank: civil disobedience and nonviolent resistance are neither civil nor nonviolent in intention: they always are designed to reveal the opponent's inability to maintain civility and nonviolence. In a revolutionary situation (or a situation which one believes he can turn into a revolutionary situation) the important consideration is not *tactical* but *strategic*, and it is *strategic* that there be martyrs and "thousands of Vietnams."

YET, HE WHO PROCLAIMS REVOLUTION certainly has no right to expect quarter from the Establishment. It is inconsistent to demand special status of C.O., or to complain about police brutality, or to demonstrate against the illegal methods of suppression if one's proclaimed aim is to overthrow the government. One has declared war, and one has to take the consequences. It is the definition of the martyr that he does not expect quarter from the enemy. All "civil" disobedience must turn into "uncivil" disobedience. Equally naive is the view, encountered frequently among New Left students, that their actions should lead to immediate reversal of government policy. But to be revolutionary means precisely to doubt that this can be done without changing other things too.

Between the expression of dissent and the proclamation of acts leading to revolution, there remains little ground for "limited civil disobedience." Either the civil disobedience is revolutionary or it is merely a stronger form of demonstration. A sit-in that does not really disturb any order and such antics as were seen at the recent wake before the Pentagon are basically unserious. When the workers "sat in" in the great strike wave of 1937, they meant to disrupt business; when freedom riders "sat in," they meant to disrupt orderly service in segregated restaurants. The action was "limited" neither in form nor in purpose. The antics of the flower children are childish and purposeless.

THE POINT TO BE DECIDED, then, is this: when does the government forfeit its legitimacy and does disobedience become a moral obligation? But one must not confuse legitimacy with morality. The law may be hostile to unions but is not for *that* reason "immoral." Socrates recognized the right of his judges to send him to death. A minority which recognizes the legitimacy of the constituted authorities and "despairs" of becoming a significant veto group has no right to decide for itself that it must disrupt the conduct of action—this would be authorizing the Ku Klux Klan!

Individuals may refuse cooperation, for moral or even for aesthetic reasons, but a *movement* cannot decide such a fundamental question on the mere basis of tactical impact on the larger community. It has to declare whether the authority still must be considered as legitimate or has forfeited the title, through abuse of its mandate or for other reasons.

Expediency will not do in such serious matters. Whoever starts a civil war and thereby gives the Establishment a pretext for suppression must justify his action in terms of aim and means. If the end justifies the means, limited aims cannot justify extreme measures, and still less can desperate means justify a limited end.

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Michael Walzer

Politics in the Welfare State

Concerning the Role of American Radicals

ONE DAY, NOT SOON, the welfare state will extend its benefits to all those men and women who are at present its occasional victims, its nominal or partial members. That day will not be the end of political history. But it will represent the end of a particular history, and one in which socialists have been very much involved, if not always on our own terms.

It is worth reflecting on what that day will be like—what will we want *then*?—even while we fight to perfect the system of benefits and argue among ourselves about the best strategies. For we are not entering, we are not going to enter, the new world of state-administered prosperity all at once. It is in the nature of the welfare state, I think, that men break into it in groups, some sooner, some much later, some with only moderate difficulty, some after long and bloody struggles. Many of us are inside already, better served by machines and bureaucrats than men ever were by servants and slaves. What do we want *now*?

Liberal theorists of the welfare state have always claimed to know what we want. Their work rests on two assumptions: first, that politics ought to be the instrument of human desire; second, that the nature of human desire is obvious. People want pleasure, but such pleasure as cannot be shared, individual delight, egoistic satisfaction. The state cannot at the moment provide any sort of direct delight; perhaps one day it will simply administer the appropriate chemicals to its members. Today it can provide only the material prerequisites of individual delight, that is, first security, and then all those services conveniently grouped under the rubric of "welfare"—education, public health, economic controls, relief for the aged and the unemployed, and so on. These are vitally important services, and liberal theory is vindicated, at least in part, by the fact that they are in great demand. Every attempt to restrict them to selected groups of people has been, and will surely continue to be, resisted. The welfare state has grown through invasion—a clear tribute to its attractiveness.

In the heat of battle, goals have sometimes been suggested which elude or transcend the liberal definition of human desire. Wild hopes for equality and fraternity have been proclaimed. But each success has turned out to be a further triumph for what might best be called political utilitarianism. If we or our ancestors or our comrades in this or that struggle have sought the actuality of freedom and love, we have settled readily enough for the pursuit of private happiness—so readily, indeed, that it would be difficult to deny that private happiness is all we ever wanted.

The cumulative effects, the likely future effects, of these successive triumphs are now becoming visible, even though there are important victories yet to be won (and the last battles may be the hardest). What I propose in this essay is a theoretical examination of these effects, of the welfare state as our collective project, our common future. I want to argue that the success, or the likely success, of welfarism makes necessary (as it makes possible) a new and radical challenge to political utilitarianism. Whatever the nature of our past demands, what we want *next* is not on any of the liberal lists. But first I must try to suggest the enormous achievements and the special

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characteristics of welfare politics. For we cannot say what it is we want, until we have understood what we have got and are getting.

FIRST OF ALL, the development of the welfare state has generated a pervasive enlightenment about the functions of political organization. For the first time in history, masses of men know with absolute clarity that the state ought to be doing something for them. They are rationalists-of-everyday-life, each one demanding, "What has it done for me?" Pre-welfare theorists have generally denied the validity of this simple question, insisting that the state always *is* more than it *does*. They have described it as a closely-knit body, dense and opaque, whose members were involved emotionally as well as materially, mysteriously as well as rationally, in the fate of the whole. The members ought to be involved, it was said, not for the sake of concrete benefits of any sort, but, simply, for the sake of communion. Since loyalty was a gift for which there was to be no necessary return, it could not be predicated on anything so clear-cut as interest. It depended instead on all sorts of ideological and ceremonial mystification: anointed kings, oaths, rituals, divine laws, and so on.

The state still does depend on ideology and mystery, but to a far lesser degree than ever before. It has been the great triumph of liberal theorists and politicians to undermine every sort of political divinity, to shatter all the forms of ritual obfuscation, and to turn the mysterious oath into a rational contract. The state itself they have made over from a "body-politic" into a machine, the instrument of its citizens (rather than their mythical common life), devoted to what Jeremy Bentham called "welfare-production." It is judged, as it ought to be, by the amounts of welfare it produces and by the justice and efficiency of its distributive system.

Political unreason survives, of course, and especially in the form of an extraordinary devotion to the modern nation-state and to its leaders, a collective zeal all-to-often unmitigated by individual interest or by any demand for functional transparency. But here too the direction of political utilitarianism is clearly marked out. Thus an eighteenth-century *philosophe*: "What is patriotism? It is an enlightened love of ourselves, which teaches us to love the government which protects us . . . the society which works for our happiness." This definition suggests that many of us are patriotic, if we are, for wrong or inadequate reasons. I will try to describe some of these reasons a little later on.

SECOND, THE EXPANSION of welfare production gives to the state a new and thoroughly rational legitimacy. The state is always immoral when viewed from the standpoint of its invisible and degraded men. Whatever the ideologies of which they are the primary victims, oppressed classes come eventually to regard the claims of their rulers with a deep-rooted skepticism and hostility.

But the claims of the liberals are of a different sort, not mysterious but hypocritical. Therefore the hostility of the oppressed takes a new form: not sullen and inarticulate disbelief, but a positive demand that the claims be realized. Do the middle classes claim to increase the general prosperity? Let them increase *our* prosperity. Do the police claim to defend public security? Let them defend *our* security. Do the rulers of the welfare state claim to maximize the happiness of the greatest number? Let them maximize *our* happiness.

Now insofar as the state becomes a general welfare state, excluding nobody, it meets these demands and so generates a legitimacy such as no previous political system has ever achieved. If no man is invisible, the state is not immoral. The recognition of its members as concrete individuals with needs and desires may seem a minimal requirement of any political system and

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hardly capable of producing significant moral attachments. In fact, however, such recognition, when it is finally achieved, will be the outcome of centuries of struggle; the right to be visible is always hard-won; and the liberal state which finally recognizes all men and grants them their humanity will inherit from those centuries an extraordinary moral power. The state will never again be so easy to challenge as it was in the days of mass invisibility.

THIRD, THE DEVELOPMENT of the welfare state has gone hand-in-hand with a transformation in the scale of political organization. This is due not only to increase in the rates of infant and adult survival—the first benefit of the welfare state is life—but also to the progressive extension of political membership to previously invisible men. The tiny political public of an earlier period has been broken into by successive waves of lower-class invaders. It has expanded to absorb each wave; it will probably expand to absorb each future wave.

Liberal theorists and politicians have discovered that there are no necessary limits on the size of the public—so long as its members are conceived as individual recipients of benefits, so long as the problems of political communion, the sharing of a common life, are carefully avoided. Now that there really are concrete benefits to be divided, the first political problem is distribution. And the members of the state, precisely because they are recognized as needful persons, seen by the impersonal public eye and assisted by an impersonal administration, need no longer be able to recognize and assist one another. The size of the citizen body of a Greek polis, like that of an early modern aristocracy, was limited by the requirement that its members be known to each other and so distinguishable from the faceless mass. But once invisibility is banished, the need for political "friendship" is also banished. The members of the welfare state need not have even the most remote acquaintance with each other. And so the welfare state is potentially of infinite extent.

THE FOURTH TENDENCY of successful welfare production is to decrease the importance of politics itself and to turn the state from a political order into an administrative agency. This was always the goal of liberalism and it is the key reason for the liberal insistence upon the transparent material purposes of the state. Beyond welfare the liberal state cannot go: the world of the mind, philosophy, art, literature and religion; the world of the emotions, friendship, sex and love—all these have been set outside its limits. They have been freed from politics, protected against heavy-handed and intolerant magistrates. Simultaneously, liberal politics has been freed from philosophy, art, literature, religion, friendship, sex and love.

Politics is now concerned only with the provision of a plentiful and enjoyable external world and with the promotion of longevity so that this world can be enjoyed as long as possible. And it has been the assumption of liberal theorists ever since Hobbes and Locke that once security and welfare were assured, once the utilitarian purposes of politics were achieved, men would turn away from public to private life, to business and family, or to religion and self-cultivation. Indeed, it was this turning away—which might be called legitimate apathy since it rests on the satisfaction of all recognized needs and desires—that would assure the stability of the liberal achievement. Conflict would disappear; the state would become a neutral agency for the administration of security and welfare. This was a liberal even before it was a Marxian vision, as Marx himself suggested when he wrote that political emancipation, as practiced by the liberals, "was at the same time the emancipation of civil society from politics."

The state is an instrument and not an end in itself. Politics is an activity with a purpose

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and not itself an enjoyable activity. These are axioms of liberal enlightenment; the attack upon the opacity of the traditional polity turns out to be an attack upon the value of political life. Why should we be active in politics? asked Thomas Hobbes, and his sarcastic reply suggests the central animus of liberal theory:

> —to have our wisdom undervalued before our own facts; by an uncertain trial of a little vain-glory to undergo most certain enmities . . . to hate and be hated . . . to lay open our secret councils and advices to all, to no purpose and without any benefit; to neglect the affairs of our own families.

So long as the state establishes peace and —added later liberal writers—promotes welfare, public activity is a waste of time, positively dysfunctional in the economy of private life. Happiness begins and ends at home. One of the ways in which the welfare state promotes happiness is by encouraging men to stay home. Hence the crucial principles of welfare distribution are first, that benefits ought to be distributed to individuals and, second, that they ought to be designed to enhance private worlds. In the perfected welfare state, enjoyment will always be private; only administration will be public; the policeman and the welfare administrator will be the only public men.

NOW OBVIOUSLY THIS is no description of our present experience. Never in human history has politics been so important to so many people, never have so many been active in politics, as in the past century and a half. Never before has the state stood at the center of so large a circle of conflict, agitation, and maneuver. Politics has been the crucial means of becoming visible, of winning recognition for mass needs and desires. Nor has it been only a means: political activity has also brought the first joyful sense of membership in a community. It has provided the positive pleasures of self-assertion and mutual recognition, of collective effort and achievement.

Unlike the welfare state itself, the struggle groups which have demanded and won the various benefits the state now provides—the unions, parties and movements—have been shaped to a human scale; their members have also been colleagues; they have called one another brethren, citizens, comrades. For a brief moment in time they created a communion which was not mysterious or opaque precisely because it was a common creation.

As the organizations of the oppressed win their battles, however, they are gradually integrated into the system of welfare administration. Their purposes are not given up, or not wholly given up, but rather give rise, under new circumstances, to new organizational forms: the struggle groups become pressure groups. Public life ceases to engage the minds and emotions of their members; local activity drops off; popular participation declines sharply. The tenacious sense of detail peculiar to highly qualified bureaucrats replaces the enthusiasm of members: it is more useful, even to the members themselves.

The pleasures of political struggle cannot be sustained once victory has been won. And it is in the nature of the infinitely expandable welfare state that victories can, in fact, be won. Thus it happens that communion is replaced by distribution, generalized aspiration by concrete expectation. Erstwhile militants are isolated and immobilized by the sheer size of the state into which they have won admission, mollified by its apparent legitimacy, by the obvious sincerity of its administrators and the transparency of their purposes. The history of the welfare state begins with the coerced passivity of invisible and degraded men, mystified by ideology. And it ends, or will one day end, with the voluntary passivity of enlightened men, their human desires recognized and (in part) gratified by the public authorities. So, at any rate, we have been led to believe by liberal writers.

What more can we possibly ask?

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ALL THESE DEVELOPMENTS—the growing rationality and legitimacy of the state, the vast increase in its size, and the decline of political life—are not only compatible with classical liberal theory, but actually represent its fulfillment. But there is one further corollary of welfare production which raises the most serious problems for liberalism: the growth of state power.

There can be no question that the development of welfare programs has involved (or required) an extraordinary expansion of the machinery of everyday state administration and therefore an increase in the degree, intensity and detail of social control. In part, this increase stems directly from the progressive enlargement of bureaucratic systems and from improvements in the training and discipline of their personnel. But it is also closely related to the very nature of the utilitarian service state and to the character of the political struggles of the past century and a half.*

For all that time liberals (and socialists too) have been like that character of Gogol's who "wanted to bring the government into everything, even into his daily quarrels with his wife"—though some of them would have stopped short at the seat of domestic bliss. Everywhere else the agents of government have been invited to roam. This was true even during the brief moment of *laissez-faire,* for the restrictions on commerce which were then overcome were largely local and corporate, and only the central government could overcome them.

Indeed, the state has been an instrument absolutely necessary to reformers of every sort: it shatters the authority of local and traditional elites; it destroys the old corporations and regulates the new ones; it establishes minimal standards for masses of men whose own organizations, however powerful, cannot do so by themselves; it protects racial and religious minorities. It is, so to speak, the crucial licensing agency of modern society, increasingly the only one; it accords recognitions, turning oppressed subjects into full-fledged members. And it absorbs the power of every defunct agency as it wins the support of every newly enfranchised member.

Nor is its usefulness at an end. Given the continued creation of new groups, the continued raising of the level of material desire, the perfection of welfare production may well be an asymptotic goal and the state an eternally progressive force. But this does not mean that the character of political struggle will remain unchanged as new groups and new desires replace the old. For from a certain point in time, the new groups will almost certainly cease to have the same communal structure as the old. The deprivations of their members are more likely to be experienced by each man in his private, state-protected world, experienced simultaneously but not shared.

Thus the Negro is one kind of invisible man, bound to his fellows in a community of suffering and anger and therefore capable of collective action. The man who drives a dangerous car or breathes polluted air is another kind, largely unaware of the risks he shares with others, only marginally aware of the existence of others, and probably incapable of significant efforts on his own behalf. Precisely because of the privatizing results of the benefits he has already won (his automobile, for example), he now stands alone and helpless in the face of one or another sort of corporate power. He is dependent upon the muckraking of free-lance journalists and academic experts and, much more, upon the benevolence of the state.

THIS BENEVOLENCE has its price: the increased power of the benevolent administrators, the increasing control over the recipients of benefits. Perhaps the most im-

* The single greatest factor in the expansion of state power has, of course, been external war, and it is probably true that the greatest dangers posed by the modern liberal state are not those which its own citizens must face. But I have, perhaps arbitrarily, excluded foreign policy and war from this discussion.

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pressive feature of modern welfare administration is the sheer variety of its coercive and deterrent instruments. Every newly recognized need, every service received, creates a new dependency and so a new social bond.

"A wife and a child are so many pledges a man gives to the world for his good behavior," wrote Jeremy Bentham. This is true only insofar as the world—economy and state—actually provides or promises a decent living to the wife and child. If it does, the pledge is serious indeed. And the better the living the world promises, the more good behavior it requires. Welfare politics thus has a dialectical pattern: pressure from below for more protection or benefits meets pressure from above for better (more disciplined, or orderly, or sociable) behavior. A balance is struck, breaks down, is struck again. Each new balance is achieved at a higher level of welfare production, includes more people, provides new reasons (and new sanctions) for good behavior.

Eventually, every anti-social act is interpreted as a demand for increased benefits. So it is. And so welfare is the obvious and only antidote to delinquency and riot. For who would be unwilling, if actually given the chance, to pay the price of social discipline, orderly conduct, hard work, and public decency for the sake of the pursuit of happiness? Only much later does it turn out that the price and the purchase are very nearly the same thing. Happiness *is* good behavior, and this equation, fervently endorsed by the authorities, is the ultimate sanction.

LIKE THE PUBLIC RECOGNITION of needs, so the recognition of men—our hard-won visibility—becomes a source of intensified social control. Never have ordinary citizens been so well-known to the public authorities as in the welfare state. We are all counted, numbered, classified, catalogued, polled, interviewed, watched, and filed away. The IBM card is the very means of our visibility, the guarantee that we are not forgotten among so many millions—even as it is simultaneously a symbol of our bondage to the bureaucratic machine.

Invisible men are invisible first of all to the officials of the state (and that is a worse bondage). Precisely because they are not seen as citizens, they are exposed to arbitrary cruelty and neglect. Because they are not numbered, they are always treated *en masse*. Because they are never polled, they are thought to have no opinions. Even their crimes, so long as they injure only one another, are not recorded. When their country goes to war, they are impressed (that is, kidnapped), but not conscripted. Gradually, with the development of the welfare state, all this changes. An extraordinary traffic opens up between the visible and the previously invisible sections of society. Individuals and groups win public recognition, learn good behavior, and march out of the slums and ghettos. At the same time, policemen, census takers, recruiting officers, tax collectors, welfare workers, radical organizers, and sociologists (in roughly that historical order) march in.

In the long run, the two parts of society will merge into one world of absolutely visible men (that does not mean a world of equals), known not to each other but to the specialists in such knowledge, not personally but statistically. The universal character of this new knowledge doubtless will protect individuals from magisterial whim and prejudice. That is one of its purposes. But it will also involve a new kind of exposure: to the developing administrative sciences of anticipation and prevention.

"It's the anarchy of poverty/Delights me . . . " wrote William Carlos Williams. He was too easily delighted, or rather, his delight was that of an onlooker and not a participant in the "anarchic" culture of the poor. Few men who are actually poor would share it. But having said that, it is still worth adding: It's the regiment of the contented/ That haunts me.

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LIBERALS HAVE NOT BEEN UNAWARE of the dangers of administrative tyranny. Wherever possible they have sought to avoid even benevolent regimentation by giving those whose welfare is at stake "sovereign" power, that is, by establishing governments representative of everyone who receives benefits. In the past that has generally meant of all property owners, for they have been the most important welfare recipients. It obviously means more today, though just how much more is unclear.

The expansion of the range of state benefits and the extension of the ballot to new social groups have been parallel and related processes. Suffrage is the first badge of membership; it is a means of winning benefits and also, presumably, of determining their character and the nature of their administration. In practice, however, it is something less than this. "Welfare without representation," Sargeant Shriver has said, "is tyranny." That is certainly true. But it is not the case that the only alternative to tyranny is a full-scale democracy.

IN THEORY, of course, the purpose of representative government is to make the mass of people all-powerful. Representatives are to be delegates, asserting popular desires, and then legislators, enacting the popular will. Administrators are to be nothing more than servants of the people, bound absolutely by legislative decree. The quality of security and welfare is thus popularly determined, at only one remove. The government of representatives cannot be made responsible to the people on a day-to-day basis, but its general responsibility can be maintained by periodic elections and, more importantly, by continuous political activity between elections. The ultimate defense against bureaucratic omnicompetence is the self-interested assertiveness of ordinary men.

If things have not worked out this way, and do not seem likely to, it is at least partly because liberals never developed a system of democratic activism sufficient to bind administrators to representatives and representatives to constituents. Political parties might have served this purpose, but in the U.S., at least, parties have not developed as membership organizations capable of stimulating commitment and action on the grass-roots level. Local politics has never been competitive with business and family. And it has been discovered that the enhancement of private life through public welfare really does not require any very rigorous and energetic self-government. It may well require a period of sustained struggle, but once that has been won, continued political participation (beyond occasional voting) seems unnecessary and even uneconomical.

Nor is it obvious that the closely articulated representative system that might make such activity worthwhile is really feasible, given the potentially infinite size and the extraordinary administrative complexity of the modern state. Administration has already outdistanced every other branch of government in the sheer accumulation of resources: competent staff, statistical knowledge, patronage, fiscal controls, regulatory powers, secrecy when that is required, publicity when it is not, and so on. Legislative activity has ceased in virtually every respect to be the central feature of the governmental process. It has been replaced in part by administration itself, in part by bargaining between state bureaucrats and the (non-elected) representatives of a great variety of social constituencies.

Thus a modern worker or farmer is far more usefully represented, his interest more successfully defended, by the Washington-based lobbyist of his union than by his locally-based congressman. This is true even though his congressman is elected in a democratic fashion, while the officers of his union are probably co-opted and the lobbyist appointed. It is virtually a law of political life that power be imitated, that those who seek benefits copy the organizational style of those who dispense benefits. Today it is palpably the executive rather than the legislative

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branch of government that is copied. At least, it is copied by those secondary associations already within the welfare system; outside, other models are still possible. In any case, the electoral process has gradually taken on the character of an outer limit, a form of ultimate popular defense rather than of popular self-government, while the day-to-day visibility of workers and farmers and the legitimacy of their government are both maintained by processes largely, though by no means entirely, independent of democratic elections. The modern welfare state is an example of limited government, but not yet of popular sovereignty.

THE FAILURE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT reveals the fundamental difficulty of liberal utilitarianism. Its standard of utility is the welfare of an individual absolutely free to make his own choices and measure his own happiness. In fact, however, no such individual has ever existed.

Men live in groups and always find that they have limited choices and share, without having chosen, social measurements. If they are ever free to choose new limits and measurements, they must do so in some cooperative fashion, arguing among themselves, reaching a common decision. But to do this, to act collectively like the sovereign individual of the utilitarians, they must share political power. Government must be responsive to their concrete wills and not merely (as at present) to their conventionally defined desires. If they do not share power, they inevitably become the prisoners of the established social systems which they invade or into which they are admitted.

State recognition of new groups obviously affects the structure of social power and value, but there is very little evidence to suggest that it does so in fundamental ways. It clearly does not do so in the ways anticipated during the long struggles for recognition, that is, it does not open the way to social and economic equality. The welfare state has turned out to be perfectly compatible with inequality. Bureaucratic benevolence even bolsters inequality insofar as it neutralizes the struggle groups, decomposing and privatizing popular willfulness. Fundamental social change would require that the state embody this willfulness, inviting its new members to choose their own limits and measurements. This it does not, perhaps cannot, do.

Instead, welfare administrators function, whether consciously or not, as double agents: serving the minimal material interests of the invaders and upholding at the same time the social system that is being invaded. That is why welfare administration, especially in its more direct forms (social work, for example), tends so generally toward paternalism. The administrators are committed in advance to the common limits and measurements, to the established modes of security and welfare. They are knowledgeable about these modes and patronizing toward anyone who is ignorant or uncommitted. But the invaders have burst into a world they never chose. They have to be helped, guided, educated in the acceptable forms of aspiration and action. They are, in a word, newly licensed to have needs, but not yet intentions or plans of their own.

THE PERFECTED WELFARE STATE will bring with it an end to the terrible oppressiveness of poverty and invisibility. Once all men are recognized as members (even if only by a distant and powerful government), the sheer magnitude of state terrorism and economic exploitation, and so of human misery, will be enormously reduced. At the same time, it needs to be said that security and welfare are not open-ended categories whose final character will be determined by the freedmen of the liberal state. The pursuit of private happiness may be endless, but its direction, for most of us, is given. The newer welfare recipients are not and are not likely to become self-determining men; they remain subject to the determinations of others,

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not only in the state, but in society and economy as well. Indeed, the established forms of social and economic (that is, corporate) power are likely to be strengthened just as state power has been strengthened: by the general expansion in scale, by the increase in legitimacy that derives from the admission, however reluctant, of all outsiders, by the universal improvement in everyday social behavior, by the new forms of bureaucratic surveillance and record-keeping. For these same reasons, the individual member is taken into account in a new way. When his rulers claim to serve him, the claim is not a lie; it is his political destiny to receive services. The reception of services brings freedom of a limited sort, but of a sort rare enough to be valuable. The citizen of the welfare state is free (and, in many cases, newly enabled) to pursue private happiness within the established social and economic system. He is not free to shape or reshape the system, for he has not seized and, except in minimal ways, he does not share political power.

THERE IS NO READILY accessible meaning in the frequent assertion that socialism lies "beyond the welfare state." No evidence suggests that socialism represents the next stage of history, or that the full development of welfare-production entails a socialist society. "Beyond," in that hopeful phrase, has neither a historical nor a logical sense.

Although socialist parties and movements have often been in the forefront of the struggle for welfare, and above all for equality in the distribution of benefits, it remains true that socialist theory belongs to a tradition of thought and aspiration not only different from, but also in perennial competition with liberal utilitarianism. Against the utilitarians, socialists have argued that mere private life, however enhanced by state action, cannot sustain a significant human culture; that the family does not provide an adequate arena for the human emotions; that man has both a mind and a passion for society; that he requires an active public life. Against the private man of liberal theory, socialists have defended the free citizen.*

THIS DISAGREEMENT is in no sense adequately summed up in the words "individualism" and "collectivism." In both traditions, the individual is recognized as the ultimate value; socialists and liberals unite in opposing any ideology which assigns to the state a moral being independent of the willfulness and rationality of its particular members. But to deny the claims of statist ideologies is not necessarily to assert a purely instrumentalist political theory.

Individual men can still recognize the pleasures of politics, can still choose political life as an end-in-itself. For politics is something more than welfare production. It is a vital and exciting world of work and struggle; of aspiration, initiative, intrigue, and argument; of collective effort, mutual recognition, and *amour social;* of organized hostility; of public venture and social achievement, of personal triumph and failure.

The welfare state offers no satisfactory substitute for any of these. Its theorists claim that all the intellectual and emotional energies of political men can be rechanneled into private life, and their creativity co-opted by intelligent administrators. Neither of these claims is true. The welfare state requires the virtual withering away of political energy and the disappearance, at least from public life, of any very significant po-

* Utilitarianism is not, of course, the only form of liberal politics; liberals have also been interested in local government and voluntary association; pluralism, before it became an ideological catchword, was as much a liberal as a socialist theory, and for both liberals and socialists it emphasized the values of political participation and communal life. But I don't think it is unfair to suggest that utilitarianism has been for some time the dominant form of liberalism and, more important, that it has been the central creed of liberals-in-power. I suppose utilitarianism has also been the central creed of socialists-in-power, but socialists, perhaps fortunately for socialism, have been in power less often.

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pular creativity. This requirement is first of all an extreme restriction upon the pursuit of happiness—because political activity is or might be one of the forms that pursuit takes for many people. Even more important, it involves a surrender of everyone's say in the determination of further restrictions (or expansions), a surrender of any popular role in determining the shape and substance, the day-to-day quality, of our common life. This is the socialist indictment of liberal utilitarianism.

THE TERMS OF THE INDICTMENT have not often been made clear in the recent past because so many of us who regard ourselves as socialists have found a kind of political fulfillment in the struggles for the welfare state. We have allied ourselves with the crowds of men battering at the gates of American society. Their cause has been our public passion. This will continue to be so for some time to come, probably for the foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, as we campaign for this or that welfare measure, we are driven to ask ourselves John Stuart Mill's famous question: "Suppose that . . . all the changes in institutions and opinions which you [are] looking forward to could be completely effected at this very instant: would this be a joy and a happiness to you?" And as with Mill, so with us, "an irrepressible self-consciousness distinctly answers, No!"

The welfare state is not the name of our desire. And what is more, the achievement of the welfare state might well entail the end of that public activity which has until now been a joy and a happiness to us. When contemporary writers talk about the "end of ideology," the disappearance of generalized aspiration, they are describing just this closing down of the possibilities for public intellectual and emotional commitment. Though their announcements are at the very least premature, they linger in our minds as disturbing predictions.

BUT IF WE ARE RIGHT in thinking that there are human desires that the welfare state cannot fulfill, then surely these desires will continue to be expressed in the form of collective demands and claims. If men really do seek the common achievements and shared excitements of politics, then they will have them, in one form or another. And they will produce new ideologies to validate their new activities.

In a sense, the welfare state makes these new activities possible, even though it decrees that they must be pursued without the goad of material need and even though its officials hope that they will not in fact be pursued. Political life, if it is to have any significance, must now be chosen for its own sake, and only now can be chosen for its own sake. I am going to assume that liberal ideologists' predictions of the "end of ideology" are wrong and that large numbers of people (not all people) are prone to make this choice. They demand or will demand some form of political participation, some share in political power. How shall their demand be met?

It might be met by the state itself. For there is no obvious reason why the officials of the welfare state, pressed by their constituents or by their own ambitions, should not move beyond the narrow limits of liberal utilitarianism. They will be, they are already, tempted to do so, for two not entirely consistent reasons: first, to avoid the great difficulties that will inevitably be encountered in the expansion of welfare production beyond its present limits; second, to avoid the boredom of success. In the long run, the second is the more important: while the building of the welfare state will have its exciting and morally significant moments, its administration will not. Its administrators will rarely feel themselves buoyed up and sustained by the zeal of their clients. The pride they may well take in the material services they render will never be elevated by the inner conviction of a higher purpose.

But beyond welfare there are many areas

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in which such purposes might be sought: education, culture, communications, mental health, city planning (and, most tempting and dangerous of all, though not within the range of this discussion, foreign policy). In all these areas the state can be active, in all of them political energies can be expended and emotional commitments made, in all of them common goods can be discovered, goods to be shared and not merely distributed.

Imagine, then, that the state moves into the field of "culture-promotion." Won't the possibilities of cooperative choice and political self-determination be enhanced? Won't the citizens of such a state, the recipients not only of material but also of spiritual benefits, feel themselves to be members of a moral community, a world of rights and obligations?

Perhaps they will; our feelings are not always under our own control. Indeed, we know they will, for the modern state always intrudes, in greater or lesser degree, into areas that lie beyond welfare, most often in the name of political socialization. Obviously, it does so with considerable success. But all this has nothing to do with socialism or with a meaningful common life, for reasons which go to the very heart of the theory of citizenship and participation.

UNLIKE THE DEFENDERS OF the welfare state, theorists of citizenship have always been concerned with the problem of social scale. If human emotional and intellectual needs are to be partially fulfilled within political society, they have argued, then that society cannot be of any size or shape. It must be built on a human scale, accessible to our minds and feelings, responsive to our decisions.

Exactly what constitutes a human scale is and ought to be a subject of debate, but this is a debate likely to be carried on chiefly among radical democrats and socialists; it is not a debate in which liberal utilitarians take much interest. For it cannot be established that security and welfare are more efficiently administered to 2 million or 50 million or 200 million people. In fact, it is virtually certain that the quality of security and welfare need not change with the size of the population.

But this is probably not the case with regard to the fulfillment of nonmaterial desires. The quality and authenticity of emotional commitment, for example, does appear to vary with population size, though not absolutely or without reference to other factors: human emotions are more easily manipulated the wider their focus anl the more they are cut away from immediate personal experience. Participation in cultural life probably varies the same way: the larger the audience, the more passive its members, the more stereotyped the products they consume. Once again, the formula is too pat, but surely contains an element of truth, and its significance may plausibly be extended to politics as well.

The increasing size of the state, the growing power of administration, the decline of political life: all these turn politics from a concrete activity into what Marx once called the fantasy of everyday life. The state becomes an arena in which men do not act but watch the action, and, like other audiences, are acted upon. Patriotic communion is always a fraud when it is nothing more than the communion of an audience with its favorite actors, of passive subjects and heroes of the stage. Our emotions are merely tricked by parades and pageants, the rise and fall of political gladiators, the deaths of beloved chiefs, the somber or startling rites of a debased religion. It could be done to anyone, whereas patriotism ought to be the pride of a particular man, the enjoyment of particular activities.

When the modern state moves beyond welfare, it does not bring us the satisfactions of citizenship, but only vicarious participation, the illusion of a common life. We find ourselves as if in a dream, living once again in a world which is morally dense and

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opaque, mystified by ideologies, dominated by leaders whose purposes are not obvious. We are oppressed in the name of a public interest, a national purpose, a solemn commitment, which is neither yours, nor mine, nor ours, in any usual sense of those perfectly simple pronouns. It is difficult not to conclude, as the liberals do, that with the provision of individual material needs, the state reaches or ought to reach its limits. That is the end of its history, the culmination of its legitimacy. There is no state beyond the welfare state.

THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL the modern state is a battle for the perfection of the welfare system. Any political leader who claims that it is more than this, who claims, for example, that citizens should do more for the state than the state does for them, is a dangerous man. He aims to avoid the problems of welfare production, or he seeks some sort of totalitarian "transcendence" (or he is preparing the nation for one or another kind of imperial adventure).

The fight over welfare is important enough. Given the most immediate desires of the poor themselves, given the sheer avariciousness of the rich and the powerful, the fight for some minimal standards of distributive justice takes on all the moral significance that has been attributed to it in the past century and a half. Nevertheless, it is not the only fight; nor ought the state to be the only focus of contemporary political struggle.

Even if the welfare state were to be perfected under the best possible conditions and under socialist auspices, the dangers of bureaucratic omnicompetence and popular passivity would not be avoided. Nor would a socialist government create a socialist society. That requires a different kind of politics, not the kind to which we are all so well accustomed, aimed permanently at the state, but a politics of immediate self-government, a politics of (relatively) small groups.

Socialist writers have never had a great deal that was new or interesting to say about the state. Despite vague phrases about its withering away, they seem to presuppose, as they probably must, an efficient and benevolent bureaucracy, hovering, so to speak, in the background, its central offices as far away as possible. The chief concern of the best left-wing theorists has always been with that day-to-day cooperation in productive activity which occupies the foreground of social life. That means, with those "life-giving nucleii," as Simone Weill called them, within which the local, immediate character of work and culture is determined.

Such secondary associations exist, or can exist, *within* the welfare state, but insofar as they are of some human value, they exist in permanent tension with the centralized administrative system necessary to welfare production. It is not the natural tendency even of liberal bureaucracy to encourage the formation of autonomous groups. This is so both because of the individualist bias of the welfare system and because of the perennial efforts of administrators to escape the system's utilitarian limits and meet the demand for meaningful citizenship in their own (fraudulent) fashion.

What socialism requires, then, is not that the welfare state be surpassed or transcended, whatever that would mean, but that it be held tightly to its own limits, drained of whatever superfluous moral content and unnecessary political power it has usurped, reduced so far as possible to a transparent administrative shell (overarching, protective, enabling) within which smaller groups can grow and prosper. The state is not going to wither away; it must be hollowed out.

WHAT SORTS OF GROUPS can fill the shell? Two are of especial interest here.

First, the great functional organizations, labor unions, professional associations, and so on: these are the crucial representative bodies of the present day. Their strength and inclusiveness is the best guarantee we can

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have of the benevolence of the welfare bureaucracy. Unorganized men are unrepresented and unprotected men, their claims unheard or but distantly heard at the centers of power. If they are benefited at all, they are subject to the most extreme paternalism.

The perfection of the welfare state will require the organization of all possible functional groups, even, or rather especially, the group of those who receive direct state assistance. In a society which still exploits masses of men, poverty is itself a function and no one so desperately requires representation as the man without an adequate income. But all these organizations, as I have argued, tend to become integrated into the welfare system: for them, success *is* integration. They are then trapped in more or less stable bargaining arrangements with governmental or corporate bureaucracies and forced to discipline their own members. They are agents simultaneously of distributive justice and social control. They are not and probably cannot be expected to become arenas of democratic decision-making (even though they will be the occasional focus of democratic revolts).

Second, all the local units of social life, work, education and culture: cities and towns, factories, union locals, universities, churches, political clubs, neighborhood associations, theater groups, editorial boards, and so on. These might be conceived as overlapping circles of engagement and action, closed circles (though not closed in any coercive sense), whose members face inward at least some of the time, and within which resources are contained.

These are the most likely arenas of a genuinely democratic politics. The great danger of the perfected welfare state is that all or most of them would be broken open, so that resources leak away, independence is lost, and the members turn outward to face the powerful state, where all the action is, from which all good things come. To some extent this has already happened. But the process is by no means so far advanced as some of the more extreme versions of the theory of "mass society" suggest. Associations and neighborhoods continue to provide important social space for agitation and activity. Indeed, it needs to be said that the advance of the liberal state often transforms traditionalist communities (like the old churches) into new political arenas.

At the same time, however, the same process cuts individuals loose, isolates them from communal ties, drives them into a material and then an emotional dependency on the central authorities. It is in response to the expectant faces of these "liberated" individuals that state administrators proclaim the mysteries of national purpose and decide that they must pursue "excellence" or promote culture (or defend freedom), rewarding their eager, needful and bored constituents with inflated rhetoric and byzantine artifacts, and all-too-often eliciting from them an irrational and unreflective patriotism.

Now all such pursuits and promotions lie outside the competence of the state; they belong to a different sphere of activity; they require a smaller scale of organization. To make these points and to make them stick is the major purpose of socialist politics in the welfare state. It amounts to saying that what we want *next,* and what we want to share, are the pleasures of power. This demand for local self-determination, since it is made in the face of a state whose power is unprecedented in human history, is sometimes called by the melodramatic but useful name "insurgency."*

* It is one of the odder features of political life that we characterize the common forms of oppression and domination with euphemisms and use words with the most violent connotations to describe modest acts of individual and popular self-assertion. In an article in DISSENT some five years ago, I used the term "resistance" to suggest the sorts of activities presently called insurgency by various New Left writers. Their word will do as well, though they are no more guerrilla fighters than I am.

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ANY MEMBER OF THE WELFARE STATE who is willful as well as desirous and who seeks some local space in which to act out his willfulness can be called an insurgent. He insists on his intentions as well as his needs. He seeks to close the circle (not every circle) against bureaucratic intrusions. He reargues the old democratic proposition that decisions should be made by those who are most affected by them. He calls into question the omnicompetence of the service state and of all the organizations created in its image.

In schools, factories, and neighborhoods, where social workers pursue their errands of decency, or union officials defend the interests of their members, or provosts and deans plan the educational experiences of the young, insurgency is likely to be a perennial phenomenon. It takes the form of wildcat strikes, welfare unions, student rebellions. Already a sense of professional *esprit* is growing up among those who know, or think they know, how to "handle" such outbursts. They believe that insurgency is a repudiation of services rendered, stupidly self-destructive since the services are so obviously helpful, even if they are often ineptly or impersonally delivered.

But insurgency is, or ought to be, very different from this. Its participants are not concerned that bureaucrats be sensitive and warm, but that they be reticent and limited, less imposing, less intrusive than they often are. Insurgency is a demand that bureaucratic services make possible, instead of replacing, local decision-making. Or rather, it is the acting out of a new dialectic, which denies conventional definitions of good behavior and seeks to make the "helpfulness" of the welfare bureaucracy into the starting point of a new politics of popular resistance and self-government.

IN THE LONG RUN, the issue for socialists is not state power,† but power *right here,* on this shop floor, in this university, in this city. And the central assumption of insurgent politics is that such power must always be won "from below"—which is also to say, against all the odds. For the triumph of benevolent bureaucrats in virtually every local society has been one of the results, not so much inevitable as overdetermined, of the entrance of masses of men into the political world. It is a function of integration.

Most of the previous forms of radical politics have involved demands for wider and wider systems of integration; every successful revolution has produced such a system. But insurgency is different from revolution (more limited, more immediate) precisely in that it seeks no more extensive unity, but calls instead for the multiplication of diverse and independent unities. And it begins this process with a modest but urgent demand for a share *right now* in the management of *this* community.

Whether this can actually be won and the victory sustained is another matter. It is not difficult to imagine a kind of permanent insurgency, generating marginal but never major disturbances in the welfare state, always asserting its claims, never able to enforce them, capable of staging riots, never capable of building a movement or a new community. Newspapers provide us daily with intimations of such a pattern. We don't know if local organizations of rebellious citizens can displace entrenched officials, sanctioned and supported by the central state; nor do we know if they can win any substantial allegiance from their own members, establish some more or less effective control over the local politics of work and culture, and generate significant cooperative activity. Above all, we don't know if they can create new patterns of democratic responsibility, so that the militants of this or that rebellion don't simply become a new elite. That success is possible must be the socialist's faith,

† Nor is it corporate power: the problem of counter-balancing, regulating, or destroying the power of private corporations is primarily a welfare problem; it concerns the most immediate interests of workers and consumers. But its solution would not necessarily even raise the question of democratic decision-making.

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or better, the wager that sustains his commitment.

The politics of insurgency and the politics of welfare obviously overlap, both in time and technique, and their different purposes are sometimes confused. Insurgency has been a prominent feature of every struggle for recognition: the sit-in strikes of the 1930's are the classic example. Oppressed groups must always win enough power either to threaten those who refuse to grant their demands or to threaten the general peace and so compel state intervention on their behalf. And "enough" power always means power in some particular place and sufficient to inflict some particular injury.

But so long as the goal of the oppressed is (as it ought to be) membership in the greater society rather than autonomy for the smaller one, such power is largely a means to an end, and it disappears when it ceases to be a necessary means. It gradually seeped away from local unions, for example, once bargaining rights were granted at the national or industry-wide level—and while this was certainly a democratic loss, it must be admitted that what the workers wanted could only have been won at the national level.

Something like this will probably happen in the civil rights movement also, since the problems of the Negro community can not be solved until its activists transform such local power as they may win into national recognition and full admission into the welfare state. And this suggests a lesson which is not easy to learn: that political power must always be twice-won. It must be won first with the help of the state or through the creation of parallel bureaucracies against established local or corporate elites. Then it must be won again by new popular forces against the state. In the U.S. today, the Negro is still fighting the first battle; Americans who have already won national recognition are, hopefully, ready for the second.

SOCIALISM, it has often been said, requires decentralization. But that is not quite accurate, for it implies a process that begins at the center and is, just for that reason, inherently unlikely. It suggests that socialism awaits the triumph of a national movement whose leaders are ready to sponsor the fragmentation and dispersion of the power they have so recently won. Once installed, however, won't they be driven to realize how much good might be done with their power if only it is kept intact . . . for a few years more? (And they may well be right.) We ought, of course, to insist that state officials do as much as they can to encourage the growth of secondary associations independent of themselves, not forming wheels within wheels of their welfare-producing machine. But the vitality of such associations depends finally on those who associate.

Socialism then requires insurgency, that is, self-government within the welfare state and against it whenever necessary. And it is the great paradox of socialist politics that the state toward which we must always remain tense, watchful, and resistant is or will almost certainly become the most legitimate, rationally purposive and powerful state that has ever existed.

IN OUR NEXT ISSUE:

BEN B. SELIGMAN — *The Poverty of Aging*

DEBORAH MEYER — *From a Harlem School*

MICHAEL WALZER — *Two Cheers for Participatory Democracy*

H. L. NIEBURG — *The Reversal of Technological Innovation*

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Lewis Coser

Nechayev in the Andes

Régis Debray's "Revolution in the Revolution"

"THE EMANCIPATION of the working class is the work of the working class itself," wrote Marx and Engels in the *Communist Manifesto.*

One of the tragic paradoxes of the Marxist movement has been that impatient revolutionaries—appalled by the sluggishness of history and the apparent unwillingness of the working class to be concerned in its alleged interest—have ever since been in search of substitute agents of historical transformation.

Lenin, convinced that unaided working-class spontaneity could create trade-union but not political consciousness, bent all his energies to organizing a devoted sect of professionals who would become the real agents of the revolutionary transformation, even though initially they might be mainly intellectuals of middle-class origin. The emancipation of the working class, Lenin believed, could never be accomplished except through the Bolshevik party. And in due course, the party substituted itself for the working class.

In Lenin's day the Russian working class was numerically small, almost drowned in a sea of peasants. But it carried considerable specific weight due to its high degree of social concentration. In China, by contrast, when the Chinese Communist party was created there was hardly an industrial working class at all. In consequence, after the bloody repression of revolutionary attempts in a few port cities, Mao Tse-tung turned to the peasantry, which was led by cadres of *déclassé* intellectuals, as the major revolutionary force. That very peasantry toward which Marx had expressed his withering contempt, and that he had judged to be incapable of concerted action due to its isolation from the major centers of political and economic power, became the basis for the second major revolution to call itself—such are the ironies of history—"Marxist."

Since this article was written, Régis Debray has been sentenced by a military court in Bolivia to 30 years imprisonment—the maximum penalty according to Bolivian law. What has been reported about the proceedings of the court does not give one the impression that it acted with anything resembling judicial impartiality. International pressures should be brought upon the Bolivian junta to induce it to expel Debray from the country rather than impose so severe and vindictive a sentence.—L. C.

In our day a significant theorist of revolution in the underdeveloped countries, Frantz Fanon, created a powerful myth according to which, the proletariat having been corrupted and softened by the exploiting colonialists, only a pure and uncontaminated peasantry allied to the lumpenproletariat of the city—that lumpenproletariat Marx had thought incapable of any constructive political initiative—would constitute the motor force of revolutionary transformation.

But the end is not yet. *The Monthly Review*, the organ of Paul Sweezy, a man who thinks of himself as the upholder of Marxist orthodoxy in the United States, has recently published a special issue, (July–August 1967) presenting a full translation of Régis Debray's book *Revolution*

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in the Revolution, in which it is argued that neither the working class nor the peasantry, neither professional political revolutionaries nor city lumpen, but armed guerrillas made up of students and revolutionary intellectuals will "initiate the highest forms of class struggle." Debray and Sweezy thus have come full circle in their distorted form of "Marxism"; the emancipation of the working class is now to be the work of declassé intellectuals.

YET DEBRAY'S WORK is by no means without historical precedent. He is a lineal descendant of that long line of Russian revolutionary terrorists and *enragés* from Nechayev to Tkachev, who, appalled by the weakness of the liberal bourgeoisie, the subservience of the enlightened nobility, and the primordial passivity of the peasantry, concluded that only the heroic deeds of small elites of dedicated revolutionaries could propel Russian society into freedom. Despairing of the slow course of history, despairing also of all existent social forces, they concluded that only terroristic acts of a self-chosen few would be able to mold the resistant paste of social reality.

Since history was unwilling to go in the direction of their desires, they would have to rape it. They would take it upon themselves to break the thick cake of customary resistance, they would pit their naked will against the inert force of history. And they would prevail.

> Neither in the present nor in the future [wrote Tkachev], can the people, left to their own resources, bring into existence the social revolution. Only we revolutionists can accomplish this. . . . Social ideals are alien to the people; they belong to the social philosophy of the revolutionary minority.

Debray is a follower of these Russian revolutionaries, though he seems to suffer under the strange illusion that he is a Marxist. A young French philosopher of impeccable upper-class origin, he has turned his intellectual gifts to developing the theoretical underpinnings for Castro's political adventurism in Latin America.

His book is not without its pathos. One sometimes feels sympathy for this young revolutionary who is engaged in what he himself surely considers a promethean effort at liberation in the face of hard and seemingly untractable realities. Nevertheless, what strikes one most forcefully in the book is his deep and abiding contempt for the common run of humanity.

ALL PREVIOUS MARXIST THEORY took as its point of departure an assessment of the preparedness, or readiness for basic change, of the class or classes which were to be the targets of revolutionary agitation and propaganda. Though they may have differed as to the extent to which voluntaristic action by the vanguard elite could hasten the process of radicalization in the population, no Marxist theorist ever considered it possible or desirable to engage in revolutionary activity without the assurance of large-scale disaffection and at least an inchoate desire for fundamental change among oppressed classes.

Debray breaks with that tradition. He is basically unconcerned with the wishes and desires of the people. His revolutionary guerrilla units are to be "organizationally separate from the civilian population." They will function in its midst, but they will "not assume the direct defense of the peasant population." In other words, they will not feel responsible if this population is subject to reprisal by virtue of nearby guerrilla actions. Debray, in fact, is at pains to point out that the revolutionary warfare he advocates has nothing to do with the age-old tradition of peasant self-defense. "Self-defense," he argues, "is partial; revolutionary guerrilla warfare aims at total war by combining under its hegemony all forms of struggle at all points within its territory."

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The guerrillas are not responsible to the peasants among whom they fight; nor are they responsible to urban-based political party leaders. Debray, like Fanon, distrusts the city; it softens and corrupts. "These lukewarm incubators [of the cities] make one infantile and bourgeois." Or: "When a guerrilla group communicates with city leadership or its representatives abroad, it is dealing with 'its' bourgeoisie." The city, that whore of Babylon, is lost; parties, being city-based organisms, are inherently suspect.

Not only can the armed units of youthful adventurers operating in the remoteness of the hinterland not trust the city; they cannot even trust older men, no matter what their politics or previous experience. "There is a close tie between biology and ideology. . . . That an elderly man should be proven militant—and possess revolutionary training—is not, alas, sufficient for coping with guerrilla existence, especially in the early stages. Physical aptitude is the prerequisite for all other aptitudes."

In Debray's picture, the guerrilla fighter who presumes to unleash the forces of revolution looks a bit like a caricature of a Nietzschean superman. He needs to be young lest he suffer from "the vices of excessive deliberation," and "a perfect Marxist education is not at the outset an imperative condition." If he can shoot straight, he need not be burdened with theoretical baggage. Too much ratiocination may only cramp his style.

"The guerrilla army assumes the prerogatives of political leadership" even though it is, at least in the initial stages of insurrection, cut off from all strata of the underlying population. The guerrillas "are the foreigners, lacking status, who at the beginning can offer the populace nothing but bloodshed and pain." They must live like perpetual nomads moving from camp to camp. Mao taught that the guerrillas should remain unnoticed, living in the midst of peasant sympathizers "like fish in water," but Debray thinks this impossible under Latin-American conditions. The guerrillas must cut themselves loose from all sectors of the population, all of which are either hostile or lukewarm. The world is corrupt, and only a tiny revolutionary elite can be trusted. But why can they be trusted, why should they be trusted? Because they act, because they wield guns. It is perhaps harsh to say so, yet I cannot help but feel that Debray's view of the matter has more affinity with the rhetoric of fascism than with that of classical Marxism.

Nowhere is Debray's distrust of reason and his elitist anti-intellectualism more apparent than in his discussion of the relationships between the guerrilla units and the revolutionary party. Here again he seems nearer to fascist than to Marxist thought. For all Marxists the forging of a revolutionary party was always a *sine qua non*, because the party and its program embodied the theoretical and ideological thrust of the movement. Its program was

You Could Always Count on the "Red Dean"

OUR OLDER READERS (over 30) will remember the recently deceased Dean of Canterbury, the most inveterate and knuckle-headed of fellow-travelers. After his death, the following item appeared in the *New Statesman*, October 28, 1966:

> Only after visiting Russia in the mid-Thirties did he become a communist apologist (though not a party member) . . .
>
> The trouble with the Dean was that he assumed towards Stalin's Russia the same attitude of credulity which all Anglican clergymen must, in law at least, adopt towards the 39 Articles. He was vain, and in his trips behind the Curtain was not always eager to dispel the notion that he was Archbishop of Canterbury. His naïveté (a very proper quality in a clergyman?) took some beating. Harold Laski told the story that, while he was having tea with Ivan Maisky [the Soviet Ambassador to England] at the Soviet Embassy one afternoon in 1936, Maisky was called from the room by an aide. He returned a few minutes later grinning broadly. "Do you know who that was?" he said to Laski. "The Dean of Canterbury, calling to congratulate me on my government's success in the elections!"

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the intellectual distillation of the movement's philosophy and ideology. But to Debray the party counts for very little, because ideas and ideologies count for very little. What Karl Mannheim once said of fascism seems eminently applicable to Debray's vision:

> At the very heart of its theory and its practice lies the apotheosis of direct action, the belief in the decisive *deed*, and in the significance attributed to the initiative of a leading elite. The essence of politics is to recognize and to grapple with the demands of the hour. . . . History is made neither by the masses, nor by ideas . . . but by the elites who from time to time assert themselves. . . . This idea of history as an intelligible scheme disappears in the face of the irrationality of the fascist apotheosis of the deed.

Someone once said that everywhere else armies were the instruments of states, but in Prussia the state was an instrument of the army. Debray has a "Prussian" view of the relations between the party and the army, "The people's army will be the nucleus of the party, not vice versa." "Eventually, the future People's Army will beget the party of which it is to be, theoretically, the instrument: essentially the party is the army." Ideology and organization, it would appear, all grow out of the barrel of a gun.

PERSONALLY, DEBRAY MAY be a man of heroic cast and admirable virtues, but what he stands for is an evil and mischievous doctrine. His is a politics of despair, a politics that has lost all belief in the political capacities of ordinary human beings. His violent and apocalyptic fantasies are rooted in his distrust of men. He would force them to be free at the point of a gun. Debray thinks of the guerrillas as promethean rebels, but had they any power, they would more likely become the terroristic scourges of the people of Latin America.

Defenders of Debray's doctrine might contend that he proposes guerrilla activity in Latin America not because he is drawn to such solutions in principle but only because, given the reality of Latin-American dictatorships, other methods are not available. How can you consult the masses, they might argue, if they are gagged by a military regime? Debray's defenders may so argue, but it is important to note that he himself does not employ this rationale. He makes no distinction whatever between political activities in relatively democratic countries, such as Venezuela and Chile, and in military dictatorships such as Bolivia. He offers the same terroristic solution for all of them—and hence shows quite clearly that he has only contempt for democratic methods and alternatives.

There is no doubt in my mind that the liberation of Latin America from internal and external oppression will be a prolonged ordeal. It would be foolish to expect that this will not be accompanied in many situations by violence and bloodshed. Guns will probably have to be used. But recourse to guns always corrupts, absolute reliance on guns corrupts absolutely, and those who make a mystique out of guns are already corrupted in advance.

AS THESE LINES are being written Ché Guevara has just been killed after his guerrilla band was discovered by the Bolivian military. And Debray faces a military court which accuses him of having been a participant in guerrilla activities. One hopes his defense that he was only a journalistic observer will be accepted and that he will simply be deported to his native France.

In the meantime it ought to be said without equivocation: those of us who sympathize with the Latin-American masses, and are moved by the misery and oppression in which they now live, must hope that they will not fall prey to the sick adventurist fantasies of Debray and his ilk. Whatever the Andes need, it is not Nechayevs from Paris.

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Richard Hofstadter

Charles Beard & the Founding Fathers

We are pleased to print below three sections from a forthcoming book tentatively entitled The Progressive Historians: Beard, Turner, Parrington, *to be published by Alfred Knopf in 1968.*—EDITORS.

PERHAPS THE BEST WAY to break through the perplexities which arise when we compare Charles Beard's simple view of the Founding Fathers with the more complex view that closer inspection reveals is to start, once again, free of his categories. Let us start with the proposition, at first almost too obvious to be interesting, that their main object was to form what they often called a "more energetic" government—that is, a true national state with all the customary powers—without losing the liberties they had. Let us assume, in short, that they were *nationalists* first of all, whose purpose was neither to restrict nor to enlarge democracy.

This will help us to remember that what we say about the relation of the Constitution to democracy elevates the problem of democracy to a position it did not have in the minds either of the Constitution's friends or its foes. And let us assume further that as nationalists in a country still made up of separate provinces the Fathers found it necessary, like all innovators and reformers, to keep public opinion in mind—and, indeed, references to what would please the people or what they would approve rippled through the discussion of the Convention.

What I would like to suggest is that, contrary to the implications Beard drew from certain scattered texts, the Fathers, though wary of what they thought to be its possible abuses, were not notably dissatisfied with the measure of democracy that already existed in the American states; again, that, under the double necessity of preserving liberty (which they did out of principle) and of pleasing the people (which they did out of a mixture of principle and expediency), they did in fact to some measure, though perhaps in the main inadvertently, advance democratic institutions and practices on a national scale.[1]

This requires us to look away for a moment from their intentions and motives to the results, sometimes unanticipated, of their actions. One of these results was to bring the existing practices of American democratic politics out of the local arenas in which they were operating and, by creating a national market in political competition, to nationalize and in the end to intensify them. Seen in this light, the Fathers become not the authors of a nationalist Thermidor imposing reaction upon particularist revolutionaries, but rather the architects of a viable national scheme by which the revolutionary impulse toward democracy was taken out of its particularist moorings and made into a continental reality.

IF WE ARE TO TRY to characterize the Fathers in the very loose language of politi-

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[1] *Cf.* The conclusion of J. R. Pole: "Once the Federal government was in operation, its electoral system gave a possibly unintentional but nevertheless an unmistakable impetus to the idea of political democracy." *Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic,* St. Martin's Press, 1966, p. 365, and the discussion on pp. 339–65.

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cal classification, they were neither radical democrats (as some Europeans believed) nor ultra-conservatives (as many historians in the Populist-Progressive tradition have argued) but moderate Whigs. The central political idea behind the Constitution was a variation of the ancient idea of balanced government. As revolutionaries who felt that they had suffered from tyrannical government, the Fathers were primarily moved by fear of concentrated and arbitrary power. They looked to a skillfully designed balanced government to render impossible the concentration of excessive power in any one arm of government or in any single interest in society. They hoped to achieve such balance by the separation of powers and by a system of mutual checks—and more sophisticated thinkers among them, like Madison, considered that this balance in the machinery of government ought to be paralleled by balance in the variety of social interests and groups within the society.

The theorists of balanced government believed that a popular arm, the lower house of the legislature, which would be based upon a broad suffrage, was indispensable. Counterposed to it, the upper house would be based perhaps upon a narrower suffrage, and normally upon certain property qualifications for its members (though this was abandoned in the federal Constitution where the basic purpose of the Senate was not to represent property but to represent the states), which would make it a protective safeguard for propertied interests and add deliberative "wisdom" to public counsels. The executive and judiciary would both be independent.

Most theorists of balanced government would have agreed with John Adams that the executive ought not to be embroiled in the factional partisanship of the legislature, particularly of the upper house, and many of them thought with Gouverneur Morris that the executive ought to have a special relationship to, a particular rapport with, the people, which would add to its strength and to their protection. The independent judiciary, which was to be guaranteed by undisturbed tenure, was thought to have a special relation to the rule of law—a difficult problem and one which many theorists a hundred years later concluded concealed a trap for democratic institutions in the form of judicial review. Practically all American Whig theorists agreed on the desirability of formal guarantees of popular rights.

Contemporaneous democrats, on the other hand, often preferred a simple government with a strong unicameral legislature, based on the unrestricted suffrage of free adult males. They often advocated annual elections as a means of keeping political leaders close to the popular will. Pennsylvania's constitution of 1776, with its unicameral legislature and suffrage limited only to taxpayers (which meant nearly all adult males), came closest to embodying these principles. And, though it was found unsatisfactory and replaced by a bicameral constitution in 1790, it is worth noting that it hardly brought about the destruction of the class system or the subversion of propertied interests.

AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE IDEA of balanced government helps us to comprehend what such terms as "the people" and "democracy" might have meant in the late eighteenth century. No one of any consequence in America doubted that government should be based upon consent, that it was responsible to the people. By now it was widely accepted that to be politically legitimate a government should be referred to the people for their approval at its beginning. The idea of a convention elected by the people for the sole and specific purpose of ratifying a constitution was a remarkable innovation of their own devising, which was intended to satisfy this scruple.

"The people," it is true, did not mean all adult males. The Fathers generally accepted the "stake-in-society" conception of suffrage rights—the notion that anyone, to qualify

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for the right to have a say in the management of the political order, should have some token of permanent attachment to its interest. For all practical purposes, this meant in the American states a freehold or its equivalent; and, of course, in a society in which property was so widely distributed, this disfranchised only a minority of adult whites.

Recent research, particularly that of Robert E. Brown, has shown in fact that the easygoing practices of American electoral politics resulted in a very loose enforcement of the qualifications that did exist; that the suffrage was indeed widely available, and was exercised at times to quite a remarkable degree. Nor should we assume, in any case, that the desire to keep the freehold suffrage, particularly in the context of American society, necessarily had to be inspired by dark reactionary sentiments. To be sure, some of the feeling in favor of property requirements came from fear that mobs might be led to dangerous ends; the mind of the eighteenth-century freeholder had a lively terror of mobs and "demagogues." But a good deal of it came from other, more philosophical premises.

Property must be seen from the standpoint of what was being both superseded and built upon in the eighteenth century, and not from the standpoint of the problems facing twentieth-century Progressives in dealing with the large business corporation. In the eighteenth century, political society was conceived as being the voluntary association of those with property. The lack of property was associated with servility, if not with servitude. (Even the Levellers had not believed in universal manhood suffrage.) To have political competence, it was assumed in Whig theory, a man must stand above being ordered about, or bought or bribed, and this status would be safeguarded by the possession of some property: only in this way would the voter have, it was said (following Montesquieu and Blackstone), "a will of his own."

A still more important point about property and politics must be understood: under the social and political conditions of eighteenth-century America, the appeal to the voice of property was not retrograde in its effects, or even conservative, but tended rather to give a startlingly strong, if unintended, impetus to the development of democracy and political individualism. After all, what the Americans were displacing was not some perfect primitive *ur*-democracy but rather a set of political institutions brought from England and having a medieval ancestry. Among these was the idea that representation should be given to separate corporate interests, orders, or "estates" in society—hardly the framework for modern democratic organization.

During the Revolution—as they drew up new constitutions and in so doing reconsidered their political principles and their techniques of organization—the Americans began (especially under the pressure of the large towns, which were on a numerical basis underrepresented) to couple property with numbers, on the ground that numbers (and taxation) formed a rough index of the distribution of property. The townsmen argued that their property was not adequately represented and proposed to register its weight by the measure of numbers and taxes.

Now in a social system in which property was very widely diffused this could, and did, cause the unchallenged authority of property in politics to come to be subtly linked with numbers, and thus to become a channel by which the political weight of numbers was ultimately increased. When, in the development of the states, property became "a sort of substitute for the faded and inadequate idea of the separate 'estate' of an aristocracy with a right to separate representation," the change marked "one of the greatest departures in the origins of modern and democratic government."[2]

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 170; see this work, *passim*, for a subtle and detailed explication of the changing political role of property.

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In the Federal Convention of 1787, though the idea of the explicit representation of property as well as numbers was initially the object of a good deal of concern, it was ultimately abandoned in order to give to the upper house another function: the Senate was instituted not on the principle of the representation of property, but simply to recognize the parity of the several states in one of the two chambers. Property as a qualification for voters found no formal cognizance in the plan for representation, except insofar as the new Constitution paid deference to the requirements already imposed on voters in the constitutions of the states.

IN THE STANDARD DISCOURSE of eighteenth-century politics, "democracy" was not used as it came to be used in the nineteenth century. The Fathers spoke, rather, of "popular government" or "republican government" or "free government."

Very few indeed among them were opposed to popular government, and when they criticized democracy, which they classified as one of the varieties of popular government, they almost always had something more limited in mind. It is not always easy to be sure exactly *what* they had in mind, because the term democracy was then in a transitional state and was not used consistently.

Democracy might mean simply the ancient idea of direct government—the people assembling without the intermediation of representatives to pass on issues of state. Often when men spoke of democracy as unusable or impossible in a large territory, they were speaking in this sense. The idea that democracy was unsuitable to the government of large territories was a fundamental tenet of the age, and one which the Fathers found it essential to controvert. But democracy might also on occasions be used to refer to that part of a mixed government, the "democratical" part, in which the power of the people was represented, that is, to the lower house of the legislature. When members of the Convention referred to the troubles of the time as having come from the "excesses" of democracy, they might be referring to mob action (as in the case of Shays' rebellion) or expressing their disapproval of certain types of measures that had received their impetus in the popular assemblies. Edmund Randolph could thus speak of "the democratic licentiousness of the state legislatures."

One must be careful not to assume, then, that invidious references to "democracy" are equivalent to indictments of popular government. It is probably most accurate to say not that the Fathers were antidemocrats but simply that their republicanism had nothing utopian about it. They saw popular government, like other forms, as being attended with certain characteristic failings of its own which they hoped to keep from becoming acute or fatal, and they were trying to devise what Madison called in *The Federalist,* Number 10, "a republican remedy for the diseases of republican government."

When the Fathers spoke critically of democracy they were at times implying condemnation of particular policies. They were also, beyond doubt, expressing their reservations about popular wisdom, and they did fear simple majoritarianism as a possible threat to both liberty and property. But they never imagined that the evils of society could be cured by eliminating the popular voice from government. Quite the contrary: all of them—with the possible exception of Hamilton—would have feared the amputation or crippling of the popular house as a threat to a central principle of balanced government and to well-founded popular rights.

James Wilson, one of the outstanding juridical thinkers among the Fathers, argued "strenuously," as Madison's notes record, for the direct election of members of the House of Representatives by the people: "He was for raising the federal pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that reason

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wished to give it as broad a basis as possible. No government could long subsist without the confidence of the people." Madison was quick to second him with the remark that he "considered the popular election of one branch of the national legislature as essential to every plan of free government." John Dickinson, undoubtedly one of the most conservative members of the group (Beard mentions him primarily for his belief in limited monarchy and in a freehold suffrage qualification), agreed: it was "essential that one branch of the legislature should be drawn immediately from the people; and expedient that the other should be chosen by the legislatures of the states."[3]

The framers did not, by and large, think that it was by any means impossible to achieve their nationalist goals and construct an "energetic" government within the framework of the popular will, as it then normally found expression; and they were content to plan a government which they thought answered to most popular habits and current practices. The longer they talked about their problems, the more respectful their references to "the people" became.

The vain young South Carolina aristocrat Charles Pinckney (who, Beard tells us, "had no confidence in popular government" and who indeed did want more checks than some members) presented an interesting philosophical statement to the Convention during the discussion of the mode of electing senators. Arguing for the choice of senators by the legislatures, Pinckney observed that the people of the United States were singular in having "fewer distinctions of fortune, and less of rank, than among the inhabitants of any other nation . . . . a greater equality than is to be found among the people of any other country, and an equality which is more likely to continue." The rest of his discourse made it clear that he was reconciled to this state of affairs, and proposed to design a government that accommodated it. "We must, as has been observed, suit our government to the people it is to direct. These are, I believe, as active, intelligent and susceptible of good government as any people in the world."[4] This is not, as the whole context makes clear, the voice of a sentimental democrat; but neither is it that of a panicky reactionary.

IN SHORT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS were not democrats in the sense that many Populists and Progressives were a hundred years afterward: they neither practiced nor professed the social and philosophical egalitarianism that had become widespread by Beard's day; and in their own day such views were still rare among the educated and articulate classes. Moreover, they did not aspire to bring about the formal equalization of political power that became an increasingly powerful motif in American thought a little more than a century afterward and that animated the Progressive demand for democratization of the Senate, for the initiative, referendum, and recall, and other political reforms. Such ideals would have been beyond their ken; and in fact the Supreme Court's one-man-one-vote decision of 1964 shows how tardy we have been in trying to implement these demanding ideals, even in the most rudimentary way.

Yet, if we are to avoid being anachronis-

[3] Max Farrand, ed., *Records of the Federal Convention of* 1787, Yale University Press, 1966, I. 49, 134, 136; see the discussions *Ibid,* I, 48–50, 132–38, 214–15, 358–62; II, 201–205, 215–16.

Attempts to impair the normal popular composition of the lower house, or its efficacy, fared badly. Direct election of the members of the House of Representatives was first passed in the Convention by a vote of six to two, with two states divided. Then, after a move to have them chosen by the state legislatures was defeated eight to three, popular election was reaffirmed by a vote of nine to one, with one divided. Annual elections were thought to be impractical but a motion by Hamilton for three-year intervals went down by seven to three, with one divided. A motion to include a national freehold qualification for electors choosing the lower house was beaten by seven to one, with one divided.

[4] *Ibid.*, I, 398, 403–404; *cf.* Charles A. Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States,* Macmillan, 1935 (paper, Free Press, 1965), pp. 210–11.

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tic, the deviation of the Fathers from the developing democracy of their own era should not be exaggerated. The basic achievements in democratic development that had thus far been brought about they not only accepted but cherished: the presence of a parliamentary system, with a popular house based upon a broad suffrage; free elections; political and religious rights for minorities.

The principal point at which modern democratic thought deviates from that of the Fathers rests on its opposition to the formal qualifications and the multiplicity of checks they wanted to put on majority rule. They would not be at odds with most modern democratic thinkers in believing that there ought to be *some* such limits and that the survival of free government in fact depends on them. But whereas most modern democrats are content with the limits involved in securely guaranteed rights of opposition, of dissenters and minorities, the Fathers wanted to go beyond this: practically all of them believed in the existing property qualifications for the suffrage. In addition, they considered that a separate upper house, which would protect substantial property rights and provide a check on a simple legislative majority, was a sound ingredient in a balanced government.

If, in the American political spectrum of the 1780's the Fathers can be ranked somewhat to the Right, it is only because the high aristocrats had been exiled or smashed as a political force during the Revolution, and there was now nothing remaining of far Right antirepublican conservatism on an interstate scale. (Hamilton's cool reception in the Convention was a token of this.) In the United States of the 1780's practically the whole political spectrum was taken up by a moderate Left and a Center.

IT IS IMPORTANT TO TAKE NOTE of the fact that the debate over the Constitution, as Cecelia Kenyon has shown, did not take the form of a debate over democracy as such. If we look only for popular rhetoric—for denunciations of aristocrats, special interests, and professional and learned men, and for encomiums on the wisdom and virtue of the common people—I think there is little doubt that we will find much more of it in Antifederalist than in Federalist literature. It is also true that, in their whole approach to the problem of representation the Antifederalists were raising an important problem of democracy and arguing from what they thought to be the democratic side.

But if we are looking for substantive differences in Constitutional proposals, we do not, on the whole, find the two sides far apart. Certainly, the main argument of the Antifederalist leaders was not an argument for simple majoritarianism. They accepted the idea that majorities can be oppressive. They, as well as the Federalists, believed in a government of checks and balances; in fact, it was a point made by some of their leaders that the Constitution did not contain checks and balances enough. Patrick Henry, supposedly the voice of the people, arguing in Virginia against the Constitution, complained that there was "no check in that government. The President, senators, and representatives, all immediately or mediately, are the choice of the people." And he warned that, in the absence of a hereditary nobility such as Britain had, the government would not incorporate any "real balances and checks . . . only ideal balances."

In proposing alternatives to the Constitution's structure, the Antifederalists did not propose direct popular election of the President or senators or argue for a unicameral legislature, or attack the possible exercise of judicial review—positions we might expect them to take if they were simply forerunners of modern Progressivism. The attitude of the leading Antifederalists toward popular judgment also frequently resembled the attitude attributed by Beard only to the Federalists. "The people," said the leading New York Antifederalist, George Clinton, "when wearied with their distresses, will in the moment of frenzy be guilty of the most im-

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prudent and desperate measures." And his colleague, Melancton Smith, thought that "Fickleness and inconstancy . . . were characteristic of a free people."

Nor were Antifederalist leaders interested in changes that would make possible a government of simple majority controls. As one of their Massachusetts spokesmen put it, they considered that "the sober and industrious part of the community should be defended from the rapacity of the vicious and idle"—a statement that sounds interchangeable with the notions attributed by Beardian scholars to the Federalists. Indeed, one of the purposes of the Bill of Rights, which they so wisely insisted on, was to protect the minority from what the same writer called "the usurpation and tyranny of the majority."[5] At least among the leaders on both sides, then, the argument over the Constitution was an argument between two groups *both* of which were suspicious of simple majority rule.

The Antifederalists performed an indispensable function—that of seeing to it that the Constitution received a thorough and demanding scrutiny—and won a major victory on one count, their demand for the inclusion of a bill of rights, on which their arguments seem far more impressive than those of their opponents. But if both sets of leaders were skeptical of popular legislative majorities and in favor of checks and balances, Beard's concentration on the Federalists alone for their views on the subject makes little historical sense.

WHAT IS VALID in Beard's perceptions can be saved if they are put into their proper proportion, and this can best be done by *beginning* with an alternative view of the Constitution and feeding his categories back into the story where they become relevant and only in so far as they seem necessary. Here I must start from some distressingly old-fashioned premises about the era—premises rather like those Beard himself came to in the end.

To me it seems that the central issue of American politics in 1787 was not whether government should protect property—a question over which "radicals" and "conservatives" agreed; nor whether it should advance the interests of personalty as against realty—a question which no historian today takes very seriously; nor how and by whom the public debt should be paid—a question of importance, but not the central one in 1787; nor whether the new government should be more or less democratic than the existing one—a somewhat misleading question.

The central issue, around which the others circled like dim and distant satellites, was whether the American union should become a national state. And after the Constitution was framed and ready for discussion, this issue was complicated by a second one: whether the particular national state now proposed would be more likely to destroy or to protect the liberties and the powers of self-government that most Americans thought they had long enjoyed and had just fought a war to keep.

It may be necessary to put ourselves in mind again of the extent to which we can say that the Americans did *not* have a nation under the Articles of Confederation. What they had was what the Articles in fact asserted the Confederation to be: "a firm league of friendship," a loose union, providing mutual citizenship, and giving the central government a bare minimum of the sanctions needed to carry out national functions: the conduct of foreign relations and the power to make treaties or wage war; machinery for settling disputes among the states; the right to regulate the value of coin issued by itself and by the several states; the privilege of asking for money from the states—but not the power to collect it; and rather little besides.

Since there was no executive power to

[5] See Cecelia Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith," *William and Mary Quarterly*, XII (1955) 33–34, 36.

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speak of, there was no center of national leadership. Since there was no power to impose a tariff or regulate commerce, or tax the citizens directly or levy troops, the fiscal power of the Confederation and its power to negotiate with other nations were badly crippled. At home its theoretical power to regulate coinage could not resolve a monetary hodge-podge. To make matters worse—and this point proved in the end to be quite decisive—constitutional terms requiring the unanimous consent of the states made the Confederation virtually unamendable, and thus deprived it of an essential mechanism for self-preservation.

Some of the states were coping quite effectively with their own affairs. The Confederation did well in moderating disputes between them and even better in laying the foundations for future Western settlement. But the diplomatic impotence of the Confederation cast a dark shadow over prospects for the future, and Americans were not by any means free of involvement in the European state system.

The British still held seven fortified posts on American soil, embracing every strategic point on the Great Lakes, from the region of the St. Lawrence to Lake Michigan, and in this area they were still effectively and ominously linked with the Indian tribes. In Vermont they were intriguing with potential American separatists and threatening to bite off a chunk of territory. On the seas, though they enjoyed access to American markets, they had shut the Americans out of the rich trade, so vital in the past, to the West Indies.

In the South the Spaniards, also allied with Indians whom they supplied with arms, held the mouth of the Mississippi which they had closed to American shipping, were busy encouraging Westerners in Kentucky and Tennessee to quit the Union, and laid claim to a large piece of American territory in what is now Georgia and Alabama. They also shut American ships out of the Spanish trade, which had become important during the Revolutionary war, and offered to reopen it only on terms which the Americans in the South and Southwest could not possibly accept—the continued closure of the Mississippi for 25 years or more.

THE AMERICAN STATES, after some ups and downs, were again beginning to enjoy moderate prosperity in the year or so before the Constitution went into effect, and it is conceivable that they might have gone on for some years more under the Confederation. But many contemporaries were afraid that the "imbecilities" of the Confederation, to use Beard's term, might be fatal to the union, to order and prosperity, and in the end to liberty. A few were troubled by the supposed dangers of a monarchical restoration or a military dictatorship, but many seem to have been troubled by the more real danger that the Union would be supplanted by two or three smaller and more tightly organized confederacies—a prospect that suggested, in modern terms, that the continent would be Balkanized, that its states might enter internecine quarrels, that they might be forced indefinitely to carry on their commerce under extortionate or crippling terms, and perhaps at last fall victim to reconquest by European powers.

The most immediate danger that hung over the Confederation was that of an internal collapse from a sheer failure of morale. Congressmen, disheartened by their continuing ineffectuality, ran up a remarkable record of sporadic attendance, and at last this problem became so acute that for extended periods Congress could not act for lack of a quorum. In January 1786 Chairman David Ramsay (who was acting in that capacity because President John Hancock himself had not bothered to show up) sent out a desperate appeal to the state executives in which he said that the delinquency of the states in maintaining representation "naturally tends to annihilate our Confederation. That once dissolved, our States would be of short duration. Anarchy or intestine wars would follow till some future

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Caesar seized our Liberties, or we would be the sport of European politics, and perhaps parcelled out as appendages to their several Governments."[6]

With this picture in mind, we need not be surprised that many men, including even some who later found grounds to oppose the Constitution, favored a move toward some kind of stronger union. And if a patriot like Beard, looking back from the relatively detached vantage point of the Progressive era, could still see "imbecilities" in the Confederation (a term also used by Edmund Randolph in the Convention), we need not imagine that a patriot of 1787 had to have a stack of continental securities to come to the same conclusion. Concern about the future of the country was widespread, and it is bootless to try to decide exactly how far it can be called an economic concern, since thoughts of personal gain and loss were mingled with thoughts of the common peace and safety and of the common advantage.

But it is also true—and here we move into areas where Beard's categories begin to make contact with reality—that the exposure of various segments of the population to these concerns was far from uniform. It should be possible to construct a hypothetical model, taking account of the various forces that impelled men to favor or oppose the Constitution, in which some of Beard's perceptions will have a place, even though not the central place.

The first point to be considered is that the Americans of 1787 had strong provincial loyalties and thought of themselves as citizens of this or that state as well as having certain occupations and interests. They considered themselves to be members of independent polities, and in these polities most of the forces that normally maintain a political community—including the habit of reckoning common state interests across the barriers of class—were at work.

[6] Edmund C. Burnett, *The Continental Congress*, W. W. Norton, 1964, p. 641.

When men thought about civic events, they thought not simply about the state of their own accounts but of the state of New Jersey or Georgia, and often the two were intertwined. Men who lived in such states as Connecticut, Georgia, Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey did not divide very decisively over the Constitution at all, and for them such differences as we may find between farmers or merchants, debtors or creditors, were not of central consequence. This is not to say that these states had no class divisions or political conflicts, but simply that such conflicts were not deeply or seriously mobilized *by the constitutional issue,* because men on all sides found so much common gain in stronger union.

To simplify, Connecticut and New Jersey, each lacking a suitable port, were at the mercy of the port of New York, and could see large advantages in a strong union that would put the power to regulate commerce in the central government. Delaware, altogether too tiny to go it alone, was similarly dependent upon Maryland and Pennsylvania. The case of Maryland, racked by a political schism in its planter aristocracy, is more complex, and will not yield to quick simplification; but it had only a small if vociferous minority opposed to the Constitution on grounds quite unlike those depicted by Beard. Georgia, as Beard knew, was so haunted by fear of an Indian war that nothing mattered there as against the military advantages of strong union. In all these states ratification came quickly and easily: it was unanimous in Georgia, New Jersey, and Delaware (despite their overwhelmingly agrarian composition), and went through by margins of three to one in Connecticut and six to one in Maryland.

Setting aside these state-by-state considerations, and trying to draw a composite and rather abstract picture of the forces at work for and against the Constitution, we might do well to begin not with the revolutionary war debt but with the whole revolutionary experience. An important determining force

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might be the extent to which men and regions had experienced the Revolution in local terms or in terms of the larger world.

Those who had had major political experience in Congress and had witnessed its impotence during and after the revolutionary struggle, or those who were drawn into political activity for the first time by their sense of the political failure of the Confederation would be more disposed than firmly rooted local politicians to feel the need of a stronger union.

Those whose military experience had been in the Continental line rather than the state militias, and who had marched from state to state and experienced the struggle against British "tyranny" as a continental, common American struggle would be similarly disposed. Having also come to look with disdain on the state militias as disorderly irregulars and on-and-off patriots, the Continental veterans were sometimes given, in the manner of the recently demobilized, to interpreting civic life in the light of their military experiences. For them, strength and order were at an especial premium.

Those who lived in areas long occupied or deeply devastated by British forces felt more keenly the necessity of a stronger union; and this, as well as urban and commercial economic interest, may help to explain the higher concentration of Federalists near the seaboard and at certain exposed points of the frontier.

Age too is a factor worth exploration. Men who were young enough to have come of age around 1775 when the agitations of a dozen years finally irrupted into open violence found the challenge of organization and power that came with the revolutionary war practically coincident with their adult political experience; whereas those who came of age during or before the agitations against British tyranny that quickened after 1763 had had their minds fixed at a formative age more upon the dangers of arbitrary governmental power and would be harder to dislodge from the combative and militant anticentralist republicanism that the Revolution called into being.

RESISTANCE TO THE CONSTITUTION might well have been strongest among some of the isolates, those remote from military action, living in relatively self-sufficing agricultural areas but not endangered by Indians; or among those who had fought only in the state militias, which sometimes meant sporadic action to protect local points of vantage. Above all, those who had a great deal of experience and vested emotional as well as practical interests in state politics and state offices frequently looked with jealousy upon the creation of a new arena of federal power, in which they had little interest and no experience, but which threatened to overshadow their local worlds in prestige and importance and to remove decisions of state that had long been in their hands.

Opponents of the Constitution, in the aggregate, seem to have attracted a higher proportion of those involved only in state politics; advocates of the Constitution had to draw more heavily in some areas upon newly concerned amateurs, men from business and the professions not previously active in politics but now mobilized by their desire for union. It is also to be remembered that in some cases the antagonisms of state factions and of leading personalities, which had their origins in intrastate concerns quite irrelevant to the merits or defects of the Constitution, became involved in the argument over its ratification.

BUT HERE BEARD'S CONSIDERATIONS must be counted. Beyond doubt, the movement for the Constitution got much of its driving force, perhaps a decisive measure, from the commercial classes. It was hardly accidental that the first impetus for a stronger central government came only after Robert Morris, the financier of the Revolution, had repeatedly failed to put the Union on a sound revenue basis. The mercantile class was as close as any to being unani-

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mously for the Constitution. Though we should not fail to add (as Beard saw) that it was joined in this by its dependents in the towns—the seamen, artisans, mechanics, and small tradesmen who lived in the orbit of commerce—and (as Beard did not see) that it was allied to many ordinary farmers who seem to have recognized that they too had an interest in trade.

When one realizes that, in a society in which the revolutionary debt loomed so large, any merchant of substance and of cosmopolitan interests was likely to hold some public paper, one recognizes that support for the Constitution by many public creditors was a function of their mercantile position, not of their concern about their security holdings. If Beard's information on the commercial experiences and interests of political leaders had been as detailed, as novel and intriguing and "hard" and statistically manageable as his evidence from the Treasury records, he might have put considerably stronger stress on the general interests and experiences of the mercantile classes and less stress on the public debt.

It is often noted that many influential men on the Antifederalist side also had large security holdings. However, we need not be surprised that the possession of *large, significant amounts* does have some positive relation to Federalist adherence.[7] E. J. Ferguson considers it "indisputable that as a group the creditors supported the Constitution," and never finds them represented "in a formal statement or petition that did not endorse stronger central government." But Ferguson too thinks that to emphasize the question whether creditors on the whole supported the Constitution

> constitutes a distortion, [and finds the security holders] rather too few in number to serve as the fulcrum upon which to raise a new political structure. To assume that they fathered it, we must suppose them possessed of a degree of power and influence with which they can scarcely be credited . . . A creditor interest certainly existed—yet it was no more than ancillary to the political development that culminated in the founding of the new government.

ONE OF THE IMPORTANT MISCONCEPTIONS of Beard's book, derived from the free silver controversies of the 1890's, inherited from the Turnerians, but shared equally by the Progressive and conservative historians of his day, was the notion that the economic situation of the 1780's, insofar as paper money and debts were involved, was quite simply analogous to that of the 1890's. This conception led to the stereotype, embodied in Turner's work and taken over by Beard, of the poor debtor-farmers locked in more or less uniform combat from Massachusetts to Georgia in a battle for cheap money and higher prices against rich merchants, great planters, speculators, and creditors, whose attitudes on such matters were taken to have been rather like those of Wall Street confronted by William Jennings Bryan.

Hence, for Beard, the Constitution, with its prohibitions against money issues by the states and against the impairment of contracts, took on significance primarily as a bulwark against the "populism" of the 1780's. He accordingly pictured a largely unified *national* elite of wealth lined up against the clamorous agrarian masses, the two sides ranged against each other in good part by their opposing interests and convictions about the state of prices and debts, and the putative effects of the Constitution upon them.

More recent writers, among them Richard Lester, E. J. Ferguson, Bray Hammond, and Joseph Dorfman, have done much to cor-

[7] One of the difficulties in discussing the political role of public creditors is that both Beard and some of his critics count men as security holders without paying attention to the size of holdings in relation to their total business investments, though it is obvious that small holdings would be unlikely to sway political allegiances. See on this count Robert L. Schuyler's "Forrest McDonald's Critique of the Beard Thesis," *Journal of Southern History*, XXVII (1961), 73–80, esp. 77–79.

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rect this view of things. We do not know all we need to know about debts and credits in the late eighteenth century, but certain complications have been at least partially clarified. Despite some unfortunate episodes in the use of paper money, including one in Rhode Island about which historians have written very dramatically, several of the states had had a good deal of success in ameliorating their chronic currency shortages with paper money issues based upon land security. Paper money was indeed controversial, but it was controversial *within* the elites. The leading advocates of paper money in the eighteenth century were not backwoods farmers or doctrinaire demagogues but outstanding merchants, leading planters, public officials, and professional men. Debt was characteristically a sign not of poverty but of enterprise, sometimes of daring speculation. There were plenty of rich debtors and solvent farmers.

Ranged against paper money advocates, and intensely prejudiced against what they called "the paper system" in all its forms, were not only some well-to-do merchants and creditors who had suffered from unsuccessful and highly inflationary paper issues but also a great many doctrinaire agrarians like James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, and even John Adams. The use of paper money to depreciate debts was widely decried by Antifederalist as well as Federalist writers. Antifederalist forces were probably too divided in opinion on this issue in most states to take a strong stand on it; and among the many proposed changes in the Constitution, amendments to the paper-money and obligation-of-contracts clauses are conspicuous by their absence. Some speculators, especially in Maryland and Virginia, had, in effect, financed their speculations by going short, as we would now say, on public paper, and the prospect of its rapid appreciation in value threatened them with ruin.

INDEED, WHEN ONE LOOKS at the situation from state to state, one is impressed by the difficulty of making continent-wide generalizations about the character of economic alignments as they affected the constitutional issue. The situation in Massachusetts, in the wake of Shays' rebellion, bears some resemblance (though not a perfect one) to Beard's picture; but the situation in Maryland, where the relatively weak opposition was based largely upon a minority of rich planters who had gone heavily into debt because of speculation, is quite close to its opposite.

On one point we may be reasonably clear: the Beardian picture of a unified national elite aligned against a relatively unified, if politically less effective, agrarian debtor mass, simply will not hold in a state-by-state analysis. What we find instead is a series of divided state elites; and insofar as the attitudes of the agrarian masses can be rather loosely inferred from the pattern of their representatives' votes,[8] they were divided also.

The situations in the several states are much too complex to lend themselves readily to brief characterization; but one generalization that will hold better than most is that in those states where there was a fairly even or at least a sharply fought division over the Constitution the provincial elites were themselves divided. And it will generally be found true that *both* elite factions had more than negligible support from the ranks of the ordinary farmers.

VIRGINIA makes an interesting study. Long ago Robert E. Thomas found, in a study of the personnel of the ratifying convention at Richmond that the Federalist and Antifederalist leaders were members of the same class, with almost the same average number of slaves and roughly the same military ranks attained in the Revolution. The slight

[8] We know a great deal about the social and economic position of the delegates at the ratifying convention, but much less about their constituencies. Lee Benson has rightly warned against assuming that public assemblies are simply the electorate in microcosm. Lee Benson, *Turner and Beard, American Historical Writing Reconsidered*, Free Press, 1960 (paper, 1965), p. 172.

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difference that he found showed the typical Antifederalist to own a larger number of slaves and to represent counties in which there were more slaves than in those represented by Federalists. With property holdings of all kinds on both sides virtually identical, and with the Virginia elite, for a variety of reasons, split quite evenly, the balance for ratification, as Freeman Hart's work indicates, was swung by representatives of the smaller planters and non-slaveholding farmers from the Shenandoah Valley (14 to 0 for the Constitution) and the trans-Allegheny region (13 to 1). In both cases, these delegates were sent by a region where debtors (as elsewhere in the state) were common. They wholly violate the pattern of expectation set up by the Turner-Beard categories, and they were acting in accordance with considerations not always taken account of by historians in this tradition.

These two western regions of the state were strong in immigrants who did not have the powerful attachments that prevailed among the old planting families. Their representatives were strong in men who had fought in the Continental line. They were eager to see the British get out of the northwestern posts, and would have considered it a good trade to get a national government that could win this end at the cost of getting some of the planters to pay their repudiated debts to British merchants. Their trade routes ran from North to South, and this gave them a strong interest in national power. Having grievances concerning taxation and representation against the state government, many of them considered that the new federal Constitution represented a more equitable departure. Being heavily biased toward the dissenting churches, they were reassured by the promise of religious liberty under the Constitution and did not even seek for additional amendments.[9]

IN NEW YORK AND PENNSYLVANIA the issue of the Constitution became involved with well-developed struggles between leading po-



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litical factions, struggles which in Pennsylvania were so systematic and continuous as to foreshadow the two-party system. In New York, where majority sentiment against the Constitution seems beyond argument, the opposition was led by the powerful faction of Governor Clinton. His government had only recently taken advantage of the prosperity of the state by devising its own funding system in which the entire state debt was funded and a portion of the continental debt was assumed and made interchangeable with state securities.

The public creditors, of whom there were many in Clinton's camp, thus found their interests tied to the fiscal success of the state, and New York became one of those states (Pennsylvania was another) in which it was by no means easy for a public creditor to be sure that the government under the new Constitution would improve the value of his holdings. In New York both parties had support from speculators and from large and small landholders. In New York City both merchants and the lower classes favored the Constitution; outside the city, however, sentiment against it was strong. And it was largely the accumulated weight of ratification by ten other states, along with whispers that the port of New York might secede, that persuaded a decisive number of Antifederalists to move over into the camp of the constitutionalists. In Pennsylvania the opposition to the Constitution was led by a rich, powerful, and well-knit faction of speculators and public security owners, headed by Charles Pettit, who owned over $55,000 in public securities and Blair McLenachan who owned over $74,000.

In Beard's terms the behavior of these men is incomprehensible, but it was neither irrational nor devoid of considerations of self-interest. Pennsylvania, prodded by the Pettit faction, had funded both the state debt and the portion of the national debt owned in the state on terms favorable to security holders and land speculators, and Pettit's forces were waging a vendetta against the Bank of North America run by Robert Morris, the leader of the nationalist faction. It is true that the Pettit group found strong allies in western Pennsylvania who roughly correspond to the populist-frontiersman stereotype of Beard and the Turnerians (though some of the leaders of this set also were beneficiaries of speculation). But both sides had a following among ordinary farmers, and the battle had more to do with this well-established factionalism than with a polarized struggle between the rich and the poor.

WE MAY WELL BE PERSUADED THAT BEARD was right in finding a positive relation between socio-economic position and Federalist convictions. But the limitations of this finding can only be seen when we ask how high a correlation it was. Somewhere along this range a change in quantity may result in a wholly different qualitative picture of the society: it is the difference between a social order that is harmonious and viable and one that is not.

If there had been no cleavage within the elite classes over such a fundamental issue, and at the same time no cleavage in the lower, and if the two had been ranged against each other, face to face and class to class, a deep social conflict might have resulted. But where there is a significant cleavage within the elite and both elite factions draw significant support from the lower ranks of society, sharp polarization is much less likely to occur and compromise and accommodation become possible. For the Americans it was a fact of fundamental importance that the Constitution provoked a significant opposition among the wealthy and won a significant support from small farmers, and that these deviants from the Beardian picture were fairly well distributed throughout the country.

[9] Robert E. Thomas, "The Virginia Convention of 1788," *Journal of Southern History*, XIX (1953), 63–72; Freeman H. Hart, *The Valley of Virginia in the American Revolution*, 1763–1789, University of North Carolina Press, 1942 (out of print), chapter 10; Forrest McDonald, *We the People*, Phoenix, 1958, pp. 255–68.

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Stephan Thernstrom

Is There Really a New Poor?

A SPECTER is haunting the imagination of commentators upon the contemporary scene, the specter of the "new poor." In days of old (precise time conveniently unspecified), the cliché goes,

> the immigrant saw poverty as a *temporary state* and looked forward to the day when he or his children could gain greater access to opportunity and financial resources. The poor of today are more inclined to regard poverty as a *permanent way of life* with little hope for themselves or their children. This change in the outlook of the poor can be explained by changes in the opportunity structure.
>
> (From Louis Furman's *Poverty in America.*)

You can fill in the rest for yourself easily enough: the poor of old had a culture; the poor today have only a culture of poverty. The poor once had political machines which protected them; now they have only social workers who spy upon them. And the crucial contrast, from which so much else follows: the poor were once on the lowest rungs of a ladder most of them could climb; the poor today are a fixed underclass, a permanent proletariat.

A COMPELLING, dramatic image, this, but is there any evidence that it is *true?* This is not the place for an exhaustive analysis of the data, but I suggest that the answer is negative. Much depends, of course, upon just whom we have in mind when we refer to "the poor"—the semantic hazards here are even greater than in most issues of social policy. If, for instance, we insist that the authentically poor are the kinds of people Oscar Lewis describes in his studies of "the culture of poverty," it is difficult to say anything at all about whether there are more or fewer of them and whether their lot is better or worse than it used to be, because the historical record provides few clues by which to make a judgment. But such simple operational definitions as income, concentration in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs, etc. yield relatively straightforward conclusions. These conclusions will not be palatable to the kind of mindless radical who reasons, "things are terrible; *q.e.d.*: they are getting worse"—though they certainly do not, I will argue, dictate a complacent view of the fate of the Other America.

I

FIRST, A WORD on the poor considered as an income class. There has been a good deal of heated argument about precisely where to draw the poverty line, but little attention to what seem the two points of greatest significance. One is that wherever the line is drawn—$3000, $4000, or whatever—an ever-smaller fraction of the American population falls below that line. The long-term trend of per capita income in this country is dramatically upward, and the way in which that income is distributed has not shifted abruptly in a direction unfavorable to those on the lower end of the scale. The rich have been getting richer, all right, but the poor have been getting richer at much the same rate.

Documentation of the claims advanced in this essay will be found in two related papers by the author: "Poverty in Historical Perspective," in a forthcoming Harvard University Press volume edited by Daniel P. Moynihan, and "Urbanization, Migration and Social Mobility in Late-Nineteenth-Century America," in Barton Bernstein, ed., *Towards a New Past* (Pantheon, 1968).

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There has been no major increase in the proportion of the national income going to those on the bottom in recent decades—a fact American liberals have been pathetically slow to recognize. But the unpleasant truth that there is no pronounced trend toward more equal distribution of income in this country should not obscure the elementary fact that the disadvantaged are now receiving the same fraction of a pie which has grown substantially larger. Admittedly they *expect* more, in some ways it can be said that they *need* more, but that it *is* more is of considerable consequence, however it might seem to those of us who do not have to worry about the grocery bills.

A SECOND OBSERVATION is that it is very important to know whether the poverty line currently in favor in Washington, or some other (presumably higher) figure preferred by those of us on the *Left,* marks off an *entity* with more or less stable membership, or whether it is a mere category into which Americans fall and out of which they climb in rapid succession. If we can assume that some fixed figure represents a minimal, decent income for a family of a certain size, and that all those below it are living in poverty, it is obviously important to know if it is pretty much the same families who fall below that line year after year, as is commonly assumed by proponents of the "new poverty" thesis, or if there is a great deal of annual turnover in the composition of the group. Some people with desperately low incomes, after all, are graduate students. Are many of the poor temporary victims?

No one has any idea about the extent of continuity in the lowest income categories in the American past—say in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—though there is a common and highly questionable assumption that there was little continuity then. What is more remarkable is that hardly anything is known about the continuity of low income in present-day America. I have been able to turn up only two fragments of evidence which bear upon this point, and neither does much to support the case of the pessimists.

ONE SUCH FRAGMENT is the often cited statistic that about 40 per cent of the parents receiving AFDC in 1964 were themselves raised in a home where public assistance had been received. This may sound impressive, but not when we recall that a high proportion of these parents were presumably children in the Great Depression, when more than a quarter of the American population was on relief at some point. AFDC parents are somewhat overrepresented by this measure, to be sure, but this is not very telling proof of the persistence of hard-core poverty.

The other fragment is a set of figures which reveal that 69 per cent of the families with incomes below the poverty line in 1962 were in the same unhappy position in 1963 as well, with the racial breakdown of that rate 67 per cent for whites and 76 per cent for Negroes. Is an annual rate of persistence in poverty of about two-thirds a high one or a low one? It would seem to be rather low if one could assume that remaining in the persisting group from one year to the next did *not* alter one's probability of escaping it in future years, for 70 per cent persistence over two years would mean 49 per cent persistence over three years, 34 per cent over four years, 24 per cent over five, etc. We probably cannot make the assumption I have made, but clearly we need more long-term studies to see *how much* reality departs from the convenient assumption that these are independent trials.

We also would want to know, of course, how much long-term persistence varies with such characteristics as race, female-headed households, unemployment or underemployment of male household heads, etc. Most important, it is necessary to compute these rates using a variety of poverty lines rather than one dollar figure; obviously, we want to know how many people depart from pov-

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erty or fall into it by earning $50 more or $50 less a year. There is the interesting finding that of the families who climbed above the line between 1962 and 1963, two-fifth remained under the $4000 mark, one-fifth earned between $4000 and $5000, and two-fifth pulled in more than $5000. The latter families are, of course, the really impressive ones, and one would like to know much more about how many of them ever fall back and under what circumstances. Appallingly little is known about this essential matter. At a minimum, however, one can say that those who are convinced that poverty in the U.S. is increasingly being meted out in life sentences have yet to do the homework to substantiate the claim.

II

IF WE TURN to another aspect of the new poverty thesis—the assumption that it is now far more difficult for a low-skilled manual laborer to work his way up the occupational ladder than it once was—there is again a startling lack of evidence to buttress the claim. For all of the facile talk we hear about the barriers against mobility growing ever higher, the fragmentary knowledge we have about the American class structure in the past and the extensive literature on current occupational mobility patterns suggests that changes in the opportunity structure over the past century have been minimal, and that those minimal changes are in the direction of greater upward mobility today.

It is clear that the educational requirements for many desired jobs have been going up steadily, but it also appears that, on the whole, the expansion of educational opportunities has kept pace with, if not outrun, this development. It may be that decisive career choices are being made earlier than they once were—that now people permanently drop out of the race for certain attractive positions when they drop out of school, positions for which there were once fewer formal requirements, but I am very doubtful that this has resulted in less recruitment from below. To some extent, it has had the opposite effect, in that the change has been part of an increasingly universalistic process of selection.

IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT A NEW poverty has recently been created in this country because of creeping arteriosclerosis of the occupational structure. Unskilled and semi-skilled laborers still do rise to a higher occupation during their lifetimes, in at least a minority of cases; their sons still make the jump more frequently than their fathers.

Impressive though it is, the evidence on rates and patterns of occupational mobility does not entirely dispose of the arguments of the pessimists. They would emphasize that the demand for unskilled labor, the capacity of the economy to absorb raw newcomers and assure them of steady wages, is not what it was when the Golden Door was open to all. That could be true without lowering the rates of occupational mobility, of course. This has become a received truth in discussions of contemporary poverty without the benefit of the slightest critical examination, it seems to me. Indubitably, the demand for unskilled labor is not what it used to be, if we take as our measure the proportion of jobs that are classified as unskilled; indeed, discussions of this point often allude to the shrinking of the unskilled category in this century and the mushrooming of the white-collar group, as if that proves something.

But what about the demand relative to the supply? To say that this relationship has changed in a way unfavorable to the unskilled is to assert that the pool of unemployed laborers—the Marxian industrial reserve army—is characteristically larger now than it was in the past; and that wage differentials between unskilled and other types of work are now larger. Neither of these propositions can be substantiated.

As to the first, we have a decent times series on average annual unemployment only back to 1900, and one broken down for

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specific occupational groups—which is really what we want—only since 1940. But you needn't dig at all deeply into historical data to arrive at the conclusion that, however hard it may be for many people to find steady employment in our society today, it was often still harder in the past.

Robert Hunter's 1904 study, entitled *Poverty,* pulls together a few chilling fragments we might profitably recall. In the year 1900, 44.3 per cent of the unskilled laborers in the United States were unemployed at some time; of a sample of Italian workers in Chicago, for example, 57 per cent had been out of a job some time during the previous year, with the average time unemployed running over seven months! The fact that horror stories like this become increasingly difficult to duplicate as we approach the present, plus the mild but distinct downward trend in the overall unemployment time series since 1900, makes me feel very skeptical about the common assumption that things are getting worse for those on the bottom.

It is possible, of course, that the unskilled labor market now offers fewer employment opportunities to certain kinds of people, and greater opportunities to others. The most obvious case would be the aged, who once were free to die with their boots on and now suffer compulsory retirement. But few of them lived *past* what we now consider retirement age, so that isn't much of an argument for the good old days.

The case of the Negro naturally also leaps to mind here. It is perfectly clear that the labor market today is not color-blind; at comparable skill levels the Negro receives lower wages, is more often unemployed, etc. If we are assessing trends, however, there is a question as to just what we compare this grossly inequitable situation with. If we compare Negro-white differentials in the past, the only way of arguing a long-term deterioration in the Negro position would be to assume sharecroppers were better off then urban laborers.

Perhaps, however, a more fruitful point of comparison would be with the most recent immigrant group at other points in the past. Was the gap in wages and employment security between Irish and Yankee laborers in the 1850's or Italian and Yankee laborers in the 1890's as large as the racial gap today? Probably not, though no one has proved it yet.

To the extent, then, that in talking about poverty we really have in mind the problem of the Negro, the historical trend is open to debate (depending on the point of comparison we think most reasonable). With that exception—admittedly not a small one—I see no basis for the common cliché about the sluggish unskilled labor market.

As to the argument about wage rates and differentials, I have found no evidence which indicates any sharp decline in the position of the unskilled relative to the skilled. The long-term trend, indeed, has been toward a diminuation in wage differentials between these two groups. There have, however, been some changes which have made things tougher for those on the bottom of the ladder and which have been responsible for some of the distress and discontent which have been mistakenly attributed to the supposed tightening of the occupational structure and the presumed glut on the unskilled labor market.

III

One of these has to do with the costs and rewards of having a large brood of children. We are now acutely aware that the rich get richer and the poor get children, so much so that we tend to forget that there ever was a time when kids were an economic asset. In nineteenth-century America the earnings of young children were of decisive importance in enabling laboring families to secure a property stake in the community, and there is evidence that much the same sort of thing happened elsewhere well into the present century.

This, of course, no longer holds true. The extension of compulsory school attendance has steadily narrowed the span of years in

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which a youth is old enough to work but too young to set up a household of his own. Furthermore, it appears that youths who are working and yet living at home are less likely today to turn their earnings over to daddy; the shift from the CCC practice of sending a lad's wages home to his parents to the Job Corps practice of paying members directly, is a revealing symptom of the social change that has weakened the economic viability of the working-class family.

Having multiple wage earners, all of whom felt that what they earned was not their own but the family's, was not only a means of generating a surplus for the savings account; it was also a kind of primitive unemployment compensation scheme, in that even in very hard times, it was unlikely that all six wage-earners would be thrown out of work. This benefit was available in only one phase of a man's life cycle, of course—it is not very common to have a steady stream of children throughout one's entire life—but if a house could be paid for during that phase, the reduction in income that came with the departure of the children would be tolerable.

THE OTHER MAJOR CHANGE which demands attention is the steady erosion of the subcultures which defined the expectations of workingmen in the past. There were once working-class enclaves—often with ethnic boundaries, but not necessarily—within which the mobility values of the larger society were redefined in more attainable terms. The workingmen of nineteenth-century America whom I described in my study *Poverty and Progress* toiled with remarkable dedication to accumulate the funds to pay for tiny cottages of their own and were amazingly successful at it. There are some contemporary analogues to those cottages, as books like the Middletown volumes, Chinoy's study of automobile workers, and Berger's *Working Class Suburb* make clear. But everything about contemporary America conspires to make both copping out entirely and lowering one's sights more difficult. Television is the prime symbol of the change I have in mind, though not necessarily the prime agent.

Certainly, there are great expectations abroad in some quarters. When a Negro leader in San Francisco greets the news that a few hundred new jobs paying $1.25 an hour have been opened up with the comment that "if you're working at the minimum wage, man, you're still unemployed," we certainly cannot assume that he is speaking for the Negro working class. But it is significant that in the past a reaction like this would be utterly unimaginable. One of the clichés about the new poor is that their aspirations are lower than those of the old poor—they are a defeated bunch, living in

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a system "designed to be impervious to hope." But the point to stress is surely the opposite. Many of the poor today *expect more,* and they will take less from others in order to get it, precisely because the enclaves of old have been levelled, with all the docility and deference they fostered.

I SEE NO REASON to mourn the passing of these enclaves of old. I find it hard to believe that those poor bastards breaking their backs in the industrial city I studied were receiving their just reward, even though they seemed to have believed it. Their conception of "making it" seems a pathetic delusion. But it was, of course, a delusion that made many of them behave in ways that kept them out of trouble, and it is quite possible that the more we do now to improve their worldly lot, the more trouble they'll make. Even if we gave them all the cash necessary to put them above the poverty line tomorrow, their incomes would be a little less than half the median family income in the United States. Why *should* they be content with that? One thinks of Samuel Gomper's famous reply when pressed as to the objectives of the labor movement: MORE. In reading Arthur Dunmeyer's extraordinary testimony before the Ribicoff Committee, I kept thinking of that, and of Bukharin's dictum: "in revolutions, appetite grows with the eating." It would be premature to descry an incipient revolution around us, but there are hints at least that fundamental questions which have been left to the market place—the core question of income distribution—will be increasingly open to political conflict and decision.

A recent analysis of the poverty problem by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce concludes comfortably that the objective situation of the poor is so encouraging now that "the old socialist tradition in discussing income [distribution] is dying out. Conditions no longer call for deep-seated and widespread social change. Rather, the discussion now is on helping the poor. Expropriation of property is no longer seriously considered as a remedy." The enlightened capitalists and the economists they hired do a surprisingly intelligent job of describing the extent and character of contemporary poverty, I grudgingly admit. But they naively assume that to disprove the law of increasing misery is to assure that no one on the bottom will ever want to rock the boat. We need only note the creative ferment that has been provoked by the current Administration's version of "helping the poor" to realize that this is by no means the case.

IN SUM, I DO NOT SEE any grounds for believing that this country is now threatened by a mass of "new poor" whose objective situations, especially their opportunities to rise out of poverty, are much worse than those of earlier generations. The real changes I see are generally encouraging, or at least mixed. Some families are worse off today because they can't reap the benefits of child labor; but in the long run, presumably, their children are better off.

I think that one can be clear-headed about what is happening without being complacent about the *status quo.* I have never understood why so many Americans believe that to assert things are bad, you must insist that they are getting worse. I would argue that they could well be getting a little better—the situation of the poor in America is, on the whole—and still be intolerably bad. A little less unemployment can still be too damned much unemployment, in a culture where people have become civilized enough to understand that recurrent unemployment is due not to the will of God but to the inaction of man. To conjure up a Golden Age from which to judge the present and find it wanting is quite unnecessary, and as de Tocqueville pointed out long ago, it is even slightly un-American; for the American way is to reject the achievements of the past as a standard for the present or future; Americans, he said, use the past only as a means of information, and existing facts only as a lesson in doing otherwise and doing better.

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Paul Bullock

On Organizing the Poor

Problems of Morality and Tactics

THOUGH MANY OF THE YOUNG and idealistic radicals of this generation may be convinced that "participatory democracy" is a revolutionary concept of their own making, a re-reading of Saul Alinsky's *Reveille for Radicals* will remind us that the essential idea has been around for at least a quarter of a century. Alinsky's work, first published in 1945, is replete with detailed descriptions of the varied ways by which a People's Organization can be built, offering as its most concrete example the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council, organized in Chicago in 1939. The history of this movement in the intervening period is sobering and instructive: the Back of the Yards community is today a bastion of conformity and segregation.

In 1967, almost every urban area where racial and cultural minorities are concentrated contains at least one organization which purports to represent the needs of the traditionally unrepresented poor. Organizers of such groups fall roughly into four categories:

(1) Alinsky and his staff of professionals, through the Chicago-based Industrial Areas Foundation;

(2) civil rights organizations, predominantly Negro;

(3) New Left organizations, predominantly white;

(4) certain labor unions, working independently or in conjunction with other groups.

Socially conscious unions such as the UAW and the Packinghouse Workers, and some staff members of the AFL–CIO's Industrial Union Department, are actively promoting the formation of "community unions." Jack Conway and Woodrow Ginsburg of the IUD have suggested that a community union "could merge traditional trade union functions with modern community-center functions. For example, a community union could bring tenants together to bargain collectively with slumlords."[1] Incipient forms of community unionism have already appeared in Chicago, Los Angeles, and Newark.

THE SOURCES of the current movement for community organizing are diverse. Alinsky is a professional, coldly realistic in his approach to tactics, fascinated by power, temperamentally suited to the public role of "trouble-maker," contemptuous of amateurish do-gooders. Civil rights groups are uncertain and uneasy in their new roles as urban organizers, seeking with limited success to move from the task of organizing in the rural or small-town South to the immensely complex arena of the sprawling big-city ghettos of the North. The New Leftists, many of them Anglo-Saxon youngsters from middle-class family backgrounds, bring with them an uncompromising rejection of the prevailing value system but often very little in the form of a definable program. The unions have a cadre of experienced organizers, but again the techniques of organizing in a factory are only partially applicable to a wider community, and organized labor it-

The author is grateful to Mr. Wycliffe Mutsune for research assistance in the preparation of this article.

[1] "Extension of Collective Bargaining to New Fields," *Proceedings of the 19th Annual Winter Meeting*, Industrial Relations Research Association, December 28–29, 1966, p. 308.

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self is ambivalent because it is at least partly within the "Establishment."

The common thread that binds the groups together philosophically is a belief in democracy and in the capacity of relatively uneducated people to represent their own interests effectively. This implies a freedom of choice, a freedom from manipulation. The paradox faced by Community organizers, however, is that the achievement of their goal—a functioning and independent organization—seems to require at least a measure of conscious manipulation of motivations and attitudes. Alinsky is explicit on the point that organizers always talk and act in terms of interests and experience of those being organized. A judgment must be made as to the motivations of people in the community and of "leaders" whose decisions may influence the success of organizing; and in turn this judgment becomes the basis for trying to channel their actions.[2]

Alinsky is impatient with his younger and more impulsive contemporaries in the field of community organization:

> It requires a certain degree of sophistication in terms of tactics to organize a community, and some of the younger civil-rights leaders don't have it. It's like putting kids into a lion's cage . . . The problem with those kids is that they always want the third act—the resolution, the big drama. They want to skip the first act, the second act, the tediousness, the listening. Actually you do more organizing with your ears than with your tongue.[3]

The professional approach to organizing demands a heavy investment of time and personnel in the process of listening to grievances. The organizer must not impose his own preconceptions upon the community; his role is initially passive, focused on an objective ascertainment of the feelings, institutions, and indigenous leadership in the area. Once having acquired this knowledge, he must evaluate it in terms of how best to build an organization out of the raw material already present in the community. He moves from passive listening to active work with that material, using his experience and organizational sophistication to draw residents into the process of organizing together. As local participation and leadership increase, the organizer's function again recedes into passivity and finally into withdrawal.

Presumably the organizer has fulfilled his function: a community organization has been built. But how does one define a "community organization" in practical terms? How much of a given community must be involved before it is possible to say that the "community" has achieved representation? Is a community organization genuinely independent and indigenous when a major part of its funding comes from outside the community, whether from a foundation, a church group, or government? How is it possible to guarantee that the organization's executive board is responsive primarily to the needs of the total community and not merely to its own individual or collective interests? Can uneducated and unsophisticated people administer a mass organization so as to avoid the omnipresent traps set by politicians, bureaucrats, and other members of the "Establishment"?

Alinsky himself raised the question of organizational representativeness in *Reveille for Radicals,* and his answer further emphasizes the complexity of the issue. A participation of 5 per cent in any community, he then said, "is a tremendous democratic phenomenon."[4] If any organization really represents only a small minority, in a direct sense, the possibilities of misrepresentation

[2] "The Professional Radical: Conversations with Saul Alinsky" (Part I), *Harper's,* June 1965, p. 45. See also *Reveille for Radicals, passim.*

[3] "A Professional Radical Moves in on Rochester: Conversations with Saul Alinsky" (Part II), *Harper's,* July 1965, p. 56.

[4] *Reveille for Radicals.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945, p. 201. Obviously neither Alinsky nor any other organizer will adhere closely to a quantitative standard, but the point is simply that no organization directly represents more than a relatively small minority of the community.

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are numerous indeed. The initial listening process implies a conscious or accidental selection of informants; the people who are most verbal about "problems" are by that very fact unrepresentative of a community which is not oriented to frank discussion in the presence of outsiders. Furthermore, communities are rarely homogeneous, even though they may be segregated. Attitudes and interests vary sharply from one person to another, in low-income Negro areas as well as in the less alienated parts of the city.

THE EXPERIENCE OF ORGANIZING the Watts Labor Community Action Committee, in Los Angeles, is revealing. A combination of Watts area residents, union representatives, and UCLA staff promoted the organization early in 1965; it was to be constructed around a nucleus of union members living in the Watts area.

The organizational experience and leadership potential of union members would presumably offer a strong base for organizing. But as the work proceeded, one factor soon became evident: in an area like Watts, active union members are an "elite." As persons with steady work, cars, property of their own, and insurance policies, their attitudes and motives often diverged from those of the self-ordained ministers, ambitious local "politicians," and the operators with various personal gimmicks who were mixed in among the poor people attracted to the meetings.

Led by a dynamic and aggressive UAW shop steward, a long-time resident of Watts, the organization achieved some public recognition and community status in 1966, when it was active in an apparently successful drive to secure a new county hospital in the area. When substantial federal funding for a summer-time youth program in Watts became available in midyear, WLCAC was selected to administer it. The resulting program, later renewed and expanded and still in operation, has received praise even from such respectable sources as the *Los Angeles Times,* usually not known as a friend of organized labor. The committee's activities, highly meritorious in most respects, have therefore been well within the conventional framework of public policy, and its role has been primarily that of a program administrator and not an abrasive critic of institutions.

The experience of WLCAC reflects both the potentialities and the limitations inherent in community organizing. Any community organizer confronts the dilemma that the people of the area expect visible results within the reasonably near future, or they will see little point in supporting the organization. Yet such results can be obtained, as a rule, only by working within the "system," even though some sort of direct action (demonstrations, boycotts, etc.) may be involved. The opponents of the system, therefore, are confounded by the fact that if the Establishment produces results satisfactory to the residents, it merely increases its strength in the community. And if no results are forthcoming, the organization will probably die.

The problem of finances similarly complicates the task of an organizer. Poor communities may sometimes lack the economic base to support organizations of their own, with paid staff. Hence they must rely upon volunteers or seek outside funding. Though Alinsky has publicly set down a general rule (perhaps not to be taken literally) that the organizations he promotes should become self-supporting after three years, he found it necessary to abandon the rule in the case of The Woodlawn Organization in Chicago, which is considered to be his outstanding achievement. TWO has subsequently sought and obtained government contracts to administer training programs and so forth. It is difficult to run an organization on a strictly volunteer basis and without a reliable source of funding. Yet when paid staff positions are created, the internal competition among candidates may become bitter and intense. Poor people are not immune from

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the selfishness and careerism which pervade our society; indeed, the daily struggle for survival leaves little room for any other concern.

THESE DILEMMAS are particularly acute for the idealistic and youthful radical organizer. Alinsky, however, does not glorify or romanticize the poor: "Too often I've seen the have-nots turn into haves and become just as crummy as the haves they used to envy. Some of the fruit ranchers in California steam around in Cadillacs and treat the Mexican-American field hands like vermin. Know who those bastards are? They're the characters who rode West in Steinbeck's trucks, in *The Grapes of Wrath.*"[5]

Young radical organizers are more likely to enter the community with preconceived idealistic notions, usually commendable in themselves but often unrelated to the realities of organizing in a slum ghetto. Certainly, they cannot be satisfied when the result of their efforts is reflected only in a greater enlistment of Americans into the detested middle class. Yet the psychology of the ghetto itself militates against a too ambitious and large-scale perspective in community organizing. The ghetto resident, in the poorest and most alienated category, is the product of a cruel environment, and this hardly increases his patience and forbearance. Essentially, he is interested in only one thing—escaping from poverty. He is not at all concerned about a mass redistribution of income, long-run social revolution, or any other concern of the young radical. He has no objections to being "corrupted" by money; quite the contrary, he yearns for the opportunity.

Ghetto life breeds a deep cynicism about human motivation; to many a ghetto resident, all life is a "hustle," and everyone has his own "bag." The world is divided between the "takers" and the "taken," and one purpose of living is to stay in the former and out of the latter category. When strangers come into the community, spouting unfamiliar philosophies and claiming to be altruistic in motivation, they will be eyed with extra suspicion. The first assumption is that the stranger is motivated in the usual way: he is probably a policeman, a bill collector, a researcher, a dope peddler, a welfare investigator, a salesman, or a reporter. Without necessarily abandoning this suspicion completely, the ghetto resident may next assume that the newcomer is a "patsy" who is exploitable as a source of occasional or frequent loans, influence with probation officers, training allowances, and so forth. Only after a long period of time, and after the newcomer has been tested in many ways and found reliable, will the basis emerge for a genuine rapport and trust

Above all else, the ghetto resident is pragmatic. The fight for basic survival makes him realistically skeptical about rhetoric and promises, however appealing they may seem in various ways. Despite the obvious emotional strength of "black nationalism," a proposal by SNCC for incorporation of the Watts area into a separate city has never aroused broad support. The objection of Watts residents is directly to the point: "How can a poor community like this finance a city government of its own?" The history of Negro political activity is also instructive. Despite the status of Negroes as the most exploited group within the economy, and theoretically a likely target for Communist appeals, the Communist party has had remarkably little success in enlisting recruits or sympathizers from the Negro community.

THE ISSUES with which a community organization will concern itself normally fall into the practical, short-run, bread-and-butter category which some New Leftists would condemn as "reformist," "compromise," "half-measures," "liberal palliatives": school lunches, tutorial projects, crossing guards, urban renewal, community improvement, training programs, employment, and so on.

[5] "Conversations" (Part II), *op. cit.*, p. 56.

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From his own viewpoint, of course, the New Leftist is wholly correct: none of these measures fundamentally alters the prevailing social system. Each one, in fact, fits easily within, even as it slightly modifies, the framework of American capitalism. Yet the best a community organizer can usually expect is to help move the residents from the traditional stance of apathy and preoccupation with personal survival to a concern with those issues which, with good planning and some luck, can be resolved with tangible benefit to the entire community. Most ghetto residents do not trust the "revolutionary" any more than do the more affluent members of society.

Some of the young radicals, especially those who have had experience in attempting to organize urban ghettos, are aware of these realities. Tom Hayden, who has organized in Newark, describes his aims as "rent control, play streets, apartment repairs, higher welfare payments, jobs."[6] Others may be so blinded by their internal emotional conflicts that they respond more to their own needs than to the interests of the community. They identify themselves with those who share neither power nor affluence within American society, but often find themselves in the anomalous position of belonging by background to the "exploiting" rather than the "exploited" class. They feel oppressed and frustrated, but can usually express these feelings only in behalf of other groups—Negroes, farm workers, welfare recipients. Their "revolutionary" experience is mainly a vicarious one, seen through the eyes of the actually exploited. Most have tasted the presumed joys and advantages of middle-class life and now consciously reject them; their revolution is essentially a personal one, manifested most clearly in the material self-denial which they not only accept but exalt. Needless to say, their ascetic philosophy is not shared by the poor.

No wonder, then, that the youngsters welcome Paul Goodman's description of American education as "mere exploitation."[7] In revolting against the college bureaucracies, they assert their own feelings and values; if they achieve power on the campus, they achieve it presumably to advance their own ideals. Their "revolutionary" experience is no longer vicarious, and there is no danger, as there always is in community organizing, that the genuinely deprived will reject their radical values.

Because most of these young organizers are intellectuals, their belief in participatory democracy coexists uneasily with an elitist strain. They strongly disapprove of popular opinion and mass rule in the prevailing forms. What the New Left appears to espouse is "participatory democracy" for certain defined groups which either share its values or engage its sympathy. At times, this becomes analogous to a civil libertarianism that defends only the rights of left-wingers. The young radicals would answer that the more affluent communities are already organized, and they would merely extend that power to the poor. This is partly true; nevertheless, the principle they advocate is a two-edged sword. They also fail to recognize that the basic ambitions of the poor and the rich are similar; the communities differ only in the extent to which those ambitions can be realized.

THE NEW LEFTISTS thus make ambivalent organizers, because they suspect that successful organizations develop bureaucracies of their own and tend to join the "Establishment." The "Establishment," a vast complex of institutions, includes most labor unions, college administrations, governmental programs, corporations, and the military services—all of which establish rules designed to protect their institutional interests and to exploit those who are outside their framework.

Furthermore, the quasi-anarchism of the

[6] Quoted in "The New Radicals," *Time*, April 28, 1967, p. 27.

[7] Paul Goodman, "Berkeley in February," DISSENT, Spring 1965, p. 162.

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New Left organizers, added to the diversity of interests within the community, makes it difficult for them to develop concrete affirmative programs in ways that can be related to the exercise of power. Alinsky has noted the importance of having an identifiable enemy (such as Bull Connor in Alabama and urban renewal in Chicago's Woodlawn area) as a stimulus to organization; apparently people will organize more quickly to repel the threats or defeat the plans of others than to advance their own spontaneous ideas and proposals. The reason, in part, is that the diversity of interests and personalities is reflected more readily on the "positive" than on the "negative" side. It is easier to organize in Woodlawn, where there appeared to be a common enemy in the University of Chicago, than in Watts, where the enemy is more amorphous and harder to define.

The young New Leftists are valuable in their willingness to unsettle the more comfortable bureaucrats and to challenge the pretenses of the traditional "leaders," including many of the liberals. They are inclined, however, to develop a new set of clichés and stereotypes ("middle class," "Establishment," "participatory democracy") which can only obscure the complexity of the issues involved in organizing poor communities and may even reduce the effectiveness of those intent upon building viable organizations. Yet the effort to organize previously unorganized (and supposedly unorganizable) communities has substantial merit in and of itself—even if it achieves only limited goals within the framework of a considerably less-than-perfect society. Thus, the sit-down strikes of the 1930's failed to usher in a brand-new social system; indeed, they resulted in the creation of labor organizations which, in the view of some New Leftists, have become part of the "Establishment." Nevertheless, it would be difficult to sustain the argument that the unions have not been of tangible benefit to groups which were previously unrepresented within the industrial structure. No one can be sure that sometime in the future The Woodlawn Organization in Chicago will not go the way of the Back of the Yards movement, or that the striking farm workers in Delano, California, will not concentrate on bettering their own economic and social status instead of focusing on the development of a new society. For the moment, it may be enough to assure that they have some freedom of choice, and that they are not simply the victims of manipulation.

The unpleasant truth is that many of the potential "indigenous" organizers seek mainly to smooth their own path to what the radicals might define as middle-class status. It is precisely this kind of person, in fact, who is most likely to gravitate to leadership positions in any new organization, because he is the one most sophisticated about the available opportunities for advancement and most motivated to pursue them. The complex task of the outsider who wishes to help build an effective community organization is to assure, as much as possible, that the leaders coincidentally serve the broader interests of their community in the process of advancing their much narrower and more personal aims. This requires a certain Alinsky-like toughness, combined with a genuine commitment to both the desirability and the feasibility of creating a community-based organization. The outsider, of course, can usefully provide technical knowledge and political support, but he must remain sensitive to the delicacy of his relationship with the community.

THE POOR SHOULD BE FREE from the tyranny of the bureaucrats and the dogmatic militants alike. They should be manipulated neither to serve capitalism nor to destroy it. Their rights as individual human beings, with a diversity of values and personalities, should take precedence over the administrative demands of the bureaucracy *and* the emotional or ideological needs of the community organizers. One may hope

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Academic Liberty: Two Reports

John Quirk & Dennis Hale

Recruiter Bans and the New Ivory Tower

THE SPIRALS OF CONFRONTATION and force which marked recent campus demonstrations against Dow interviewers, military recruiters, and Johnson Administration spokesmen have raised serious issues regarding academic freedom.

SDS and its allies have announced an abrupt turn "from 'mere protest' to 'resistance.'" SDS National Secretary Mike Spiegel has declared: *"We think the issue of civil liberties tends to obfuscate the real issues."* According to the rationale proffered by leaders of the demonstrators, the university should have no right to participate in the military efforts of the country, and Dow Chemical representatives and other recruiters must, when they come to the campus, discuss their involvement in the war machine. Otherwise, say these leaders, demonstrators have a right to drive them from the campuses.

Liberal newspapers and university administrators have vociferously attacked the tactics and motivations of the demonstrators. President designate of the University of Michigan, Robben W. Fleming, has deplored "the tyranny of the minority" and "the high tensions and emotions that surrounded the Dow incidents [and] ignore the underlying principle of freedom . . ." The American Association of University Professors, which condemned General Hershey's directive to use the draft as a "punitive instrument" against protesters, has also differed with students *and* faculty who stop interviewers and hamper invited speakers by obstructionist tactics. Supporting the AAUP statement, National Student Association President Ed Schwartz asked, "In what way does the left's attempt to rid the university of recruiters whom they oppose differ from the right's frequent attempts to ban Communists from campus?" However, Schwartz proposed that "any recruiter coming to campus be required to participate in an open forum to answer questions if students so request."

Both the rationale of SDS and the position of the AAUP and NSA suggest new and aggressive versions of the "ivory tower" conception of the university, which they counterpose to pollution of the campus by the military-industrial complex. As the revelations of CIA subsidies and chemical warfare research proved, there is a grave danger to the integrity of the academy posed by Pentagon and security agency contracts and influences.

THE PROPOSED PRESCRIPTIONS may, however, prove fatal to the already impaired health of academic institutions: impose a ban on outside recruiters, who do not meet supposed "standards of an academic community," which will be defined and determined on an *ad hoc* basis. After a Dow representative declined to comment on certain questions during an "open forum" at NYU, protest leader Brendon Sexton called his performance unsatisfactory and grounds for further harassment: "If he will not debate the issue of burning civilians with napalm in Vietnam, then he cannot be a recruiter. Let them send a recruiter who will debate."

On the surface, this seems fitting when we consider our sense of outrage and total opposition to the war and the draft. However, this does not dispense with the question of the right of free speech and access to the campus or the proper relation between the universities and the "military-industrial complex." The demonstrators have not answered pressing and fundamental questions: whether their cavalier attitude toward maintaining an orderly and "open" campus might weaken the traditional means by which the academic community opposes outside pressures? whether these new

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"resistance techniques" do not themselves detract from the New Left's power of exposure, which in the past year effectively crippled covert CIA subsidies and biological and chemical warfare projects?

Moreover, the napalm debate proposals *reverse* the conception of "freedom of expression." The traditional American conception holds that persons and organizations ought to have the right to decide whether to participate in debate or submit to questions. Freedom of speech signifies that, right or wrong, a person has the right to choose whether he wishes to debate, and his decisions to refuse to debate with anyone is no adequate ground for an attempt to deprive him of the right to speak. Under the terms of the new theory, however, a recruiter's acceptability depends upon his moral probity as judged by his audiences. How many employers could pass that test?

The application of this principle to other campus visitors would look like the very "prior censorship" which SDS and student free-speech movements have protested. When a "visiting speaker's form" was required of Staughton Lynd, the University of Illinois SDS chapter was "appalled by the Student Senate's compliance with the University of Illinois regulations . . . In a society in which individuals are supposedly guaranteed freedom of speech, there is no place for the Committee On Visiting Speakers." But now SDS leaders there and elsewhere have proposed preconditions that would, in effect, require a "Committee On Visiting Recruiters."

IF THE DEBATE-OR-BE-BANNED PRINCIPLE were adopted, it would have to be applied equally to all—in line with commonly accepted "standards of an academic community." Presumably Herbert Aptheker and other Communist speakers could be required by the audience to discuss Hungary instead of Spain, the jailing of Soviet writers instead of the writings of Marx. DuBois Clubs recruiters could be cross-examined about the sources of their funds and whether they were members of the CPUSA. Although Rap Brown and other "black power" advocates have been willing to discuss the morality of riots and violence, rules like those suggested for Dow men could be invoked to "ban" them unless they answered specific questions about their personal and organizational involvement in ghetto "rebellions." The Young Americans for Freedom, coached by William F. Buckley, Jr., might have a field day employing the new New Left concept of freedom of expression.

These speculations would be academic were there not historical parallels between present problems and the banning of "front" groups from campuses during the late forties. Perhaps a perfect example is the University of Illinois, the scene of many unresolved controversies over academic freedom.

Last year SDS and other organizations at the Champaign and Chicago campuses mounted a protest against restrictions on free speech whereby the DuBois Club and Communist speakers were not allowed to use university facilities. This year some of the same groups have rationalized their part in obstructing Dow interviews with a faulty historical analogy between "McCarthyism" and corporate "repression."

THE CLABAUGH ACT of 1947, the state law which was opposed last year, banned "the use of any facilities of the university for the purpose of carrying on, or advertising or publicizing the activities" of "any subversive, seditious, and un-American organization." The burden of responsibility for determining the probity of those who used the campus was placed upon the university itself, which established student and faculty committees to determine standards in the case of every applicant. That, said the New Left correctly enough, was a piece of McCarthyite repression aimed at the campus.

Now SDS leadership argues that the presence on campus of military and industrial representatives is the vanguard of a new wave of "repression" that "is coming," spawned by "the fascist phase of corporate liberalism." And they add that the university is guilty of complicity because it has not taken a stand against the Vietnam War, as formerly it did not oppose the Clabaugh Act. Therefore, they conclude, students must take matters into their own hands. One Dow demonstration leader told the press that the munitions makers must be driven from the campus, "like Jesus taking things into his own hands because they were doing something immoral." Invoking the name

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of Unamuno, a faculty demonstrator announced: "There are times when you have to break civil liberties. Here two issues were involved and one was more important than the other."

Unfortunately, the chain of circumstances which led to the passage of the Clabaugh Act provides a different parallel—and another lesson. Before the Act was passed, various "liberal" groups of students at Illinois, led by the student newspaper, initiated a move to ban American Youth for Democracy, the Communist-led youth front, on the grounds that its "sham" activity was inconsistent with the purposes of the university. The charge against AYD was, in effect, similar to that now being made against Dow Chemical.

Eventually AYD violated a university regulation governing outside speakers and the direct result was that right-wing legislators passed the Clabaugh Act with the tacit approval of the "ban AYD" movement on the campus. The result has been that the university has been forced to ban groups like the DuBois Clubs and SWP affiliates.

Unquestionably, the students were right about the suspect affiliations of AYD, and they are right about the insidious implications of military-industrial influence on the campus. But we could argue that both cases demonstrate the futility of "ivory tower" militancy. In each instance, the proponents of some special ban on access to the campus fell back upon a double standard: that advocacy in a university setting should only be allowed to those who meet standards of academic and moral probity, and closed to deceivers and seducers. Thus, opinions guaranteed access to public and private forums must meet unusual requirement for toleration in the groves of academe.

SUCH THEORIES OF "SELECTIVE TOLERANCE" find their obverse in the defenses of those who rationalize the uses to which their "pure" scientific researches are put. "What the Defense Department does with our work is its business," Willis E. Groves, head of Project Michigan, told the Collegiate Press Service, "We just go ahead and develop more technology." In a similar manner, the advocates of "selective tolerance" have eschewed responsibility for the impact which their actions may have upon civil liberties.

Twenty years ago few voices were raised to warn against the implications of the "ban AYD" drive. But the opinions of Prof. Mulford Sibley and the Socialist Study Club at Illinois, no newcomers to anti-Stalinism and anti-militarism, were and remain instructive: "The Socialist Study Club . . . in the interest of maintaining freedom [is ready] to defend an organization whose policy we oppose."

Today, the New Left should ponder whether the consequences of the fight to exclude outside recruiters will not legitimate administrative and legislative equivalents of the Clabaugh Act. Once directed against a specific "enemy within," such precedents have an inherent tendency to be used against all dissent. Indeed, the New Left's finest battles were against the Clark Kerrs who sought to exclude "outside recruiters" at Berkeley on the grounds that the university was a place for theoretical discussion rather than unbridled advocacy. The Free Speech movements offered decisive arguments against arbitrary bans and made the Bill of Rights the only set of applicable "standards of an academic community."

Freedom After Fifty Years

"ANDREI D. SINYAVSKY and Yuli M. Daniel were not covered by the terms of the jubilee amnesty and still serve their labor-camp sentences. They were convicted early in 1966 of 'anti-Soviet propaganda' in satirical works published abroad. . . .

"According to a recent report, Mrs. Daniel was allowed to visit her husband with their young son at the Ozernoye camp in the Mordvinian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

". . . They covered the 10-mile stretch between the railroad station and the camp on foot, carrying as much food and supplies for Mr. Daniel as they could.

"At the camp, according to the report, they were forced to leave all but four oranges and a package of cigarettes outside and were made to carry the rest back home after a visit that lasted one hour. Mrs. Daniel described her husband as ill, overworked and underfed."

—*New York Times*, November 16, 1967

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During the forties the non-Communist Left had developed adequate and legitimate techniques to withstand infiltration. Today SDS and the New Left have discovered open means to expose CIA and military-industrial influence with devastating effectiveness. The resort to dubious rules has been neither necessary nor honorable. Those who use Herbert Marcuse's notions of "repressive tolerance" to exorcise "hang-ups about bourgeois civil liberties and middle-class law and order" do an injustice to the other element of the Marcusean dialectic: "the closing of the universe of discourse." Speakers' bans and the use of napalm are both by-products of a "one-dimensional mentality." It would be a tragedy if the New Left, which reopened discourse within the university, should now lend intellectual justification to another era of exclusion in the name of opposition to tyranny and war.

Neil Rudenstine

Letter from Harvard—Dow Shalt Not

UNIVERSITY DEMONSTRATIONS against Dow Chemical erupted in the weeks immediately following the Washington march on the Pentagon on October 21. The Harvard sit-in took place on October 25. Dr. Frederick Leavitt, director of Dow's lab in Wayland, Mass., was confined for about seven hours in a room he was using to conduct job interviews. Nearly 300 members of the university blocked the corridors outside Dr. Leavitt's office.

Yet, despite the size of the crowd, the sit-in was essentially orderly. There was neither personal abuse nor violence. University officials were allowed free access to the recruiting room, and people who chose to address the crowd (even in opposition to the demonstrators) were listened to. The demonstrators made their decisions by majority vote, and it was by voting that they finally disbanded. An extraordinary form of due process was thus used to deprive someone of his liberty for several hours. Criticism of the Vietnam War had shifted, on one more occasion, from dissent to what is loosely called resistance.

Such resistance can be an extremely effective kind of protest. The government needs continually to be reminded of the fact that a great many people are actively hostile to its policy in Vietnam. Latent antiwar feelings must be activated, and individuals be given concrete means of expressing those feelings. The Harvard sit-in clearly contributed toward all these ends. Like all such demonstrations, it produced some backlash, but probably a minimal amount compared to the galvanizing potency of its frontlash.

A great many people who disapproved of the tactics of the Dow incident have nevertheless been prodded into one or another form of action by it. Some are working for Eugene McCarthy's nomination, others have joined the Boston draft resistance. Meanwhile, the university administration and faculty are in the process of creating a joint student-faculty advisory committee to inquire into the substantive issues raised by the Dow sit-in, primarily the issues of campus recruiting, ROTC, federal research funding, and methods of campus protest. The university is in effect agreeing to re-examine its relationship to the government and the so-called military-industrial complex of America. When a group of students can bring this about, one can scarcely deny at least a degree of effectiveness to obstructive demonstrations.

BUT THE PROBLEM, INEVITABLY, is whether effectiveness confers legitimacy, whether obstructive or "harassing" techniques are not seriously compromising unless they are used with much greater moral discrimination than has recently been shown. To some, the question may seem little more than a quibble. In the light of the war's enormity, can one seriously worry, for example, about the temporary, harmless imprisonment of a Dow recruiter? When the government so frequently disparages and consistently ignores those who dissent, can one temporize about the use of more aggressive tactics?

If this reasoning is persuasive, it is also disturbingly simple. It tacitly offers demonstrators carte blanche in their choice of resistance methods—or at least it provides no obvious

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means of evaluating the moral basis of one form of resistance as opposed to another. Imprisoning the Dow man at Harvard may have been intended as a symbolic gesture, but it was nonetheless a wanton and aggressive act that inevitably compromised the cause of those who carried it out. It was all the more offensive because the victim was only remotely connected with the war effort, and his immediate business was something as innocuous as job-recruiting.

There were other reasons why some of us had ambivalent feelings about the Harvard demonstration. The purposes of the sit-in were so ambiguously defined as to be confusing and misleading. Many students who began the day protesting against napalm and the war were disturbed to discover that they were, willy-nilly, also protesting against the university. Napalm and the war were the large issues, the rallying cries. But sit-ins by their very nature need and create more limited, specific issues. In the Harvard affair, Dr. Leavitt was asked to guarantee that his company would never again recruit on the Harvard campus. He had neither the authority nor the inclination to do so, and his refusal ultimately prompted the demonstrators to redefine their immediate goal: if Dow would not agree to stay away, then the university policy of open recruiting must be changed in order to exclude the Dows of the world. The focus of protest unobtrusively shifted from the war to the university, and this was not at all what many of the participating students had either hoped or bargained for.

ALTHOUGH THE PURPOSES of the Harvard sit-in were ambiguous, and its methods dubious, the action still deserves to be judged on fundamentally substantive grounds. How significant are the actual issues raised by the demonstration, and how important a case do the students have against the university? What has been charged, of course, is that Harvard's policy of open recruiting is only one symptom of a dangerous and widespread disease. The support of an ROTC program is another symptom, and the reliance on federal research funds ($55 million last year) is the most serious of all. In all three of these instances, the university is said to be compromised by an unjustifiable involvement with the military-industrial sector of American society. It is an inconspicuous but deeply implicated partner in the policies of the government, including specifically the Vietnam war effort.

What has come to be called university "complicity" has thus emerged as the major legacy of the Dow affair. The question is whether the university has not in fact surrendered a significant portion of its freedom of inquiry, decision, and even speech by having become a tacit partner of government and industry. This is obviously an enormously complicated question, and although its conspiratorial implications may be easy to dismiss, other implications are more deeply troubling. Of the three items cited as evidence of university complicity, the first two—recruiting and ROTC—seem to me to be relatively trivial. The policy of allowing organizations of all kinds (excepting political organizations) to hold job interviews on campus is a legitimate enough extension of ordinary university concerns. So long as the program is fairly administered and genuinely "open," it is a harmless convenience.

At the same time, if the program is genuinely offensive to a significant portion of the community, there is no compelling reason why the university shouldn't defer to those offended members. That the campus should be either entirely open or entirely closed are arguable alternatives. The only unacceptable course would be for the university to act as moral arbiter, excluding some organizations while admitting others. The impossibility of developing rational criteria for exclusion (or inclusion) seems obvious enough. At the moment, Harvard does in fact deny facilities to firms who are known to have discriminatory hiring practices, but here the criterion is simply the law of the land.

THE MOST CRITICAL ISSUE raised by the students is that of federal funding. Harvard received approximately $4.7 million from the Department of Defense during the past year, and approximately $50 million from other government agencies. The question, inevitably, is what strings are attached to such aid? Harvard acted several years ago to obviate one potential danger: it voted not to accept federal money for classified research. In other words, funds currently received from even the De-

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fense Department are used only to finance nonsecret projects whose results can be published openly. The refusal to do classified research was not based, of course, on the premise that government and military activities are tainted and must therefore be avoided. The argument was that secrecy in academic work is antithetical to the free purposes of a university.

While secret research seems an indefensible activity for a university, the case of federally financed nonsecret or "basic" research is much less clear. At the moment, we know too little about either the actual nature of such research or its effects on the university community. In theory, the government's basic research program is an unpragmatic venture. Some grants (particularly from the NIH or OEO) have immediate practical repercussions, but many are given for the general purpose of "advancing knowledge."

What factors, one would like to know, make some applications more acceptable to the government than others? Are successful applications noticeably similar in kind? If the government does in fact exercise strong preferences, it seems clear that applicants will quickly learn what these are. Proposals will be tailored in order to be made acceptable, and many projects may be conceived largely because one knows that money can be obtained for them. It may well be that the government investment in the universities can ultimately influence the general direction and nature of research in very critical fields. Such a situation need not have sinister implications, but even the most sanguine among us could hardly regard it as entirely healthy. In any event, we now know much too little about this entire, very murky area.

INSINUATIONS are much less useful than information, and one hopes that committees such as the Harvard one may shed some light on the subject. Equally, one hopes that academics may begin to think much more persistently about the relation of their own institutions to those of the government and the society as a whole. The Dow demonstration at Harvard had many regrettable aspects, but it also had the virtue of provoking such thought.

ON ORGANIZING THE POOR (*Continued from page* 70)

that "the poor don't want to be middle-class," but clearly a great many of them will settle for a secure job and a comfortable house in the suburbs; and after all, don't they have the *right* to choose that option, however irritating it may be to both conservative suburbanites and leftist militants?

Perhaps, in the course of their rise to higher ecenomic levels, their own cultural and personal values will permeate the larger society and generate changes for the better. Perhaps their group identity will be sufficiently preserved that they remain at least partly resistant to the temptations of conventional middle-class living. Nothing can be judged certain or predictable in this process. The critics of capitalism may or may not take comfort from the fact that social revolutions often occur at the "wrong" place and the "wrong" time, for the "wrong" reasons. Meanwhile, we should keep striving for the less ambitious victories of the moment.

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James Toback

Bonnie & Clyde: Style as Morality

A STRONG CASE could be made to show that America is a land that was won, expanded, divided, and healed by violence, a land in which a premium was placed on a readiness to fight and on a capacity—when necessary—to kill. But even in the context of such a history and a mythology that extends and exaggerates it, contemporary America seems particularly violent, seething with frantic calls to rebellion and apocalyptic suggestions of self-destruction: the Kennedy assassination, Vietnam, Watts, Harlem, Detroit, the proliferation of the Maffia. All this is evident in the novels of Norman Mailer, the music of Aaron Copland, and the plays of Tennessee Williams. And it is expressed unremittingly—sometimes with skill, sometimes for shock, always with gore—in American movies.

Violent films are no innovation; it is hard to think of a screen hero who lacked a potent punch or failed to wield a deadly gun. But it is only in the past few years that serious films, those transcending the boundaries of simple "entertainment" and laying claim to the province of art, have become so frequently informed with an almost sensual lust for the depiction of brutality. If there is truth in Leslie Fiedler's assertion that movies are "half-mythic entertainments that are the scriptures of our time," then it is likely that we can learn something about America from two popular films full of blood and killing: *Bonnie and Clyde* and *Point Blank*.

Ostensibly, they are concerned with different subjects. *Bonnie and Clyde* revolves around the exploits of the most famous bank robbing team in American history; *Point Blank* is a surrealistic vision of the Maffia ("The Organization") and centers on the quest of a former member to regain $93,000 he believes coming to him. Nonetheless, there is an underlying unity of spirit, a source of unarticulated assumptions from which both spring. It is an ambivalent spirit which focuses on a new breed of American hero, a special kind of antihero who is defined by his style: not by his cruelty but by *the way* he is cruel. He is a hero best described by the Negro term "bad," meaning "awesome"—someone to be reckoned with, or, more specifically, someone who is independent, tough, unafraid, terse, hard, and often funny.

WHEN WARREN BEATTY, as Clyde, commits his first murder, he looks helplessly at Faye Dunaway, his bonny lass killer-comrade, and cries "I didn't want to kill him." It is his only lapse. From then on he and his pistol (which is conceived of—in simple-minded terms—as a substitute for his impotent sexual weapon) put on a display of consummate virtuosity—fighting, conning, stealing, escaping, and killing.

While we are meant to see that his is the self-destructive life of the hunted, the total vision that emerges is a kind of celebration; celebration not because his victims (the banks) and his hunters (the police) are seen as bullying forces of greed, nor because of some touching love scenes with Bonnie and friendship with his brother, but because Clyde does everything with a flair. He drives wildly but always owns the road; he steals a car but wins the favor of the man he robbed; he gets excited but rarely loses control. If he had been clumsy, crude, or ugly, he would not be liked and, more significantly, he would not be *envied*. But because of his grace, he is able to generate an admiration born of secret longing.

Confusion of intention regarding the hero extends to the whole film. In one sense, with its comic banjo music, its array of stock towns

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and stock townspeople, and its mood of overstated exuberance, *Bonnie and Clyde* can be taken as camp, a mockery of all the gangster movies of the thirties. But it tries to have it both ways, for there is also an inexorable current asserting the same valueless style of heroism that it mocks.

POINT BLANK DEALS WITH an even more hardened hero. As Walker, Lee Marvin is a monomaniacally bitter crusader, looking for the money he helped steal but never received. He cons, chops, batters, and shoots his way through the murky network of The Organization until at last the money is there for him. It is this style, this independence from restriction and convention, this implacable control that wins over the beholder. Although portrayed as the victim of infidelity by his wife and treachery by his best friend, and although his enemy is a gigantic goon corporation, Walker becomes a hero primarily through the sheer form of his prowess.

As a "bad cat," Walker cracks only once, but this slip, rather than calling into question his claim to heroic stature, serves instead to define that heroism. Brewster, a king of The Organization, challenges Walker: "What is it you *really* want, Walker? Money? No. It's more than that. What is it you *really* want?" Walker looks stunned, confused. He has at last been touched. A second later he is back in control, petrifying Brewster with his pistol.

But director John Boorman has managed to suggest a possibility about Walker's life that cannot from then on be totally denied. It is the possibility that it is the *style* of his quest rather than the goal of the quest that Walker really seeks and needs. When at the end the goal becomes attainable as a small package of large bills, Walker turns his back on it and disappears, and it is impossible to imagine what in the world he can do next, for without an object or goal to enable him to flaunt his violent life style, he loses both our envy and his own reason for being.

If the glorification of this new American hero is disingenuous in *Bonnie and Clyde,* it is ambiguous in *Point Blank.* When Walker is told by his sister-in-law that he "died at Alcatraz," that he has the feelings of a stunted barbarian, we know she is right, and doubtless are meant to shrink from him, or at most to feel sorry for him. But in the very next scene he is back to his pursuit with renewed *éclat,* tracking down a still greater Maffia figure with a still more compelling ingenuity and force, and thereby eliciting a sense of excitement which obliterates any possibility of revulsion or disapproval.

Even the cinematography contributes to this impression; the color is so lush, the range of settings so varied, the sound so resonant, that the reality of splintered bones, crushed testicles, and gushing blood is fairly well obscured.

BOTH FILMS REFLECT the new American ethic: an ethic of aesthetics. It is an ethic that celebrates Stokely Carmichael, William F. Buckley, and Murf the Surf—purveyors all of values that few rational people would share—because of the flair with which they project these values, while it condemns figures with the same values but much less flair, like Rap Brown, George Wallace, and Frank Costello. More than simply providing slick entertainment, *Bonnie and Clyde* and *Point Blank* serve the cultural function of presenting heroes who express the current infatuation with style—style as a value in itself, a replacement of values.

Stephen S. Schwarzschild

The New Left Meets The Real Thing

DURING THEIR VISITS TO HANOI David Dellinger (editor of *Liberation*), Tom Hayden, and Nick Egleston (recent chairman of SDS) were invited to gather a group of about 40 American radicals in order to arrange a meeting with a group of Vietnamese. The Americans were expected not only to oppose the war in Vietnam but also to favor, on balance, an NLF victory. Such a group did in fact meet with their Vietnamese counterparts last September in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. Their hosts were the Czechoslovak and Slovak Peace Committees—though it should be made clear that the American participants defrayed all other expenses out of their own pockets

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or through their respective organizations at home.

Extremely little, if anything, that is new or significant emerged from the meeting. My own opposition to the American war in Vietnam continues to be as complete as it had been before—I still see no viable alternative to a victory of the Vietnamese Communists (all other possible alternatives having been polarized out of existence by the ruthless American war) and prefer it immeasurably to the brutal American policy now being pursued. All this, however, not because of what I witnessed in Bratislava but *despite* it.

Apart from the original organizers, the American contingent consisted in about equal measure of a few religious radicals from the American Friends' Service Committee (AFSC), other Quakers, the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), and one or two off-beat clergymen; young academicians; representatives of the Black Power movement; young community organizers and student organizers of the New Left; a few writers, most of them associated with Left periodicals. This group, in which there were very few trained political technicians or Vietnam experts, was confronted by two Vietnamese delegations who had brought along their own experts in all areas under discussion and their own translators. It soon became clear that the Vietnamese were from very high echelons. At least one of them mentioned in passing that he had been a member of the Vietnamese delegation to the Geneva Convention in 1954; all spoke with governmental authority. They were highly disciplined and in their way very competent.

The contrast between the two groups was striking. The Americans represented small factions—in some respects at odds with one another—of a movement on the outermost periphery of American society—whereas the Vietnamese were representatives of an effective government in one area and of a para-government in another.

The first day of the conference was set aside for reports from the Americans about the struggle against the war and the conditions for social revolution in this country; the second day for reports from South Vietnam; the third for North Vietnam; the remaining time for smaller group discussions about special aspects of the Vietnam situation. The American reports were multitudinous, relatively brief, mostly extemporaneous, quite subjective, and sometimes in conflict with one another. The Vietnamese reports were well-prepared. Each subject was assigned to a single expert. These reports were often written out and mimeographed beforehand and extremely lengthy. (Madame Binh, head of the South Vietnamese delegation, took all of one afternoon and most of the next morning for her opening statement.) They were clearly formulated as quasi-official, diplomatic documents.

YET OUT OF THESE QUASI-OFFICIAL reports no "hard news" whatever emerged. Even someone like myself who knows nothing about Vietnam but what he reads in the newspapers and in a few supplementary sources heard nothing that I had not known beforehand. It was, furthermore, absolutely impossible, even in private conversation, to break through the official propaganda line to which all of the Vietnamese rigorously adhered. This was especially annoying since the Americans had, after all, been selected because they supported the cause of their Vietnamese counterparts—and yet they were addressed as if they had to be indoctrinated from scratch with the crudest tools of persuasion. Two evenings, for example, were set aside for a series of North and South Vietnamese propaganda films that might be effective with Asian or African peasants but surely could not be expected to be persuasive with an even slightly sophisticated group.

Along with some AFSC and FOR people, I spent a long afternoon with the official Buddhist representative of the NLF. We plied him with questions about religious and cultural trends in his country, "third force" personalities known to us, and the facts concerning religious groups in his organization. It was, however, entirely impossible to come to grips with such problems: he insisted, first, on giving us what was in effect a two-hour filibuster, reviewing rudimentary knowledge and views obviously perfectly familiar to us. Anything that did not fit into his picture was either disregarded, condemned as treason and called untypical of the Vietnamese people, or treated as still an open question that could be answered only after the Front had ruled upon it.

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In a private conversation, I probed the attitude of this gentleman and that of the head of the North Vietnamese lawyers' guild toward the Roman Catholic church. It is perfectly obvious that the church is virtually identified with the American cause in Vietnam. To admit this, however, would be tantamount to a contradiction of the official propaganda line that "all of the Vietnamese people" are arraigned with the NLF and that theirs is a "neutral, popular front." I could not, therefore, extract an anti-Roman-Catholic opinion from either of them. Indeed, the Buddhist representative insisted that a Roman Catholic priest, whom he named, was a member of the NLF Central Committee.

"Is he recognized by Rome?" "Yes, he has been ordained by a bishop and officiates at a church." "Is he still recognized by Rome?" "Yes, he still says mass." "Is his saying of mass still recognized by official Roman Catholic authorities as licit?" "Well"—this after half-an-hour's involved, translated give-and-take—"the priest is right now temporarily not recognized by the Vatican."

Several sessions were devoted to explore possibilities of dissuading Americans from participating in the war. The prominent role of black men in the army was discussed. One of the American blacks asked the relevant question: how many black soldiers had defected to the NLF? It took a long time to explain that question. Finally, the answer came forth that all the Vietnamese present were from the North and that they, therefore, did not have such information. "Could we ask some people from the NLF?" "Yes, they'll come in the afternoon."

In the afternoon again much time was spent in making the question clear. Ultimately, of course, it had to be conceded that there was no record of American defections, black or white. (On the other hand, the numbers of South Vietnamese defectors are, of course, vast—to the point where the NLF people claim, with considerable credibility, that they train some of their officers by letting them be inducted into Ky's army and having them instructed under U.S. auspices.)

As for Czechoslovakia, the situation in that country, even as revealed during such a visit of little more than a week, struck me as much more oppressive and frightening than the descriptions we have been getting in the press. At the very beginning I had heard a few of the Americans express relief at finally being in a "socialist" country and no volunteered critical observations. I feared, therefore, that this representation of the New Left was buying the Czech party line completely. As the week drew on, however, my initial fear turned out to be unjustified. With no exception that I know of, the Americans became aware of the mindless and repressive society in which we found ourselves. At least within the confines of the American caucus, phrases such as "fascist," "paranoiac," "get out of here with my life," "totalitarian," etc. became quite frequent. Yet, to my knowledge at least, no one but myself confronted any Czech with articulated criticism.

There was, however a considerable amount of nonverbal criticism. At first, the Czechs tried to keep us together in supervised places. But American, or New Left, anarchy soon took over. Many of us dispersed through Bratislava in so many directions at the same time that it would have been extremely difficult to keep track of all of us. A black man, a minister, and a student actually conducted a flower-power demonstration off the central square of the city. Still, in discussing possible future press relations, the Americans stressed that one should mute one's criticism of the Czechs in order to prevent undesirable consequences for the Vietnamese and for future American-Vietnamese contacts—a rather eloquent expression of the stance of New Left people toward Communists.

This is precisely the main point about the encounter between the New Left and the real Communists in power. The question whether criticism of the Vietnamese should be muted never came up. It was apparently assumed that there was none. Certainly, none was expressed. The unspoken premise was that the Vietnamese were effectively fighting America as it is—and *"pas d'ennemies à la gauche combattante." Newsweek* quoted an anonymous reporter for *Ramparts* as having heard Tom Hayden exclaim: "Now we're all Vietcong." I did not hear such an announcement—but this certainly was the mood of the gathering.

There were some nasty manifestations of this

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total identification with the Vietnamese Communists. The NLF military expert gave a long presentation of the situation in the field as he saw it and some of the informal and quite brutal guerrilla tactics that had to be used in combating the American aggressors. (This had, the previous evening, been illustrated in one of the propaganda films.) The most one can say of these methods is that they possibly may be necessary, if not desirable, in defense against at least equally brutal and politically even less justified foreign invaders. One might even be prepared to go so far as to say that the Vietnamese who had to practice them might, in order to be able to live with themselves, have to get some kind of personal satisfaction out of these tactics. While some of these blood-curdling tactics were being described, I made it my business not to look at the speaker but to study the American listeners. I am sorry to have to say that, with the exception of some of the members of pacifist, especially Quaker, organizations who maintained straight faces, there was nothing but approval to be seen in any facial expressions, and there were even a few audible chuckles. So far as I know, not a word was ever said about this afterwards.

The American reaction to the Vietnamese ranged all the way from calculated political "popular frontism" to naive to wilfully blind to literally sick to craven. There were, no doubt, some who actually had no idea of what a Communist is. There were surely some who did not want to know and regarded every enemy of American imperialism as a comrade. They inclined, thus, to interpret the new NLF program as if it were an "agrarian reform" document. There was certainly a representation of the sick, who outraged one or the other Czech puritan Communist by talking, mostly in the language of "shit," about nonmarital sex relations and the abortions of girl friends. What most of the Americans had in common was the belief that anyone who batters the American Establishment effectively makes a contribution to the defeat of capitalist imperialism and he may not be criticized in any way, for fear of detracting from his effectiveness.

I, for one, can draw only one ideological conclusion: radicalism at this point can consist only of a radically realistic view of the utterly hopeless situation in which we find ourselves: American capitalist imperialism is flooding much of the world with blood and vulgarity, while neither "coalition politics," nor "old-style socialism," nor the New Left have any relationship to the real world or hold out any hope for political effectiveness—and "the socialist blocs" not only exhibit no significant regaining of humane or humanist values but are, in fact, widening the destructive circle. Still, because this is the only way we know to be human, we try to embody and to advocate radically libertarian social ideals.

Lincoln Wolfenstein

The Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer

On February 18, 1967, the life of J. Robert Oppenheimer came to an end. Its history, probed with such agonizing detail in the 1954 AEC Security Board Hearings,[1] dramatizes the dilemma of the American scientist in the twentieth century.

To appreciate this history, we must have a view of Oppenheimer (or Opje, as he was called) before World War II, in those days before the scientists knew sin. There is no disagreement among the many observers: Opje was a brilliant analytical thinker, an intellectual with a striking variety of interests, and a natural leader of men. ". . . my admiration for his intelligence," writes Haakon Chevalier, "his judgment, and his character had gradually led me to the conviction that a high destiny awaited him."[2]

[1] U.S. Atomc Energy Commission, "In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer," *Transcript of Hearing before Personnel Security Board*, U.S. Government Printing Office (1954).

[2] H. M. Chevalier, *Oppenheimer, the Story of a Friendship*, Pocket Books, p. 21 (1966). Chevalier, a close friend of Oppenheimer around 1940, was the central character of the "attempted espionage" incident that dominated much of the 1954 Hearings. While Chevalier's book must be read with knowledge of his intense bitterness toward Oppenheimer, it is a fascinating and instructive document.

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It has been suggested that even in this early period Oppenheimer felt a sense of inadequacy as a theoretical physicist because he made "no fundamental contribution to his field, which men like Heisenberg, Fermi, Dirac, Joliot, and a dozen others of his generation had so greatly enriched."[3] On the whole this suggestion is probably not correct, though Opje undoubtedly must have felt the sense of frustration that is the lot of all theoretical physicists most of the time.

In 1929, when Oppenheimer returned to the United States after several years of study and work in Europe, he was only 25 years old. The basic development and application of quantum mechanics by physicists like Heisenberg, Schrodinger, Dirac, and Pauli was practically completed, and the young Oppenheimer had already made a significant contribution in the work he had done with Max Born on the quantum theory of molecules.

In the 30's progress in theoretical physics was to be much slower than it had been in those hectic years between 1925 and 1930. Only two new important theoretical ideas were to be formulated in the 30's: the Fermi theory of beta-decay and the Yukawa theory of the meson; to these one might add the Bethe–von Weizsäcker theory of stellar energy.

The great, remaining problem of quantum electrodynamics, that of the divergence difficulties, proved as unyielding to men like Dirac as it did to Oppenheimer. In fact, a postdoctoral student working under Opje's guidance, Sid Dancoff, came closest to the solution that was to win a Nobel prize for Feyman, Schwinger, and Tomonaga, the team that was to find it in the postwar years.[4]

Justifiably, Oppenheimer's fame as a physicist, like that of Sommerfeld, was primarily based on his work as a teacher. Oppenheimer started the first great graduate school of theoretical physics in the United States. In the late 1930's the most brilliant American graduate and postgraduate students—men like Julian Schwinger—went to California to study with Oppenheimer instead of going to Europe. And later, in the years just after the war, Oppenheimer's lectures were the source of graduate courses taught in universities throughout the United States. When I was a graduate student, in 1947, I counted a copy of the Oppenheimer lecture notes on classical electrodynamics among my most prized possessions. The first modern textbook on quantum mechanics, published in the U.S. in 1949 by Leonard Schiff, was inspired by Oppenheimer's lectures.

BUT OPJE WAS MORE than a physicist. He was an avid student of Sanskrit, philosophy, poetry, and the classics. He was a humanist, deeply and rationally concerned with the fate of mankind. From 1937 on he was a contributor to, a member of, and an occasional worker for a variety of left-wing organizations. To gain an insight into Oppenheimer's story one must know some of the basis for these left-wing activities. It seems impossible to accept his own self-debasing account:

> I had had a continuing, smoldering fury about the treatment of Jews in Germany. . . . I saw what the depression was doing to my students. . . . But I had no framework of political conviction or experience to give me perspective in these matters. . . . I liked the new sense of companionship, and at the time felt that I was coming to be part of the life of my time and country. . . . The matter that most engaged my sympathies and interests was the war in Spain. This was not a matter of understanding and informed convictions. . . . I had no clearly formulated political views.[5]
>
> [Again, discussing his views of some Communist activities] That seemed fine to me at the time. I am not defending the wisdom of these views. I think they were idiotic.[6]

Possibly, Opje had thought very little about politics before 1937, but it seems improbable that he could have become so involved in radical politics from 1937 on without a deep intellectual commitment. The picture given by Chevalier seems to ring more true than Opje's even though it may contain its own exaggerations:

> He was keenly alert to the problems of the day, he was active among his fellows, surrounded by students and colleagues and plain ctizens, vigorously discussing public issues—eloquent, persuasive: a counselor, a guide, a leader. . . .[7]

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 169.
[4] S. Tomonaga, in *Physics Today*, Vol. 19, No. 9, p. 25 (1966).
[5] *Hearings, op. cit.*, pp. 8–10.
[6] *Hearings, op. cit.*, p. 114.
[7] Chevalier, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

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> It was, to a considerable extent, a passion for intelligence, an intense faith in the efficacy of reason, that impelled him to share his (political) insights with students and colleagues.[8]

Oppenheimer must have been aware of the Communists' totalitarian methods and found them acceptable in view of the overall goals. In the hearings Oppenheimer spoke of learning of the Russian purges and terror in 1938, to indicate how his views began to change;[9] but in fact he remained close to the Communists at least through 1941. Indeed, if Chevalier is to be trusted, Oppenheimer remained loyal throughout the difficult months between August, 1939, and June, 1941. "The Soviet-German pact," writes Chevalier, "and later the invasion of Poland by the U.S.S.R., and the Soviet war with Finland, had confused [sic] and upset many people, even the most open-minded and liberal. Opje had a simple, lucid way of explaining facts and arguments that allayed misgivings and carried conviction."[10]

ONE MAY NEVER really understand how Oppenheimer changed from a committed Communist fellow-traveler in 1940 to a supporter of the May-Johnson Bill for the military control of the atom in 1945, and to a strong Cold Warrior in the following years. But these years marked a complete transformation in Oppenheimer's way of life. The inveterate bachelor with a sequence of mistresses suddenly became, in late 1939, the responsible married man and the following year a father. The inspiring professor and intellectual leader became suddenly, in 1943, the director of the most significant technological enterprise of human history. In the non-physics world, he now found himself dealing not with professional intellectual colleagues like Chevalier but with a completely different breed—men like General Groves. In some sense, then, the Oppenheimer that emerges in 1946 is a completely different person from the one we saw in 1939.

THE TRAGEDY OF J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER is usually described in terms of the Security Hearings held in 1954, after which "he was a changed person; much of his previous spirit and liveliness had left him."[11] But Chevalier claims that Oppenheimer's personal tragedy was already consummated in 1943, and to this end he refers to Oppenheimer's interviews with (or more accurately, interrogation by) Lt. Col. Boris Pash, Lt. Col. John Lansdale, and General Groves. And even now, after the intervening McCarthy years, the transcripts of these interviews make remarkable and painful reading.[12]

LANSDALE is as clever, as insulting and insidious an inquisitor as any in fiction. He flatters, he cajoles, he insults, and he threatens in succession. Oppenheimer, already then the director of Los Alamos, submits and cooperates. He volunteers name after name of people who he knows are or whom he suspects of being Communists. Lansdale feels him out about doing a little spying and Oppenheimer volunteers that he "could get partial information." Throughout the proceedings he refuses to name Chevalier as the intermediary for the Russian "espionage" attempt although he does volunteer under direct questioning that he wouldn't be surprised if Chevalier were a Communist party member and that "he is quite a Red."

There is no transcript of the interviews with General Groves, but we are told that early in the first conversation Oppenheimer volunteers to reveal Chevalier's name if Groves "orders" him to do so. Finally, two months later, "after much discussion in trying to lead him into it," General Groves reports that he now gives the order—and Oppenheimer betrays Chevalier.[13]

LOOKING BACK at these interviews, it seems that they were not aimed at the information Oppenheimer had to give, but rather at Oppenheimer himself. This conclusion may not be correct, but one feels that these army men were delighted to make the civilian head of this great project squirm and submit to their inquisition. How else could one explain that for two months Groves refrained from giving

[8] Chevalier, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
[9] *Hearings, op. cit.*, p. 10.
[10] Chevalier, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
[11] H. A. Bethe, in *Science*, Vol. 155, 1084 (1967).
[12] *Hearings, op. cit.*, pp. 945 f.
[13] *Hearings, op. cit.*, p. 168.

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Oppenheimer the order while the officers, with "much discussion," tried to get him to betray Chevalier voluntarily.

How are we to understand Oppenheimer's behavior? Already here in 1943, as in the longer cross-examinations of the Security Hearings in 1954, he cuts a pitiful figure. The whole moral tone and the very manner of speaking seem completely alien to Oppenheimer as he appeared in 1939. Yet, his submission to army rule in 1943 was not so dissimilar to his commitment to the Communist causes in 1939. Once Oppenheimer was committed intellectually to the building of the bomb in the apparent race against the German scientists, he submitted himself voluntarily to the totalitarian regime (the army) that logic convinced him to be necessary to achieve the goal. No vague morality contrary to this logic could keep him from betraying Chevalier once he had received the "order" to do so. His moral code, from the beginning, was of this particular rational logic. Was it so different from that of the men who submitted themselves to Communist discipline because of their commitment to the building of a "socialist" society? Oppenheimer is a Rubashov, the victim not of his pride or his self-seeking, as Chevalier would have us believe, but of a cold logic that had always governed his life.

During the postwar years we have seen the escalation of this calculating logic among the scientists—including Oppenheimer—who were advising the government. They have been involved in developing more and more atomic weaponry and in planning for all types of catastrophic nuclear wars. Their studies led to such books as Herman Kahn's *On Thermonuclear War*, which was described by the late James Newman in the *Scientific American* as "a moral tract on mass murder: how to plan it, how to commit it, how to get away with it, how to justify it."[14]

Yet once the basic premise of the Cold War was accepted, once it was accepted that the Russians under Stalin were moving rapidly ahead and developing their own nuclear weaponry, each step seemed logical and necessary.

[14] James R. Newman, in the *Scientific American*, p. 197, March 1951.

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We can only guess to what extent Oppenheimer was troubled by that "silent partner, whose realm started just where logical thought ended, . . . the grammatical fiction."[15]

YET THERE WAS one historic moment when the scientists recoiled from the next step demanded by the logic of the Cold War. This was in October 1949, when the General Advisory Committee (to the Atomic Energy Commission), headed by Oppenheimer, unanimously voted against a crash program to develop the hydrogen bomb. Although it was the unanimous decision of eight of America's leading scientists, Oppenheimer's hesitation at this moment to follow the destructive logic of the Cold War was one of the major charges brought against him at the Security Hearings. Oppenheimer's opposition to the development of this weapon, which would be a thousand times more powerful than the original atomic bomb, was not based on moral grounds. It was the minority report of Fermi and Rabi that Oppenheimer was unwilling to endorse—that said of the H-bomb, "it is necessarily an evil thing considered in any light . . . [it is] wrong on fundamental ethical principles to initiate the development of such a weapon."[16]

The majority report, written by Conant and signed by Oppenheimer among others, emphasized the development of tactical nuclear weapons as an alternative to developing the super bomb and expressed the hope of "providing by example some limitations on the totality of war." However, once President Truman had given the order to go ahead with the hydrogen bomb, Oppenheimer insists "the moral and ethical and political issues . . . were never again mentioned, and that we [the General Advisory Committee] never again questioned the basic decisions under which we were operating."[17]

THE AEC SECURITY HEARINGS are often considered an aspect of the McCarthy era, the persecution of a liberal by the right wing. Yet, in a sense the hearings are more analogous to the Army-McCarthy Hearings which were taking place simultaneously. Oppenheimer and McCarthy, each in his own way and for his own reasons, sought to play an important role in the decision-making processes of our country. Each was an interloper obtaining a share of power by an unconventional method. McCarthy was too crude and Oppenheimer too literate to fit in with the Establishment. Yet neither one was put down, despite his vulnerability, until he angered the most powerful establishment of all, the military.

THIS NOTE is not an atttempt to give a total picture of Oppenheimer, either as a thinker or as a scientific adviser to the government. His postwar role as an advocate of international control of atomic weapons and as an opponent of many of the concepts of the Strategic Air Command are well-known. His writings plead for a humanistic view of science in a nation where so much emphasis is placed on technology. I have limited myself here to the problems raised by rereading some 13 years later the transcripts of the Security Hearings together with Chevalier's interpretation of them.

Nothing I have written should be considered as passing judgment on Oppenheimer. Rather, his story serves to illustrate the personal tragedy of the scientist in the nuclear age, who finds himself compromising ethical principles if he wishes to play a role in the vital decisions concerning nuclear weapons. The nuclear scientist, as much as anyone and perhaps even more than others, finds himself a stranger and afraid in this new world of his own making.

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[15] A. Koestler, *Darkness at Noon*, p. 254 (Macmillan, 1941).

[16] *Hearings, op. cit.*, pp. 79–80.

[17] *Hearings, op. cit.*, p. 81.

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James Lowell McPherson

America's Slave Revolt

THE CONFESSIONS OF NAT TURNER, by William Styron. New York: Random House. 428 pp. $6.95.

"HISTORY," SAID STEPHEN DAEDALUS, "is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake."

But first it must be fully dreamed, in all its implications. And this is what William Styron has set out to do in *The Confessions of Nat Turner*, which he calls "a meditation on history."

In August, 1831, a few miles south of where the first slaves were brought into this country 200 years earlier, a literate slave, Nat Turner, acting on Biblical and visionary inspiration, led an uprising of Negroes against their white masters. His revolt, which accomplished the murder of 57 whites—men, women, and children—was ruthlessly suppressed and was succeeded by bloody reprisals and repressive legislation to secure the institutions of slavery. After a quick trial Turner himself was hanged.

His confession was a brief document compiled by Thomas Gray, Nat's white "defense" counsel, from statements made by the prisoner while awaiting trial. A white novelist, native of the same Tidewater Virginia area, took up this document 130 years later and asked himself why this revolt had occurred at that time and place. He asked himself what it means to be a slave; he reflected on how the institution of slavery shaped the lives of everyone in the slave system; then he wrote this novel.

THE BOOK is full of dreams, visions, memories. Like a dream, it moves with a slow and mysterious pace and transforms familiar objects as it moves. Like a dream, it seems to be speaking of things that are personally important to us yet remote, detached—above all visual. And like a dream it leaves us wondering what it all means and convinced that we have touched some profound truth. The dream is done, but we are not done with it.

If we allow ourselves to dream at all of that "peculiar institution," slavery, we find ourselves trying to piece together items labeled "myths," "truths," "conjectures," "historical forces" with what traces of meaning are left to us now—what we know, or think we know, of race, of domination and subservience and freedom, of the human capacity for hatred, love, pride, and revenge. No inside view of slavery is possible. The otherness of the "not-now" and the "not-this" and the "not me" still eludes us. And yet we are haunted, and American literature is haunted, by the fact of slavery in this country and its unassimilated meanings and consequences.

Styron has the usual materials to work with. To the few shards of fact that research has unearthed about the rebellion, he has brought childhood memories of the landscape of the Virginia Tidewater and a novelist's habit of remembering: what Southerners (and Northerners), black people, and white, have said, thought, written, feared, done—literature, folklore, history, subtleties of communication and sentimentalities of talk, melodrama, and banality—he has thrown them all into the pot.

The result could have been a historical novel, a Gothic tale set in period costume, but here all the action—swift and terrible as it is—seems but an instant in the whole brooding dream, although violence presides over that dream. It could have been a pastiche, and indeed we sift these rich materials for familiar stereotypes. Yet something holds these frag-

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ments and styles together, whether you call it artistic will power or hard dreaming.

THE STRUCTURE is very simple—simple and sturdy enough to sustain a great weight and complexity of meaning. There are four sections. In Part I—"Judgment Day"—Nat tells of his encounter with Gray in the jailhouse, his motives for offering his confession (for he feels no guilt), and his subjective experience of the brief trial that condemns him to death. Part II—"Old Times Past"—is a long memoir, thoughts of Nat Turner about his early life and the experiences that culminated in his determination to carry out his destined mission. These memories well up in him as, in a fevered half-sleep half-waking interval of days, he waits for the gallows. Part III—"Study War"—is Nat's vivid account of the planning and execution of the revolt. And Part IV—a mere eight pages—records his final thoughts as he is led away to be executed.

This is the framework, but the quality and power of the book reside in scene, dialogue, and contemplation, in notable achievements of eye, ear, and moral concentration.

ALTHOUGH NAT SPEAKS of himself as one who has lived "close to the ground," so that "no animal sense is superior to another," it is the visual quality that is most important in a dream, and it is through scene, first, that Styron projects himself into the mind of the slave.

The dream or vision with which the book begins (it is a recurrent dream) is like the face of History itself—of a stillness beyond all this flux, a Poussin landscape. The words reinforce the feeling of ultimate order as they depict an empty white temple on a headland above a vast ocean. The words here are: "seasonless . . . neutral . . . unpeopled . . . silence . . . motionless . . . unchanged . . . serene stark white . . . temple mysterious . . . ineffable . . . without name . . . strange . . . lonely remote . . . profound mystery . . . haunting recurrence."

This image soon fades and we are in the rural landscape of Virginia—a landscape explicitly seen. And almost every moment of seeing has a frame around it, thus partaking to some degree of that initial visionary scene, because this land, too, dwells in the mind of the slave, a man doomed to die, still seeking to transcend the narrow world he was born into.

Frequently the frame is a window. Even at moments of the most intense action Nat may quite naturally glance out of a window, or with careful mnemonic distancing, step into a remembered picture. Usually we see a relatively desolate countryside with skies often gray and "brooding," farms set at distances in brown cornfields, and far-off things moving—dogs, roosters, crows, buzzards, plodding Negroes.

THE STYLE does what it must to let the dream come through. Though somewhat modified, it is basically the slightly formal, conventionally inexact, not quite elegant style of so much premodern fiction: generally avoiding extravagance and (unlike the "modern") also avoiding newness and the arresting metaphor, but yet elevated from the colloquial. One cannot believe that people ever quite talked this way: "You will find him a man of simplicity and of modest resources." "Will such casuistry never end?" "I have long and do steadfastly believe that slavery is the great cause of all the chief evils of our land." "I rose to my feet with infinite difficulty and lassitude."

I would not have bet a plugged nickel on this style. but it works. Even when it descends into solecisms ("essayed an attempt") it works. Even when it exists in serene conjunction with passages of dialect where the orthography is reminiscent of Uncle Remus, it works. The problem seems insoluble. How can Styron's modern post-Hemingway consciousness clothe itself in the McGuffey's Reader prose of Nat's quasi-education (*The Life and Death of Mr. Badman* is Nat's primer) without making the reader feel any of the condescensions of archaism and quaintness? He has run all the risks and avoided nearly all the falls.

(Oddly enough, the most imitative passage, to my mind is the speech of justification given by Marse Samuel, the "good master,"—where for a time the rhythms become Faulknerian with a succession of "because's and "the fact remains that's" and "had you's" and "even though's." But this lapse is an isolated one, and I believe an unconscious one. For all I know the language of justification and regret is just naturally Faulknerian.)

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BECAUSE this book is a meditation, not an argument, complexities are unraveled but never resolved. In some sense we understand at the end some things we did not understand at the beginning. In another sense we are more aware than ever of the nuances of human feeling and motive that continue to baffle analysis. What turned this literate, skilled, and on the whole well-treated slave into an implacable conspirator, a "fanatic" who showed and felt no remorse for the destruction of babies and small children? Even at the beginning, we know—and we don't know. At the end we know, and still we don't know. What happens between is vision, not explanation. Everything that happens to this man counts, but nothing accounts for his destiny. There are still mysteries.

Only the rationalist defense attorney, Gray, thinks he has found the answer to his questions in the "confession" he has elicited from Nat Turner. And Gray's answer (part of which is typically interrupted by a courtroom revery of the prisoner) is a mixture of nineteenth-century "anthropology" and proto-psychiatry: that the racially inferior mind of the prisoner was deranged by contact with the superstitions and excitements of an outmoded religious doctrine—"Christianity," as he inaccurately calls the Old Testament doctrines of revivalist Virginia.

No such easy answers are available to us. As we view the texture of Nat's whole experience, not only the mystical hallucinations but also the shrewd observations, the hurts, slights and pleasures, emotional torments and uncertainties, we begin to understand how it feels to be a chattel, how self-hatred is nurtured in the oppressed, how men learn guile, learn to conceal their feelings. A man like Gray could not understand Nat's rage, but we cannot be too surprised that the greatest moment of fury ("hatred I have only felt once for one single man") is evoked in Nat by kindly old Marse Samuel (a sort of pocket Jefferson) who, like a good liberal benefactor acting out of the best of motives, betrayed Nat after promising him freedom.

Styron says, "Perhaps the reader will wish to draw a moral from this narrative." The "perhaps" seems ironic. Styron implicitly eschews that activity, and I think most readers will eschew such handy "morals" as "he who takes the sword shall perish by the sword." The awful consequences of aborted rebellions are well-known. And it is easy enough to find historical parallels for the fate of these determined zealots, implacable in their faith, who really had no program but to destroy the town of Jerusalem and then retreat into the Dismal Swamp and await deliverance—a politics of desperation in which the masses, of course, did not join.

YET THE STRUCTURE of the book does perhaps seem to be urging us toward some conclusion. Each section but the last ends with a question.

The first: " 'Then what I done was wrong. Lord?' I said 'And if what I done was wrong is there no redemption?' I raised my eyes upwards, but there was no answer, only the gray impermeable sky and night falling fast over Jerusalem."

Again, at the end of the second section Nat, struck by a whip for the first (and only) time in his life, whispers "Lord?"—and receives from heaven the answer *I abide*. Though this is the faith that will sustain the uprising, it is a cryptic answer. If it counsels patient waiting for deliverance, it also nourishes apocalyptic hopes and strivings.

The third section ends with still another question. Pondering the fact that the alarm that gave away the existence of the revolt and allowed those in its path to prepare resistance had been raised by a young girl whom he had seen escaping the slaughter and had allowed to go, Nat wonders why he stayed his hand: "I know nothing any longer. Did I really wish to vouchsafe a life for the one that I had taken?" (His sole personal victim had been another young girl, one who had befriended him.)

Only at the end does affirmation take over, and the reader of modern sensibilities, accustomed to irony and distance, may squirm at this conclusion. Having been cut off since the failure of his mission from prayer and from the presence of his God, Nat achieves at the end a resolution of sorts. The severance from the source of his strength and rebellion is overcome. Whether this ending "comes off" depends upon how successfully Styron has

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dealt with the character of Margaret, the girl Nat killed.

WHAT OF MISS MARGARET? Here we skirt all the Big Easy Resolutions of Melodrama. Here are all the elements of that myth of Southern White Womanhood: innocence, piety, good will, a sunny open disposition—but especially innocence (the American dream).

Yet one can't be sure. When Margaret recapitulates her girlish arguments on vital issues with her dear school chum Charlotte Tyler Saunders at Seminary, or recounts the silly romantic pageant there performed, she seems almost a parody of the Southern Sorority girl. Perhaps innocence is only emptyheadedness after all. And there lurks (as spelled out less deftly in the character of Miss Emeline, another mistress) the other suspicion: that the girl is really sexually aware after all, and that her happy chatting and carefree sympathy is but a courting of rape and destruction.

But it is all more complicated than that. Nat's sexual feelings, so sternly repressed, so enmeshed in his prophetic religion, seem to be most sharply aroused when sympathy is expressed, as if they can be directed only at accessible objects, and sympathy opens access. So the killing of Margaret by Nat is more like a rape than any of the decapitations and disembowelments wreaked by his fellows.

But there is love, too, even as she turns to receive the blow. There is a quality here of terror, tenderness and nightmare that reflects, Othello-like, the dream at the heart of the "sexual question." This killing, so central to Nat's story, is the necessary proof of his manhood, for he must demonstrate to his followers that he will not flinch. Perhaps the Sunday-school goodness of Miss Margaret is a necessary element in this stern morality.

THE CONCLUSION does not come easy, and Nat's final affirmation is by no means a simple one, for he asserts that he would do it all again—"except one." Then in a brief moment of apotheosis there is a hint of ultimate reconciliation.

But this is a vision, not a tract, and I choose not to draw a moral but to be drawn into the moral world here illuminated. Of the many vivid scenes, three in particular stay with me and continue to exert an artistic force that can only be called moral: There is the attempt of Hark, Nat's friend, to escape north to the Susquehanna, only to be captured days later a short distance from his starting point—a memorable short fable which even the recollection of that other fugitive, Miss Watson's Jim, cannot dim. There is that blinding instant when, the axe crashing down between Travis and Miss Sarah, Nat's observant eye takes in at a glance all the small details of bedroom domesticity. And there is, especially, the scene where Nat is left alone in the emptied-out plantation to await the arrival of his new master who will come to fetch him away. And in that silent place, for the first time in his life really alone, he feels "white" in possession of empty house and deserted grounds. Is it a sepulcher then, on that promontory above the ocean? Can we awake from this nightmare?

As long as novels like this can be written, the medium isn't the message. Styron's masterful work rises above literary fashions, schools, and trends, as do the other books that we remember in our dreams.

Edwin Schur

The Undersides of Society

HUSTLERS, BEATS, AND OTHERS, by Ned Polsky. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company. 218 pp. $5.95.

THIS COLLECTION of essays, which displays the author at work in a variety of settings, includes one piece that originally appeared in DISSENT ("The Village Beat Scene: Summer 1960"), some scholarly papers, and various other material. Polsky manages to be extremely readable, and several pervading themes help tie together what might otherwise have been a series of disconnected essays.

Polsky is a scholar who cares, who thinks clearly and writes well. His book reflects throughout a genuine concern for the people he studies, and a coherent approach to the research he undertakes.

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The topics Polsky deals with are the significance of pool playing and poolrooms; pool hustling as an occupation; the deficiencies of conventional approaches to the study of crime; the beats; and finally, the social functions of pornography. In each case Polsky breaks new ground.

Each chapter discloses significant disagreement with accepted views (sociological or otherwise), and reveals the author's belief that "polemical scholarship improves the quality of intellectual life—sharpens the mind, helps get issues settled faster—by forcing genteel discussion to become genuine debate."

A KEY EMPHASIS in the book is on the value of seeking to understand people more or less on their own terms and of studying their behavior in its natural setting. Polsky is one of the new generation of sociologists of deviance who refuse to pass any kind of judgment on deviating individuals, who disdain psychopathological and even "social pathological" explanations of offending behavior. Rather, the focus is on understanding fully the behavior and its meaning for the participants and for the social order in which it occurs.

In a devastating broadside against dominant approaches in criminology, Polsky makes an eloquent case for what he calls free-ranging study of the uncaught criminal in his natural setting. Although he may be going a bit far in characterizing all the more conventional research approaches as "cop outs," Polsky is certainly right in suggesting that concern with quantification and reliance on research populations of jailed offenders have overwhelmed what should be a central interest for the sociologist—a qualitative understanding of the rich variety of criminal behavior.

Successful field research requires the ability "to look at people, listen to them, think and feel with them, talk with them rather than at them." Unfortunately, it is quite true that many a modern sociologist "can't see people any more, except through punched cards and one-way mirrors. He can't talk with people any more, only 'survey' them. Often he can't even talk about people any more, only about 'data.'" Using his own experience in "getting to know a professional heavy man in his own environment" as an illustration, Polsky shows that the standard textbook emphasis on obstacles to studying serious criminal offenders in the open is misguided.

OTHER SECTIONS of the book similarly reveal the value of a totally non-moralistic and rigorously observant rooting-out of basic social patterns. Polsky's essay on the beats—already known to readers of DISSENT—was probably the first systematic social analysis of the newer forms of bohemianism; it presents much valuable information and numerous insights into this way of life.

The sections on poolrooms and pool hustling, informed by both long-term participant observation and historical research, undoubtedly constitute the definitive study of these interesting phenomena. The author comes to the conclusion that poolrooms and pool playing are on the wane not because of the popular association of pool with gambling and criminals—as has sometimes been suggested—but because the poolroom served as a stronghold of "a special kind of subculture that has become increasingly rare and unimportant in America—the heterosexual but all-male subculture, which required that certain gathering places (clubs, barber shops, taverns) serve as sacrosanct refuges from women."

In his chapter on pornography Polsky views this phenomenon as functional for society—the counterpart of our restrictive norms on sexual behavior, in much the same way as prostitution has been related to monogamous marriage. Considering both their general functions in the social order and more specifically the uses to which they are put by pornography consumers (i.e., as a source of masturbatory fantasies), Polsky concludes that the effort to distinguish between hard-core pornography and erotic "art" is somewhat beside the point—a conclusion which is perplexing from the policy standpoint, but which indeed may be quite sound sociologically.

I HAVE A FEW reservations concerning minor points of interpretation. In his eagerness to indict conventional crime research, Polsky lashes out somewhat overbearingly against "applied sociology" (which he associates with social work impulses, adjustment psychology,

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and the like); he calls for a reassertion of objective value-free research in the social sciences. While it is certainly true that some researchers improperly confuse their scientific and citizenly roles, I think Polsky unnecessarily downgrades the value of applied research. For some sociologists such a stance means no more than the selection of relevant problems, a process which need not adulterate the objectivity of the research itself, and which often has produced solid findings that effectively challenge the *status quo*—a result with which I'm sure Polsky is sympathetic.

The other point one may question appears in the chapter on the beats. Even in the updated version of this essay, Polsky sticks with his original assertion that "there is hardly a Negro alive who in his heart of hearts doesn't want to be white, and the various kinds of Negro chauvinist movements invariably represent a reaction formation against the forbidden desire to be white." This may of course be true, but I rather doubt that Polsky *knows* it is true, anymore than his critics (whom, in all fairness, he quotes on this matter) know it is not true.

I hope I have managed to convey the liveliness of Polsky's work which, notwithstanding the virtual absence of "political" content, should appeal greatly to DISSENT readers. It is a book that makes a contribution to sociology and the study of mass culture.

Oscar A. Ornati

Keynes Plus Growth

NEW DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, by Walter W. Heller. W. W. Norton. Paper, $1.75.

THE "NEW ECONOMICS" are clearly in. Congress, the federal bureaucracy, the commander in chief, the intellectual establishment, the fourth estate, indeed all who matter are now Keynesians. This is no minor accomplishment; compare the 25 years it took Congress to learn the new economics with the more than 100 years it took the Tennessee legislature to admit the existence of the new biology. That we are all neo-Keynesians, how it came to be, and that it is a good thing is well told by the former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.

Heller's reminiscences make good history. How the education of, by, and for Presidents on matters economic progresses; how an adviser can go further than the President and how in turn, on occasion, the President is ahead of his advisers is well told. The theme of the "death of ideology" is turned around in a section dealing with the dislodgement of the doctrinally pure at heart from their old ideological foxholes. Heller lauds the triumph of experience over old ideas. In fact, what has really happened is that one economic theory was displaced by another. But it is typically American that the substitution of ideas is presented as the result of experience. Pragmatism inherently is an *ex post* doctrine even though, in its most vulgar forms, it is used to justify future action.

THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY is no more than Keynes *cum growth*. Heller claims no more for it. The political corollary is continuing discretionary and precise action rather than automatic anticyclical governmental intervention. To it the Washington economists, time, and MacNamara have added the quantification of economic goals and the development of tools of economic management. Economic action has been shifted from a corrective to a propulsive orientation. In all this Heller is an excellent guide. Briskly and with ease he pilots the reader through notions such as "fiscal gap," "full-employment surplus," "monetary twist." This is required reading for the action intellectuals and an excellent refresher in contemporary economics.

Yet, in some ways the book claims too much and evades what should be central. Heller's case is based on the "miraculous achievement" of a six-year period of unprecedented prosperity and the effect of the 1964 tax cut. But this achievement is overstated. A rate of growth of 4.8 per cent per year looks miraculous only after the Eisenhower years. Matched against the 4.6 per cent of the Truman years it turns into a mere "respectable record." That the country has "learned to live with administrative deficits" seems less impressive once we remem-

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ber—as Heller made sure Kennedy would remember in his Yale speech—that the current deficit is, relative to Gross National Product, less than half of the 1945 deficit. Our tools of economic management are far less than precise when we remember, for example, that there are even considerable underestimates in the Census.

Heller notes that experience with fiscal and monetary management has made mincemeat of the Hayekian thesis that planning was the road to serfdom. Indeed, individual political rights and activities have not been curtailed—on the contrary, they have been expanded. Hayek and other *laissez-faire* advocates of his ilk never contributed much more than the perversion of materialistic determinism, which stems from a lack of faith in democractic man.

But there are some more subtle problems. A change in interest rates, for instance, changes the parameters within which decisions are made: the individual—consumer or producer—is still free to make decisions, and his political rights are unaffected. But he does not participate in—and is not aware of—the establishing of the new limits, the new rules that determine his actions. That such participation is hard to achieve is clear. That the issue is important is equally clear. What it means is well illustrated in the impact of the recently "planned tightness" in mortgage monies for home construction. What the economists refer to with unwarranted neutrality as a 1 per cent shift in rates meant here that an average white-collar worker—who postponed, freely, the buying of a house by one year—lost, freely, almost two years' pay.

ECONOMICS, LIKE POLITICS, deals with the question of who gets what, when, how, and why. Heller notes concern with poverty, the quality of life, and all the other topics so popular these days. But the matter of income distribution, which underlies all of these questions, is really never tackled. The discussion of the distributive disadvantages of the tax cut appears only in a discussion of Presidential doubts, political pressures, and the fact that "the long shadow of Galbraith had fallen across the White House with a renewed call for expenditure increases rather than tax cuts in the face of unmet needs for public services." The redistributive impact of our tenacious wedding to the mythology of "inflation" is never discussed; nowhere is there a hint that in a nation of borrowers keeping prices stable benefits only a minority of lenders. Equality of opportunity is presented as a policy *constraint*—should it not be a goal?

Who benefits from the application of the new economics? As they propel an economy where returns are on the basis of private profit, the answer is clear: the rich, the near-rich and most particularly the large corporations and their stockholders. Beginning with 1935, a quintile-by-quintile analysis of income distribution indicates a slow but continued reduction in inequality. The process stopped in 1953; for a while inequality increased. The new political economy has not changed matters—in terms of the distribution of wealth and income it is the entire community that helps those already well off.

The acceptance of the new ideology is a matter involving more than the development of a "new consensus." Hobart Rowen, in *The Free Enterprisers: Kennedy, Johnson and the Business Establishment* (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1965), traces the paradoxes in the relationship between the Administration and the business community, leaving no one in doubt that the acceptance of the new economics depended on the latter's good will.

The poor benefit also from the country's planned propulsive orientation, and surely no sane man would advocate rejection of a pattern of economic management solely because it benefits the rich still more. Yet for a full understanding of the social and economic costs, as well as benefits, involved in the policy choices, we should not lose sight of who it is that is getting more equal more quickly.

THE NEW ECONOMICS not only have taken hold, but they seem to have taken hold in precisely the framework that Heller advances. The current Congressional debate of whether to accept the Johnson-proposed tax increase reflects no theoretical or political advance over the discussions surrounding the 1964 tax cut. What is being weighed is how strong expansionary forces are and whether they will take place now or six or nine months hence. Whether price increases are politically desirable or not and what they will mean and for whom is not asked. T'is a pity.

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Richard Robbins

Whither the Jews?

THE END OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE?, by Georges Friedmann. New York: Doubleday & Co. 305 pp. $5.95.

GEORGES FRIEDMANN is a Frenchman, humanist, intellectual, distinguished sociologist, Jew. I choose the order of these modifying nouns deliberately, for Friedmann, like so many assimilated Jewish intellectuals and social scientists at work in Western Europe in the period between the world wars, had no occasion to be centrally preoccupied with such questions as the loss of faith in Judaism, the "danger" of complete assimilation, or the future of Jewish tradition and ritual. A "marginal" Jew wholly at home in France and with no direct experience of anti-Semitism, Friedmann simply went about his work in industrial sociology. For a time attracted to Communism, he thought "the Jewish question" might be resolved by revolution; but the excesses of Stalinism turned him away from the Soviet Union.

Then, in an instant, with the explosion of Nazism beyond Germany and the fall of France, all seemed different. For the Nazis it mattered not in the slightest that a Friedmann's "Jewishness" was no more, really, than a certain open and generous outlook toward life itself; he would suffer exactly the same fate as a Goldmann who went daily to the synagogue —deportation and death in the East.

Stripped of his job, subjected to the humiliating new Vichy laws, Friedmann went into the Resistance and restored his faith in France. But after the gas chambers of Auschwitz, what could restore his faith in man? And, specifically, how could a French Jew who felt a new identification with fellow-victims of the holocaust experience a revitalization of his Jewish identity?

A POSSIBLE ANSWER suggested itself in the founding of the state of Israel. In 1963 and 1964 Friedmann made two extended visits to Israel. His book is not about "the end of the Jewish people" at all—with or without question mark. It is about the state of Israel as observed by a sociologist of sensibility whose Jewishness, for all that Friedmann remains non-Zionist and *non-pratiquant,* can never be the same again. It is about Israel's "centrality" for every Jew. For the sake of a review let me be false to Friedmann's emphasis on the relatedness of his role, as detached sociologist and involved, Jewish, humanist, and first take up his sociology of Israel. As a case study of a small evolving society which is much more than simply a place of refuge for Jews driven out of other countries, *The End of the Jewish People?* is first-rate. I can think of no better book to place in the hands of a reader, Jewish or gentile, who is interested in social innovation, continuity and discontinuity over three generations of time, cultural diversity and synthesis, socialism-in-practice, the relationship of religion to state, the public-private tension in a mixed economy.

Arriving in Israel almost too highly charged, expecting Israel alone to provide very nearly a complete counterweight to the unredeemable loss of European Jewry, Friedmann soon settles down to a sympathetic, judicious, but also tough-minded view. Kaleidoscopic sketches quickly give way to closely argued chapters on the changing *kibbutz* pattern of community organization; the unique, confusing but somehow workable Histadrut joint labor-management economy; the *Sabras,* the native-born—some of them not so much Jews in the accepted sense as citizens of Israel speaking Hebrew—confident men and women who, as one informant wistfully puts it, have put aside not only the defects of their European parents but also their virtues; the paradox of a society where Orthodox Judaism occupies a special, favored place but is strongly resented by a large segment of the population which defines Israel basically in secular terms. Friedmann concludes, and I would concur, that despite such aspects of Israel which disturb those who had hoped "normalization" might bring a less boisterous, more reflective integration of nationalism and *diaspora* Jewishness—Israel, as it stands, is a buoyant, hopeful example of what can be done by a people, in the face of enormous obstacles, to build and sustain a democratic society.

Who can afford the luxury of a theoretical

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debate about Israel, given what has happened, what can still happen to Jews? For easy proof consider the recent Arab-Israeli war, and the stunning defeat inflicted on Nasser's forces by an army of bus drivers, professors, clerks, some more Jewish than Israeli, some more Israeli than Jewish, but all known to us because they were saying, "No, not this time! Not again!"

FRIEDMANN'S ACOUNT OF ISRAEL is so rewarding that it seems unfair to cavil at his other theme, the broader question of Jewish identity in the world. But apart from a vague hope that the rich, historic, creative "anxiety" of the Jewish diaspora can coexist nicely with the secure, solid, if somewhat flat "happiness" of the new Israel, Friedmann fails to come to terms with a central issue: Judaism within Jewishness. If one has left the faith of the fathers or never knew it, if one is assimilated *here* and does not wish to go to Israel to live *there,* if one does not wish, for the sake of parents or convention, to practice the forms of religion without accepting the commitment to faith—if all that, is there then a point in holding to "Jewish humanism"? Why not humanism, *point?* For millions of Jews whose Judaism is one with their Jewishness this is not a relevant question; they believe, and they live "in the community." But Georges Friedmann, as a Jew, is not one of these. It is anti-Semitism *in extremis,* it is Auschwitz and Vichy, that have brought him back, via his deep and compelling experiences in Israel, to *Jewish* humanism, to diaspora "anxiety," and Israeli "happiness." Is that enough for us? Or our children?

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(*Continued from page 2*)

tics, starts at the barrel of a gun." This remarkable sentence appeared in the course of an essay about the recent urban riots which came close to, if it did not actually reach, a celebration of the idea of "guerrilla warfare" as a solution to racial conflicts.

I wrote a little letter to the *New York Review* noting that "this is nothing but a restatement of the *Stuermer* doctrine, 'When I hear the word culture I draw my revolver.' " Kopkind then replied with a paragraph that deserves immortality:

> Do you mean morality *doesn't* grow out of a gun? Mr. Coser . . . may have new information on the eternal verities, but my own sources are not so good. It seems to me the notion of morality, as of politics and everything else, grow out of existing institutional relationships—that is, how power is organized in a society.

A MAN WHO BELIEVES there is no difference between institutional relationships and guns is, intellectually, in a bad way. A man who thinks that not only politics and morality but "everything else" (sex, for example?) grows out of "existing institutional relationships" is in an even worse way. Would Mr. Kopkind care to explain to us from which institutional relationships the Sermon on the Mount was derived?

—L. C.

Another Kind of Coalition

IN LATE NOVEMBER a previously obscure young Negro, Fred H. Brooks, testified before Senator McClellan's committee investigating "subversion" in the urban riots.

Under sharp prodding and encouragement from the skillful McClellan, the twenty-year-old Brooks declared he would shoot Mrs. Johnson "if she was my enemy." Asked whether he would take aim at the President, he answered that he would advocate that step as "a last resort."

Brooks's inane declaration, offered in the name of "Black Power," received wide publicity in our sensation-hungry newspapers. In some circles devoted to the revolution of the word, Brooks was probably applauded, and weighty explanations were offered as to the "therapeutic value of releasing pent-up violence." Among the reactionary members of Senator McClellan's committee there was undisguised pleasure, for Brooks's loud-mouthing was put to immediate use in smearing the anti-poverty program.

On our side the coalition may be in trouble; but it looks as if the nuts and the bastards find ways, on occasion, of patching up a coalition of their own.—I. H.

Crisis of Values

> *"We must develop the kind of institutions that will bring out the best in people," Richard C. Cornuelle, executive vice president of the National Association of Manufacturers, said.*
>
> *"Nowadays, you go to management conferences and hear them talk more about love than double-entry bookkeeping."*
>
> —*New York Times*, November 22, 1967

Gems from McLuhan

"ACCORDING TO MCLUHAN, *'Printing created the portable book which men could read in privacy and in isolation from others.'* Didn't Ovid have a portable book or two? And St. Augustine? Did they do all their reading in public? I hadn't thought so. Useless, actually, to raise such points. McLuhan just listens with a kind of half smile. Visual vapourings, he seems to be saying. My head was full of queries. *'The child was an invention of the 17th century; he did not exist in, say Shakespeare's day.'* Really? And He took a child and set him in the midst of them.' That was well before Shakespeare, wasn't it? And who followed the Pied Piper—gnomes or what? *'Authorship—in the sense we know it today . . . was practically unknown before the advent of print technology.'* Boccaccio, Chaucer, Horace, Sophocles, not to mention Omar Khayyám, Lao Tzu and Thomas A'Kempis—weren't they authors?

" *'The idea of detention in a closed space as a form of human punitive corrective action seems to have come in very much in the 13th and 14th centuries.'* I always thought St. Paul did a stretch in the cells. And wasn't I shown in Peking some dungeons going back much further even than that? *'There were no bedrooms up to the 17th century . . . Shakespeare*

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never knew such a place as a private bedroom.' He put Desdemona in one though, and say! that reminds me—I live in an Elizabethan house and it's always had bedrooms. *'When a new media goes around an old media the old media becomes an art form. . . . When the novel gave way to the movies the novel became an art form.'* Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Flaubert, for that matter Cervantes, not considered art in their day? Phew!"

—Malcolm Muggeridge in the *New Statesman*, September 1, 1967

Hosts of Righteousness

"Mr. Wallace is probably making more conversions among former Republicans than former Democrats. But in Madera yesterday, the prize catch was Joseph Mashburn, a funeral director and former chairman of the Madera County Democratic State Central Committee.

"Mr. Mashburn, 61 years old, headed Lyndon B. Johnson's campaign in his county in 1964. He came forward after Mr. Wallace's standard, 30-minute speech attacking Federal judges and bureaucrats, foreign aid, open housing, 'pseudo-intellectual professors,' rioters, anarchists, Communists, 'the left-wing press' and the world, generally, arrayed against 'the average working man,' and pledged Mr. Wallace his support."

—*New York Times*, November 25, 1967

Protest and Confrontation

"IT'S EASY ENOUGH to put down people who are frightened by violence as chicken, or middle class, or white liberals, or some other dehumanizing stereotype. What they are, they are. One thing they are, in my judgment, is a big majority in the peace movement, as well as an overwhelming majority of the millions that the peace movement has not—yet—involved or reached. To adopt a strategy involving 'direct action' that is explicitly or implicitly violent, to foster mass confrontations that inevitably lead to violence, and, still worse, to put down 'mere' protest as futile handwringing, is in effect to tell all these people to get lost, because we are not interested in their values or feelings.

"This is perhaps a happy thought for some 'revolutionaries,' who would prefer—and say so—a small, 'militant' movement to a large, 'compromising' one. It is not such a happy thought for the Vietnamese, since a small peace movement, no matter how militant, is not going to stop them from being bombed and burned."

—Robert Claiborne in the *Village Voice*, November 9, 1967

The Fetishism of Commodities?

"COTONOU, Dahomey—Python fetishists, a large and powerful cult here, are trying to run Roger Ruvell out of business. His business is pythons. Since he began collecting them in June he has shipped 1,265 snakes—most of them ball or rock pythons, which abound in Dahomey—to the United States.

"Now the 35-year-old American businessman, who came to Dahomey to export frozen frog legs but switched products when he was unable to get Dahomeyans to collect frogs for him, is being systematically harassed by the snake worshippers.

"His truck, a Peugeot 403 used on collecting trips, has been impounded by the customs office, the head of which is a prominent fetishist. The villagers who used to collect the handsome, rare reptiles for him have been told that if they do business with him the python spirits will withdraw their blessings from them. . . ."

—*New York Times*, November 25, 1967

Yeah, But How About Onion Roll?

"I went to a dance which was started off with the guests being given a label bearing the name of half a well-known dish. You had to find the person with the other half. For instance, fish went with chips, roast beef with Yorkshire pudding, and so on. My label was egg, and I found a boy labelled bacon, but when I spoke to him he said, 'Let's have a look round first.' Then he went off with a girl labelled liver and I was left with nobody except a boy labelled onions, which certainly didn't go with egg."

—Letter in *Woman's Mirror*, England

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